BLUEFIN TUNA: SHOULD HAVE BEEN CAREFUL WHAT YOU ASKED FOR--BECAUSE YOU GOT IT

 

Before I begin getting into this post, let me make one thing completely clear:  There have been a lot of bluefin tuna swimming off the East Coast of the United States over the past few years. 

What that means with respect to the health of the bluefin stock isn’t completely clear, as bluefin tuna are an extremely difficult fish to assess, particularly because there are two recognized stocks, which spawn in the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, respectively, although but individuals from both stocks regularly cross the Atlantic to feed.

Because of the difficulty of assessing the two stocks, and the fact that the stocks intermingle on the feeding grounds, scientists at the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas no longer manage the two stocks separately.  In 2022, ICCAT adopted a “Management Procedure” which

“links eastern and western Total Allowable Catch (TACs) under one management framework, providing joint management advice, and requires the Executive Summaries for the East and West [bluefin tuna]…to have common or closely related sections.  The [management procedure] frees the assessment process from having to provide annual TAC advice and allows the stock assessment process to return to its traditional strengths which are to provide a determination of relative stock status…”

Thus, the management procedure no longer attempts to determine whether either stock is overfished.  However, it does still seek to determine whether overfishing is occurring.  According to the 2024-2025 ICCAT report, overfishing is not occurring in either the eastern or the western stock.  However, because the stocks are of very different sizes, permitted eastern and western stock landings are very different as well.  Thus, the total allowable catch for the large eastern stock is 40,570 metric tons, while the total allowable catch for the much smaller western stock is just 2,726 metric tons, less than 7 percent of what may be removed from its eastern counterpart.

The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, often referred to by the acronym “ICCAT,” is empowered to assign bluefin tuna quotas to each member jurisdiction.  Because the eastern stock is so much larger than the western stock, some of the nations that fish in the eastern Atlantic Ocean and/or the Mediterranean Sea have been assigned quotas that are substantially larger than the entire total allowable catch for the western stock, which western stock quota must be shared among multiple fishing nations.  For example, Spain’s quota is 6,784 metric tons, nearly 2 ½ times the size of the whole western TAC, while France isn’t far behind with a 6,694 metric ton quota, followed by Italy at 5,283 metric tons.

Of the nations that fish on the western stock, the United States receives what is by far the largest quota, 1,316.14 metric tons, roughly twice that received by the nations with the next-largest quotas, Japan (664.52 metric tons) and Canada (543.65 metric tons).  

The United States then breaks its quota down into various categories, with 54 percent assigned to the commercial General Category, which fishes with hook and line or harpoons, 4.5 percent going to the Harpoon Category, 15.9% assigned to the Longline Category, and 0.1 percent to the tiny commercial Trap Category.  The Angling Category receives 22.6 percent, or 297.4 metric tons, of the overall quota, with that further broken down into 134.1 metric tons for the School Bluefin category (27 to 47 inches curved fork length), 154.1 metric tons for the Large School/Small Medium category (47 to 73 inches CFL), and 9.2 metric tons for the Trophy category of over 73 inches.  All of those subcategories are further broken down into regions.  In addition, the National Marine Fisheries Service maintains 2.9 percent, or 38.2 metric tons, of its overall quota as a reserve, to be assigned should any category exceed its quota.

But while all those details are nice, the important thing to remember is that if any nation, including the United States, exceeds its ICCAT-assigned bluefin quota, that nation must pay it back pound-for-pound in the following season.  And if the same nation exceeds its quota for a second consecutive year, then ICCAT can compel that nation to pay back not 100 percent of the excess poundage, but 125 percent, as an incentive to keep landings in line.

The United States went over its ICCAT-assigned bluefin tuna quota last year by nine percent.

Most, but not all, of the categories exceeded their quotas.  In the commercial fishery, the General Category was over by 8 percent, the Harpoon Category by 12.  The Longline Category was under by 33 percent, while the Trap Category didn’t land any bluefin at all.  But the Angling Category clearly had the biggest overages, with the overall category over by 52 percent, School Bluefin over by 14 percent, Large School/Small Medium bluefin over by 83 percent, and the Trophy subcategory over by a startling 102 percent.  

Thus, when the National Marine Fisheries Service has to allocate its pound-for-pound payback among all of the separate categories, which will happen later this year, the Angling Category naturally and deservedly will probably take the greatest percentage reduction, because it also had, by far, the greatest percentage overages in 2024.

But that put NMFS in a quandary because, as everyone agrees, there are a lot of bluefin swimming off the East Coast of the United States.

The agency had to put together a set of recreational regulations that struck a balance between providing anglers with a viable fishery, while at the same time preventing those anglers from exceeding their 2025 quota.

And with that understanding, I’ll get on with the primary point of this post.

When I attended the Highly Migratory Species Advisory Panel meeting last May, NMFS had already announced that it would maintain the so-called “default regulations” that set a one-fish bag limit for all recreational vessels, including charter and head boats, and a size limit of 27 to 73 inches, curved fork length, for the 2025 fishing season.

In theory, those regulations were to stay in effect until the end of the year but, at the Advisory Panel meeting, NMFS’ fisheries managers made it very clear that, with the number of bluefin available, there was no way that the season was going to last that long.  

Based on the previous years’ landings, the managers predicted that the recreational season would probably be closed sometime in late summer, sometime between the very end of July and the beginning of September, depending on how quickly the Angling Category quota was filled, and also depending on how many bluefin had already been landed off the South Atlantic coast, a figure that hadn’t yet been calculated.

As I noted in an earlier post, a lot of people were unhappy with NMFS’ preferred bluefin tuna regulations.  That was particularly true of the charter and party boat operators, who argued that customers wouldn’t book any trips if the one-fish bag limit remained in place.  

That led to the managers asking a very important question:  Was it more important for the for-hire industry to be able to kill a second fish, or to maintain a longer season?

The question didn’t seem to generate much conversation during the Advisory Panel meeting, but maybe NMFS got a lot of comments once the meeting was over, because on June 3, it published a rule in the Federal Register that adjusted the Angling Category retention limits, limiting harvest to School bluefin (27 to 47 inches CFL), and prohibiting the landings of Large School and Small Medium tuna, while maintaining the one-fish bag limit for private vessels, but increasing the bag limit to two School bluefin for vessels in the Charter/Headboat Category.  NMFS clearly explained that it adopted the new rule because

“Given fishery performance in recent years and the high availability of [bluefin tuna] on the fishing grounds, it is very likely that under the default daily retention limits, which allows fishermen to land heavier-weight large school/small medium [bluefin tuna] the recreational fishery could reach the available 2025 Angling category quota and subquotas relatively early in the season resulting in a premature closure of the recreational [bluefin tuna] fisheries.  As such, NMFS believes adjusting the daily retention limits to the levels established in this action, which limits landings to lower-weight school sized [bluefin tuna], would assist in extending the time it takes to harvest the Angling category quota and subquotas…  [emphasis added]”

So, NMFS did what it could to extend the recreational season, while still managing to give the charter and head boats the second fish that they wanted.  And so, of course, the agency was excoriated for trying to do the right thing.

On the Water magazine ran an article that began,

“Is it worth the time—and the fuel bill—to run offshore to the tuna grounds if the most your crew can bring home is one small bluefin tuna?,”

which went on to quote Glenn Hughes, president of the American Sportfishing Association, the biggest tackle industry trade group, who complained,

“We’re disappointed in NOAA’s revised 2025 retention limits for the bluefin tuna Angling category because of its associated economic impacts.  These restrictions threaten revenue, jobs, and fishing opportunities for the sportfishing industry—affecting anglers, charter operators, and coastal businesses.”

Another article, which appeared in the publication Fishing Tackle Retailer, was written by Tom Fucini, the Northeast Sales Representative for the Folsom Corporation, a major fishing tackle importer/wholesaler.  Fucini whined that

“This [regulatory] update brings a major reduction in both the number and size of fish that recreational anglers can harvest,”

observed that

“In many parts of the region the Bluefin bite in recent years has consisted of predominantly 50-70″ class fish—these fish are ineligible for harvest in 2025,”

and warned tackle shop owners that

“Over the past few seasons, Northeast Anglers have seen a “Tuna Boom,” with many new anglers getting into the fishery…These new limits threaten to slow that momentum.”

He called the new bluefin regulations

“a dramatic step backward,”

and after leveling additional criticisms at NMFS, told readers that

“If you’d like to voice your concerns about how these changes will affect retailers, charter boats, and manufacturers in the fishing industry, you can contact NOAA directly, [emphasis omitted]”

Given NMFS’ clear warning that allowing anglers to kill the Large School and Small Medium fish would lead to a “premature closure” of the bluefin fishery “relatively early in the season,” such criticism of NMFS School Bluefin-only rule can only be viewed as the industry effectively saying that

“We would rather have a very short season, and the ability to harvest the larger bluefin, than have a long season but be restricted to only School-sized fish.”

The people writing those articles were certainly sophisticated enough to know and understand the regulations and, more importantly, understand the consequences of their decisions.

 And they must have made some convincing arguments to NMFS, and inspired others to do the same, because on June 12, just 9 days after the School bluefin-only regulations were released, NMFS issued a new rule stating that as of July 1, all recreational vessels, including for-hire boats, will be able to retain one 27 to 73-inch bluefin per day, and boats in the Charter/Headboat category would be able to keep a second, School bluefin as well.

The rule was even more liberal than the default regulations, because of the second for-hire fish, and thus assured that the fishery would be closed that much sooner.

Despite the certain early closure, the angling press embraced the June 12 rule.

The Cranston [Rhode Island] Herald blared that

“Bluefin tuna regs change for the better,”

and made the complimentary comment

“Hats off to Rick Bellavance, President of the RI Party & Charter Boat Association and Chair of the New England Fishery Management Council as well as Mike Pierdinock [President of the Stellwagen Bank Charter Boat Association] for advocating for a larger bluefin size.”

Similar sentiments were voiced by The Fisherman magazine, which announced that

“NOAA (Thankfully) Revises Bluefin Tuna Regs.”

But now that the bill for those revised regulations has come due, in the form of an early closed season, no one is making happy comments any more.

An article in Anglers Journal announced the August 12 closure, and quotes an American Sportfishing Association email that uses the same language it used to oppose the School bluefin-only rules last June:

“This closure threatens revenue, jobs, and fishing opportunities for the sportfishing industry—affecting anglers, charter operators, and coastal businesses.”

Apparently to the ASA, the closure was worth a pro forma whine, but not worth thinking up a new comment.

Salt Water Sportsman was resigned about the closure, but apparently didn’t care enough about the issue to research what was really going on.  It wrote,

“The closure should come as no surprise to anyone keeping up with the fishery.  During a banner 2024 bluefin season off the coast of the Northeast, scads of school-size bluefins (27-47 inches) podded up close to shore, where private anglers and charter captains experienced a blufin [sic] boom and over-ran the quota by at least 50 percent according to NOAA’s estimates.

“In response, NOAA revised retention limits.  For 2025, private vessels with a highly migratory species permit were allowed just one school-sized bluefin tuna; charter boats and headboats were allowed two.  No retention of fish longer than 47 inches was allowed without a commercial license…

“…Apparently reduced retention limits had little effect in deterring anglers from fishing.  The season has been shut down a little more than two months after it began.”

There was no mention of the Large School/Small Medium bluefin that were at the heart of the issue and the overage.  With anglers getting such flawed information from the hook-and-bullet press, it’s not surprising that they’re often confused about how the fishery management process works, and so easily manipulated by those with personal or organizational agendas.

One of the biggest red herrings are angling industry voices who place the blame on the United States’ ICCAT quota, arguing that it represents only a very small percentage of overall bluefin tuna landings.  

What such industry advocates—whether charter boat captains or representatives of the fishing tackle industry—don’t tell recreational fishermen is that when they compare, say, the Tunisian quota of around 3,000 metric tons with the US quota, they’re comparing two very different things.  Tunisia fishes on the eastern stock of bluefin, where a 3,000 metric ton quota represents far less than 10 percent of the total allowable catch, while the United States fishes on the western stock, where the total allowable catch—for every fishing nation—is, at 2,726 metric tons, and the United States' quota of 1,316.14 metric tons is about equal to the combined quotas of the other five nations that fish on that stock.

But somehow, being able to harvest half of the entire western stock is not enough for these folks, and they are holding out hope that the United States is going to go to the next ICCAT meeting and convince Canada, Japan, and/or Mexico to give up some of their fishermen’s quota, just so United States anglers can catch a little more.

The bottom line is that a quota increase just isn’t likely to occur.

About the best we can hope for is that, when a new stock assessment is released in 2026 or 2027, it will suggest that everyone’s quotas can be increased, and that such rising tide will float the United States’ anglers’ boat along with everyone else’s.

Or course, the next stock assessment might just as easily suggest that a reduction in quotas is needed.  We won’t know until the assessment is released.

In the meantime, there’s little doubt that some anglers, for-hire captains, and tackle industry figures will continue to complain about the early bluefin closure, and will blame NMFS, maybe ICCAT, and anyone else they can think of for the fishery being shut down.

But it’s pretty sure that the one group of folks that they won’t blame is themselves, even though they were the ones who insisted that NMFS allow anglers to target and land the Large School and Small Medium bluefin.

They’ll never admit that NMFS did just what they wanted—gave them just what they asked for—and that they failed to consider the implications of their request before they made it.

But when you get what you ask for, and then decide you don’t like it, it’s nobody’s fault but your own.

 

 

 

 

 

STRIPED BASS REBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE HEADWINDS

 

Striped bass are arguably the single most important recreational fish species on the Atlantic Coast of the United States--and probably on any coast of this nation.  Last year, anglers took approximately 15.6 million trips primarily targeting striped bass, dwarfing the number of trips primarily targeting other popular sport fish such as summer flounder (9.1 million), red drum (8.9 million), spotted seatrout (3.9 million), scup (2.8 million), or black sea bass (1.5 million).

Given that fact, one might expect that everyone, and particularly angler-dependent businesses, would be eager to rebuild the currently overfished striped bass stock, and to do it as quickly as possible.  However, that has not been the case.  There are significant headwinds hampering the striped bass rebuilding process, being generated in part by advocates for the commercial fishing industry, but also, illogically, by individuals who would have much to gain from greater striped bass abundance.

Consider a letter sent to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board in advance of last week’s meeting.  Submitted by a Rhode Island charter boat captain, its contents are...somewhat puzzling.

After a brief introduction, the letter begins

“Regarding Striped Bass management, I am concerned that the poor recruitment that has been reported over the past several years is being influenced by management decisions that are designed to protect as much [spawning stock biomass] as possible.  I would like the board to consider the possibility that the large [spawning stock biomass] we currently have is actually limiting spawning triggers within the stock.  We have had a variety of environmental conditions over the past 6 years, yet no real change in the spawning output.  Maybe something else is in play, like the stock does not feel compelled to spawn due to excessive [spawning stock biomass] in the water.”

It’s hard to get so much wrong in just one paragraph, but let’s take things a point at a time.

First, we have to point out that the references to “the large [spawning stock biomass] we currently have,” and “excessive [spawning stock biomass] in the water [emphasis added]” are completely divorced from reality.  The striped bass stock is currently overfished, which means that far from being “large,” or even “excessive,” the spawning stock biomass has been badly depleted, and has fallen below the threshold that biologists have established to better ensure long-term sustainability.

Thus, the assertion that striped bass recruitment failure could be based on an overly-abundant spawning stock necessarily fails, as it’s based on a false premise.

But even if that was not the case, a search of the literature failed to turn up evidence that striped bass spawning is, in any way, density-dependent, although the survival and fitness of juvenile striped bass probably is affected by the density of the juvenile population. 

But what is really shocking is how that paragraph ends:

“I would ask the board to consider giving a management strategy that reduces the [spawning stock biomass] a chance.  We know a low [spawning stock biomass] can produce healthy year classes so the risk of testing this hypothesis seems limited.  [emphasis added]”

Let that sink in for a moment.  This particular charter boat captain is suggesting that the Management Board abandon its years-long effort to rebuild the overfished striped bass stock, which is finally showing signs of crawling over the biomass threshold and reach the point where it is no longer overfished—but will still be well below its target level—and allow the stock to decline deeper into “overfished” territory, even though that stock has experienced spawning failure in three of its four most important spawning areas—Maryland, Virginia, and the Delaware River—and, if the 2025 data indicates another poor spawn this year, will experience failure in the Hudson River as well.  

He justifies such approach by saying that the stock “can” produce healthy year classes even when spawning stock biomass is low.

That latter assertion is true.

But there is a big difference between “can” and “will,” particularly in the face of a changing environment and warming Bay, and conditions that are not the same as they were the last time a relative handful of females produced an exceptional spawn.

Which may be why the commenter’s next step was to effectively discount the importance of the Chesapeake data by claiming that

“the Chesapeake Bay is not as influencing as it was 20 years ago.  In Southern New England, we regularly see smaller fish from 10-25 inches and I believe they are coming from other spawning areas.  There are good numbers of fish entering the fishery each year that are not considered in the current assessment model.”

Of course, what the commenter doesn’t suggest is just where the fish that he sees might come from, if not from the known spawning areas.  He claims that fish “[enter] the fishery each year that are not considered in the assessment model,” but doesn’t explain how he knows that to be true.

Did he, perhaps, perform genetic testing on those fish, to determine their place of origin?  Not that I know.  Or did he, perhaps, conduct biological surveys in candidate rivers, to determine where those “other spawning areas” might be?  Again, not to my knowledge.

However, other people have done such things, and their conclusions should come to no one’s surprise.

In one case, researchers in New Hampshire did a genetic study, sampling 5,400 striped bass, caught in 2018 and 2019, in the waters between Long Island, New York and Portland, Maine.  They found that somewhere between 80 and 88 percent of all striped bass sampled originated in either the Chesapeake Bay or the Delaware River (the genetics of the fish from the two regions are too similar to be reliably distinguished), between 10 and 18 percent of the bass were spawned in the Hudson River, while just two percent came from either North Carolina’s Roanoke River or , just possibly, from the “other spawning areas” cited in the commenter’s letter.

Two percent isn’t very much, while the 80 to 88 percent of the fish being of Chesapeake origin suggest that, contrary to the commenter’s assertions, the Chesapeake by is still “as influencing as it was 20 years ago.”

If we look at the samples unique to the commenters home grounds off Rhode Island, we find that, in 2018, 86.8 percent of the Rhode Island bass sampled were spawned in the Chesapeake, and only 1.6 percent in the Roanoke or in “unknown” waters.  In 2019, the Chesapeake share increased to 88.8 percent, while the Roanoke/unknown percentage fell to 0.9 percent, very strongly suggesting that the commenter’s assertions have no factual basis at all.

Still, the myth of striped bass spawning at unknown sites has spread pervasively throughout the for-hire community, and is often wrongly asserted at public hearings.  In response to such claims made during the hearings on Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, which were held in December 2023 and January 2024, and particularly in response to claims that Connecticut’s Housatonic River had become a major spawning ground, I contacted Dr. Justin Davis of Connecticut’s Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, to get his view on the matter.  His comments left no room for doubt:

“I think it is pretty easy to dismiss that striped bass spawn in the Housatonic or Thames Rivers.  The head of tide extends almost up to the most downstream dams in both systems—there’s very little freshwater habitat available below those dams—just not suitable spawning habitat for striped bass.”

Dr. Davis said that striped bass probably do spawn—although perhaps not every year—in the Connecticut River, as river herring surveys conducted in that river have come across both juvenile and Year 1 bass, along with females bearing ripe eggs and males with ripe, flowing milt.  However, with respect to both the Connecticut and other possible, “unknown” spawning sites in the northeast, Dr. Davis observed,

“While I agree that there are coastal rivers where striped bass spawn where no one is doing a scientific survey to produce annual indices of [young-of-the-year] relative abundance in those rivers, and therefore trends in YOY production in those rivers are not incorporated in the assessment—but—it is not then a logical step to assume there is some body of striped bass out there on the coast that is somehow “invisible” to the assessment and therefore the management process.  The striped bass spawned in those rivers will leave those rivers and recruit to the coastal stock—and when they do—they will be caught by recreational anglers, they will be harvested by commercial harvesters, and they will be captured by the many scientific surveys operating along the coast—and all of this information feeds into the assessment to produce estimates of [spawning stock biomass], fishing mortality, relative strength of various year classes, etc.  It’s a fallacy to assume that just because we don’t have a YOY survey in a given river, that somehow the fish produced in that river are never “counted” in the stock assessment over the course of their lifetimes.  [emphasis added]”

So once again, the Rhode Island charter boat operator/commenter based his position on a false premise.

The problem is that, while he doesn’t seem to grasp, or doesn’t choose to grasp, generally accepted striped bass science, he is nonetheless influential, either heading or playing a major role in no less than two for-hire industry organizations.  Thus, he has substantial opportunity to propagate his erroneous views, and have them accepted by other members of the for-hire organizations.  In addition, he has ready access to, and apparently the ear of, the fishery managers in his home state, and seems able to convince them of the need to elevate his and his organizations’ priorities when the Management Board meets.

Such industry voices, scattered along the coast from Virginia to Maine, create a substantial headwind, that makes it far more difficult to convince the Management Board to adopt needed conservation measures.

Unfortunately, headwinds are also generated by members of the Management Board itself, who have their own agendas and, more importantly, a vote that can push their state in the wrong direction, and are typically cast against the interests of the striped bass and the angling public.

We saw that at last week’s meeting, when John Clark, a Delaware fisheries manager, argued that the commercial striped bass quota should not be cut, and that all of the burden of rebuilding the striped bass, should be placed on the shoulders of the recreational sector, because commercial fishermen have already seen their quota cut by 40 or 50 percent since 2014.  Fortunately, another fisheries manager, Nicola Meserve of Massachusetts, rose to remind both Mr. Clark and the rest of the Management Board that the recreational sector has experienced its own substantial cuts, going from a 2-fish bag limit and 28 inch minimum size—with no cap on the maximum size of the bass that might be retained—to a one-fish bag and narrow, 28- to 31-inch slot over the same period.

We saw it at last week’s meeting, too, when Maryland fisheries manager Michael Luisi suggested that anglers might be able to avoid unpopular—and unenforceable, and probably ineffective—season closures in which even catch-and-release is outlawed, if they would be willing to lower the biomass target and threshold—moving the goalposts in, to make it easier to claim that the stock was fully rebuilt, while not coincidentally increasing the number of dead fish available to Maryland’s commercial and for-hire fleets, which Luisi has long done his best to protect, even if doing so meant taking fish away from Maryland’s anglers.

It wasn’t the first time that Luisi has tried to get the reference points lowered to increase the kill, and certainly won’t be the last.

But even before last week’s meeting, we saw Management Board members’ hostility to striped bass conservation, striped bass anglers, and particularly catch-and-release anglers, emerge.

We saw that at the October 2024 Management Board meeting, where New Jersey’s Legislative Proxy, Adam Nowalsky, tried to discredit the newly-released stock assessment update, and find a way to distort the data to suggest that the last six years of poor recruitment were somehow not as bad as they seemed:

“What I’m just looking for is some other way to possibly interpret this information that would indicate that there is perhaps more stability in the fishery with regard to recruitment…

“..if you didn’t have some of those super high years, that recruitment mean would be lower, and maybe you would have a different interpretation of recruitment…”

So yes, let’s throw all of the better years out of the time series, and keep all of the bad ones.  Then when we calculate the long-term average, it will be lower, and maybe current recruitment won’t be below-average any more...

Nowalsky’s contempt for the conservation-minded angler comes out most clearly in a comment that he made at the February 2025 Board meeting where, in response to anglers’ opposition to no-target closures that even outlaw the catch-and-release fishery, he said that

“Obviously, the no-targeting aspect is something that has generated a lot of discussion amongst people who have for a long time advocated for conservation at all cost, but are now pulling back from that stance to some degree, when they are faced with being directly affected by the need for conservation.”

No, the opposition to no-target closures arises out of the fact that the Law Enforcement Committee recognizes that they are practically unenforceable, and has listed them dead-last on a preference list of 27 possible management measures.  But Nowalsky, the same guy who was willing to cook the recruitment books by leaving out the highest-recruitment years, chose to make it a matter of personal spite. 

Believe it or not, some Management Board members really do think that way.

And some just seem to believe that recreational fishermen, particularly those who practice catch-and-release, should sit on the bottom rung of management priorities.  

Thus, Emerson Hasbrouck, New York’s Governor’s Appointee, someone who has supported putting all of the conservation burden on the shoulders of recreational anglers, while leaving the commercial quota unchanged, and who actively supports giving for-hire boats special regulations not available to those fishing from private boats or who fish from shore, also tried to convince the Management Board to devalue anglers’ comments on Addendum II, saying, at the January 2024 Board meeting,

“For most of the written comments and comments received at the public hearing.  The majority of those commenters, again written and again at the public meetings, were recreational fishermen primarily?  Is that correct?..

“However, on our own [Advisory Panel] we have a more balanced representation between recreational anglers, the for-hire industry and commercial fishermen, so that provides us with a more balanced representation.  As I recall from [Ms. Emilie Franke’s] presentation, the [Advisory Panel] and the majority, actually twice as many, I think, members of the [Advisory Panel] supported Option C [to give the for-hire fleet special privileges not enjoyed by other anglers] for the ocean fishery.  There was also overwhelming support for Option, I think it was, Option A, status quo for the commercial reduction.”

So yes, let’s disregard the public comment with respect to those options, give the for-hires special privileges that will allow them to catch more fish, make no reductions in the commercial quota, and place all of the burden on the shoulders of the shore-based and private boat anglers, because one, unfortunately stacked, panel said that they wanted things that way.

Having such people sitting on the Management Board creates a very big headwind, that isn’t easy to overcome.

Still, if we are to rebuild the striped bass stock and manage it for long-term stability, and—and this is not unimportant, although less important than conserving the stock—also preserve the interests of recreational fishermen who, in 2024, were responsible for 84 percent of striped bass fishing mortality and, here in New York, accounted for over 99 percent of all directed striped bass fishing trips, thus generating the lion’s share of the fishery's social and economic benefits, the headwinds must be overcome.

And the only way to do that is putting in the work and the time.

We have to show up at the hearings, and bring others with us, and let the managers know what we think.  Grab some friends and offer to buy them a beer after the meeting.  Believe me, by then, you'll all need more than one.

If we can’t show up at the hearings, we need to, at a minimum, submit written comments that protect the bass’ interests, and also our own.

Don't doubt that the headwinds will be fierce, and it will take substantial effort to defeat them.  But if enough people face them together, they can be overcome.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

STRIPED BASS: ADDENDUM III APPROVED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT

 

On Wednesday, August 6, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board approved Draft Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass for public comment.

It’s not an easy document to characterize.

If the assumptions made by the Striped Bass Technical Committee, on which the Draft Addendum is based, are correct, Addendum III has a 50 percent probability rebuilding the spawning stock biomass to its target level by the end of 2029, which in itself is a good thing.  However, there’s no guarantee that those assumptions are right—the one that assumes that recruitment will return to 2008-2023 levels may be particularly suspect—and, even if recovery occurs, spawning stock biomass is likely to decline again unless recruitment stays at 2008-2023 levels going forward.  (It’s probably important to note that recruitment in the years 2008 through 2023 constitutes the “low recruitment scenario,” and not historical striped bass recruitment levels; however, striped bass recruitment has been so poor in every year since 2019 that returning to “low” recruitment levels would be a marked improvement from where we are now.)

So from the striped bass’ perspective, the draft Addendum doesn’t look too bad, although it would have been nice had the Management Board opted for a 60 percent probability of rebuilding.  But that would have involved a larger mortality reduction—18 percent as opposed to 12—and there didn’t seem to be much of an appetite for that in the room.  As Massachusetts fishery manager Nicola Meserve observed, the 12 percent reduction was seen as striking a balance between needed conservation and economic concerns.

From a striped bass fisherman’s perspective, though, the draft Addendum has a few problems, most notably the possibility of closed seasons where even catch-and-release would be outlawed, and options that would give special privileges to the for-hire fleet, and relegate shore-based and private boat anglers to a sort of second-class status.

But even from that fisherman’s perspective, the draft Addendum could have been worse.  The big thing to remember when considering the document is that, at least in the so-called “ocean” recreational fishery, which encompasses the entire recreational striped bass fishery outside of the Chesapeake Bay, managers already have, for practical purposes, gone as far as they can reasonably go with restrictive bag and size limits. 

That means that the entire 12 percent recreational reduction is going to have to be accomplished with some sort of closed season, and closed seasons are a completely different sort of regulation from size and bag limits.  For no matter how restrictive size and bag limits might be, they still allow people to fish, and they at least hold out some hope that an angler who wants to take home a bass might, with luck, be able to do so.  But a closed season completely prohibits any kind of harvest, and a no-target closed season even outlaws catch-and-release fishing.  Such prohibitions can have a much greater impact on angling effort, and so can do much more serious harm to angling-related businesses than mere size and bag limits.  Thus, fishery managers tend to exercise far more caution when putting such closures in place.

 

Such concerns certainly played a role in the Management Board’s decisions, going back at least as far as last December, when managers decided not to adopt any new restrictions for the 2025 season.  To understand how they may have affected yesterday’s Management Board meeting, it is probably best to take a chronological look at events, including some of the motions that shaped the Draft Addendum and some of the comments made in opposition and in support.

The draft Addendum III that the Plan Development Team presented to the Management Board was a big, unwieldy document that just about everyone realized would have to be cut down before it went out to public comment, if the public was to have any chance to understand what the Board was trying to do.

The first action taken on the Draft Addendum, as I already noted, was limiting the probability of timely rebuilding the stock to 50 percent.  It was not a particularly controversial decision, with only Connecticut voting against it and the National Marine Fisheries Service and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service opting to abstain.

The second motion, made by Ms. Meserve and seconded by David Sikorski, Maryland’s Legislative Proxy, inspired more debate.  It was,

“Move to remove in Section 3.4 Option C (0% commercial reduction and -14% recreational reduction)”

In explaining why she wished to remove the option, Ms. Meserve stated that she didn’t believe that recreational fishermen should have to shoulder the entire burden of rebuilding the stock, but that such burden should be shared by everyone participating in the striped bass fishery.  She also noted that she didn’t want the issue of who should be responsible for rebuilding the stock distracting commenters from other, more important issues in the Draft Addendum.

Predictably, Delaware fishery manager John Clark opposed the motion, arguing that while recreational reductions are based on estimates and predictions of future landings levels, which might or might not be accurate,

“Every pound we take away from the commercial fishery is revenue we take away from our commercial fishermen.”

He argued that, since 2014, the commercial quota had been cut by 40 to 50 percent, a comment that brought a response from Ms. Meserve, who noted that the recreational fishermen had also suffered major reductions during that time, going from an ocean limit of two fish per day and a 28-inch minimum size to a 1-fish bag limit and 28- to 31-inch slot size.  Clark answered by saying

“We have very small-scale fisheries in Delaware.  There are guys depending on this income,”

but his response apparently wasn’t convincing enough.  When the vote on the motion was taken, the motion passed, with eight jurisdictions in favor (Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia, and North Carolina), six opposed (New York, New Jersey, Delaware, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, Maryland, and Virginia), and the two federal agencies abstaining.

The vote didn’t completely close the door on the commercial fishery taking a smaller cut than the recreational sector.  When the Management Board meets in October, it could, for example, cut the commercial quota by six percent and recreational landings by 12, thus weakening Addendum III and making it slightly less likely that the stock will recover on time.  However, no such option will appear in the Draft Addendum, and we can hope that the Board ultimately sees the fundamental fairness of everyone making an equal contribution toward rebuilding the stock.

At that point, what is arguably the most controversial issue in the Draft Addendum was addressed—so-called “no-target” closed seasons, when even catch and release would be illegal.

Martin Gary, the Director of the New York Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Division, opened the discussion by asking whether there were any other available tools for reducing release mortality, and then raised the key issue:  He asked whether no-target restrictions were, as a practical matter, enforceable.  

His question was answered by Lt. Jeff Mercer, of the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management's Division of Law Enforcement, who responded that

“We believe that no-targeting closures would be very difficult to enforce,”

noted that such no-target closures ranked dead last on the Law Enforcement Committee’s list of 27 potential management tools, and observed that, even though no-targeting closures have been in place in federal waters since the mid-1980s, to his knowledge no one has ever been convicted of violating such closure unless they also had a striped bass in their possession.

Mr. Gary noted that he had spoken with New York law enforcement officers who said that, as a practical matter, they can’t write tickets unless an angler had a fish in possession. 

He also made a motion which read,

“Move to remove no-targeting closure options for the Ocean.”

He limited his motion to closures of the ocean fishery because he wanted to respect the previous actions of Chesapeake Bay jurisdictions, which enacted no-target closures specifically to deal with the Bay's extreme summer conditions of hot, hypoxic water, even though, when he was executive director of the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, he advised against the PRFC adopting such closures, which were implemented despite his advice.

Mr. Gary’s motion was seconded by Matt Gates, a Connecticut fisheries manager.

At that point, the debate began.

Opposition to Mr. Gary’s motion came from the usual sources—Board members such as New Jersey fisheries manager Joseph Cimino, New York Governor’s Appointee Emerson Hasbrouck, and Maryland fisheries manager Michael Luisi—individuals who have historically favored the catch-and-kill component of the recreational fishery, and cast jaundiced eyes on catch-and-release anglers.

Mr. Cimino argued that

“This is about winning hearts and minds,”

apparently assuming that anglers can be convinced not to target bass during the closures.  He argued that no-target closures were the only way to reduce release mortality and, demonstrating a remarkable lack of concern for the realities of fisheries management, said that he didn’t like the enforcement—or unenforceability—of no-target closures bearing on the decision of whether such closures should be adopted.  He also expressed the opinion that the no-target closure in federal waters resulted in a substantial decrease in anglers fishing for striped bass there, an opinion that might change should he ever take a trip out of Brielle or Atlantic Highlands late in the fall, and see all of the anglers “fishing for bluefish” more than three miles from shore, and just catching all of those pesky striped bass “by accident.”

Mr. Hasbrouck’s comments were similar.  After first stating that his views on the matter had nothing to do with components of the for-hire fishery—components he always seems to support by voting for sector separation and other proposals that benefit the for-hire industry at the expense of private anglers—he observed that on a substantial majority of recreational striped bass trips, no fish are retained and that half of the recreational fishing mortality is caused by fish that don’t survive release, and so argued that a no-harvest closure would only address half of the problem.  He admitted that no-target closures were not enforceable, but observed that other rules currently in place, such as those requiring circle hooks and banning the use of gaffs, were also virtually impossible to enforce (although why adding to the list of unenforceable management measures would be a good thing, he didn’t explain).  Like Mr. Cimino, he expressed a naïve belief that anglers would obey an unenforceable rule, even if that meant that they had little or nothing else to fish for.

But it was Mr. Luisi who made the most diabolical opposition comment of all, suggesting that there might be room for a compromise, if catch-and-release anglers would be willing to accept a trade-off where, in exchange for the Board abandoning no-target closures, the biological reference points for striped bass would be revised to lower the spawning stock biomass target and threshold (and by so doing, although it wasn’t explicitly stated, allowing more fish to be killed).

There is a reason that I often refer to the New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland delegations as the “Axis of Evil” when it comes to striped bass…

But Mr. Gary’s motion had supporters, too.  William Hyatt, Connecticut’s Governor’s Appointee, noted that no-target closures would likely lead to “gamesmanship” that would adversely impact recreational fisheries data.  He felt that such closures would lead to anglers providing false information on what they were targeting on any given trip, and to fail to report striped bass caught and released during a no-targeting closure.  Doug Grout, New Hampshire’s Governor’s Appointee, noted that release mortality could be reduced by other means, circle hooks being but one example, a point also made by Ms. Meserve, who noted that Massachusetts was currently engaged in research on gear modifications that could lead to better striped bass survival.

At that point, Adam Nowalsky, New Jersey’s Legislative Proxy and a long-time critic of both the catch-and-release fishery and many striped bass conservation efforts, rose to put a motion to amend on the table which read,

“Move to remove no-targeting closure options for the Ocean with the assumption that striped bass only trips are eliminated.”

Probably to no one’s surprise, it was seconded by Mr. Hasbrouck.

It was a terribly worded motion, and a lot of people, both in the audience and on the Board, appeared to have some trouble understanding what it meant, although it was finally made clear that the motion referred to one of the two assumptions that the Plan Development Team made when crafting the no-target options.

In crafting those options, the PDT asked themselves the question, “What will anglers do if they can’t target striped bass?”  One possibility is that they stop fishing until the closure ends; the other is that they switch their angling effort to another species, but might incidentally encounter striped bass as bycatch.  The former assumption would lead to a shorter closure, as no striped bass release mortality would occur; the latter would lead to some release mortality, and so require a longer closure.

Mr. Nowalsky’s motion would eliminate the no-target closure options that were based on the assumption that, if people couldn’t legally target bass, they wouldn’t fish for anything at all.

It wouldn’t solve the enforceability problem, and it wouldn’t do anything to improve angler compliance, but it was presented as a compromise of sorts, and as such had significant support. Nine jurisdictions (Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, Virginia and, surprisingly, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service) voted in favor, six (Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina) voted against, and New York cast a “null vote,” as Mr. Gary and Mr. Hasbrouck cancelled each other out, and there was no Legislative Appointee to cast a deciding vote.

The amended motion then passed with just Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina in opposition, and New York again null.

So at least some no-target options will be in the Draft Addendum for public comment.

After that, the issue of sector separation came to the fore.  No one ever addressed the sector separation options for the ocean recreational fishery, so the Draft Addendum will include both some options that treat all anglers equally, and multiple options that elevate the for-hire fleet above the rest of the sectors.  But with respect to the Chesapeake Bay, Mr. Sikorski made an motion that would have removed all of the sector separation options from the document.  His motion was seconded by Mr. Clark.

That didn’t go over well with Mr. Luisi, a long-time promoter of his state’s for hire fleet, who said that he opposed the motion because he wanted Maryland’s “charter public” to be able to comment on the issue (as if we don’t already know that the charter fleet will say “Yes, we want more liberal rules than everyone else).  

But Ms. Meserve quickly rose to seek a compromise, amending Mr. Sikorski’s motion in a way that would delete only two of the three sector separation options, and leave one in the Draft Addendum.  Her motion was seconded by Mr. Luisi, and met with universal approval, except for the federal agencies, which abstained.  Thus, the Draft Addendum will include one sector separation option, which would provide a 19- to 23-inch size limit for shore-based and private boat anglers, and a 19- to 25-inch size limit for the for-hire fleet. 

Hopefully, Public comment on the option will inform the final decision of the Management Board.

Ms. Meserve then made a motion to conform the Chesapeake Bay no-target options to those applicable to the ocean fishery, by removing the option that assumed that anglers wouldn’t fish for anything else when the striped bass season was closed.  Mr. Grout seconded.

Again, Mr. Luisi opposed, arguing that Ms. Meserve’s motion didn’t capture the reality of Maryland’s Bay fishery, saying that anglers wouldn’t switch targets and

“If striped bass is closed, the trip does not happen.”

Nonetheless, Ms. Meserve’s motion passed on a vote of 12 to 4, with only New York, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, and Virginia in opposition.

And with that, the discussion of how to reduce fishing mortality was done, although the Management Board still had three other matters to discuss.

The first was whether to require commercial fishermen to tag their striped bass at the point of harvest or, at the latest, before their boat returned to shore, rather than at the point of sale, as is currently permitted in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina.  Mr. Clark thus made a motion that read,

“Move to add an option for tagging at point of landing in Section 3.2,”

which was seconded by David Borden, Rhode Island’s Governor’s Appointee.

He justified his motion by arguing that, by not tagging bass before the point of first sale, there is an opportunity for fishermen to divert bass into the black market.  A majority of the Law Enforcement Committee agreed with that rationale, although there was a minority who felt that tagging at the point of harvest or landing might actually increase illegal activity, in the form of fishermen using other fishermen’s tags, and would certainly increase the administrative burden.

In the end, no one had a problem with Mr. Clark’s motion, and it passed by unanimous consent.

At that point, Mr. Clark made what might have been the most bizarre motion of the meeting, which read

“Move to add in Section 3.2 the following text:  Option B [requiring tagging at the point of harvest] can be considered an unquantifiable reduction in commercial removals because it strengthens the enforceability of commercial quotas.  The Board has approved unquantifiable reductions in recreational removals in recent years (e.g. gaffing prohibition) to offset the reductions needed through other recreational measures.  If the public and Board decide to pursue an option in Section 3.4 requiring further reductions in striped bass removals, Option B, by providing an unquantifiable reduction in commercial landings, justifies a smaller reduction for the commercial sector.”

Besides being factually inaccurate—the no-gaff provision was not used to “offset” any other recreational measure, but was merely adopted as good management practice—Mr. Clark’s motion was clearly just another way to undercut the commercial quota reduction needed to rebuild the stock.

Fortunately, it died stillborn, with no one willing to provide a second.

The second related issue was a reorganization of Maryland’s recreational seasons, which became a hodgepodge of open seasons, no-harvest closures, and no-target closures that Maryland imposed on the shore-based and private boat recreational fishery in order to provide greater benefits for its commercial and for-hire sectors.  Maryland hopes to provide a more logical season structure that would benefit both its striped bass and its striped bass fishermen, and presented a proposal that would allegedly do just that without increasing recreational fishing mortality.

However, there was substantial uncertainty surrounding the proposal, as it would open a catch-and-release season, and later a catch-and-kill season, at a time in the spring when, previously, no targeting was allowed.  The Technical Committee acknowledged discomfort with Maryland’s claim that the new open seasons wouldn’t increase recreational fishing effort, but it lacked the data needed to predict what any change in effort might be, and thus did not change the Maryland proposal in that regard.  

But the Plan Development Team included two options that called for buffers of 10 and 25 percent, respectively, to account for the uncertainty by increasing the reduction that Maryland would have to achieve with its reorganization effort.

Mr. Sikorsky moved to eliminate the 25 percent buffer option, arguing that, while the management plan called for such buffers in the case of conservation equivalency proposals, what Maryland was doing wasn’t technically conservation equivalency, that the percent standard error in the Maryland data, when taken as a whole, was under 30 (the level which triggered a 25 percent conservation equivalency buffer), and that

“The buffers are almost punitive.”

Ms. Meserve then made a motion to amend, seeking to also remove the option that would allow Maryland to reorganize its recreational seasons without any buffer at all.  Mr. Grout seconded, and Mr. Sikorski objected, again arguing  that the buffers were punitive (a questionable claim given the level of uncertainty acknowledged by the Technical Committee), and that a substantial majority of stakeholders supported what Maryland was attempting to do.

In the end, Ms. Meserve’s motion failed, gaining the support of only New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and North Carolina.

At that point, Robert Brown, a commercial fisherman and a Governor’s Appointee from Maryland, moved that the entire section addressing Maryland’s reorganized recreational seasons be deleted from the Draft Addendum.  His motion failed for want of a second.  The main motion, to remove the 25 percent buffer option, then passed on a vote of 10 in favor, three against, and three abstentions.

The Management Board then moved on to the final issue, a proposal that would require anglers to measure striped bass in a straight line, from the tip of the snout to the end of the tail, with the tail compressed to achieve the greatest possible length, rather than over the curve of the body.  On that issue, there was neither discussion nor dissent.

The Draft Addendum was then approved for public comment, again by unanimous consent.

Where does that leave the bass and the bass fishermen?

There will undoubtedly be opposition to Addendum III, with most probably coming from the commercial and for-hire sectors.  The 12 percent fishing mortality reduction in the Draft Addendum is the bare minimum needed to rebuild the stock by 2029, and leave it in the best possible position to face the future should the current very low recruitment rate continue.  Thus, it is important that anglers comment on the Draft Addendum, in order to better assure that the reduction actually happens.

Beyond that, it makes sense to oppose unenforceable no-target closures, which will almost certainly be less effective than they appear on paper, in favor of clearly quantifiable, but somewhat longer, no-harvest closures—that is, traditional closed seasons.  Such traditional closures will allow anglers to continue to fish, and so allow tackle shops and for-hire boats to do some kind of business, when the season is closed, and so provide the greatest socio-economic benefits from the fishery while also providing the most certain and quantifiable benefits to the bass stock.

It may also make sense to support the mandatory commercial tagging at harvest/before landing, and for an interesting reason.  At this time, Massachusetts may have the only open-access commercial striped bass fishery on the coast, which sees bass caught and sold not only by legitimate commercial fishermen, who depend on the fishery to feed, house, and clothe their families, but also by what have been dubbed “recremercials,” anglers who choose to sell their fish to pay some of the cost of their hobby.  Massachusetts has already publicly stated that if it is forced to go to a tag at harvest/landing, rather than a tag at sale, system, it would be practically unable to provide tags to all of those currently licensed to sell striped bass, and might be required to put some sort of limitations on who can get a commercial striped bass permit.

That could be a good thing.

Also, from a conservation perspective, if the Maryland reorganization is to be supported at all, the option that includes a 10 percent uncertainty buffer should be the only one considered.  We know that uncertainty exists, and the expectation is that effort and landings will, in the end, be higher than Maryland predicts.  Under such circumstances, a buffer is not punitive, it is merely prudent.

Finally, anglers should oppose any sector separation proposal that trades a longer closed season for everyone for a more liberal slot limit for the for-hire fleet.  An angler is an angler, no matter whether they fish from shore, their own boat, or a for-hire vessel, and as a policy matter, it is wrong, and completely unjust, to elevate one small group of anglers above another, and grant them special privileges, particularly when for-hire anglers account for a very small percentage—well under five percent—ofall directed striped bass trips, and so should not be raised above those who make most of the trips and generate most of the economic benefits from the fishery.

And that’s it for now.

Once the schedule of public hearings is out, and the Draft Addendum is released in its final form, I’ll undoubtedly put out another post addressing the specific issues in greater detail.  But for now, you can just take what we know so far, and start steeling yourself for the debate to come.

 

THERE ARE NO "MOST IMPORTANT" FISH IN THE SEA

 

Seventeen years ago, author H. Bruce Franklin published a book.  It was titled The Most Important Fish in the Sea:  Menhaden and America, and it caught the public’s attention.  A blurb advertising the book declares, in part, that

“…Today, one company—Omega Protein—has a monopoly on the menhaden ‘reduction industry.’  Every year, it sweeps billions of fish from the sea, grinds them up, and turns them into animal feed, fertilizer, and oil used in everything from linoleum to health food supplements.

“The massive harvest wouldn’t be such a problem if menhaden were only good for making lipstick and soap.  But they are crucial to the diet of bigger fish and they filter the waters of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, playing an essential dual role in marine ecology perhaps unmatched anywhere on the planet.  As their numbers have plummeted, fish and birds dependent on them have been decimated, toxic algae have begun to choke our bays and seas.  In Franklin’s vibrant prose, the decline of a once ubiquitous fish becomes an adventure story, an exploration of the U.S. political economy, a groundbreaking history of America’s emerging ecological consciousness, and an inspiring vision of a growing alliance between environmentalists and recreational anglers.”

The book was very well written.  A lot of people read it, and a lot of people believed everything that Franklin wrote, even though he had no scientific background at all.  His academic degree was in English, which he first taught as an assistant professor, later associate professor, at Stanford University.  He was also something of a radical, who helped to set up a European network of deserters from the U.S. military during the Viet Nam war, founded a group that later became the Revolutionary Communist Party, and was ultimately fired from Stamford after inciting students to shut down the school’s computer facility and encouraging them to “resist police efforts.”

Both his lack of scientific training and his radical background arguably colored his book which, in my view, contained a few factual errors and definitely had anti-corporate undertones.  But those flaws seem to have only made some of his readers more fervent, and helped to create what I might deem “The Cult of the Menhaden,” a group of people who truly believe that menhaden really are “the most important fish in the sea,” and who are inclined to blame any decline in fish, bird, or marine mammal populations on a menhaden shortage, and then blame such alleged shortage in the menhaden reduction fishery, even though the last stock assessment, released three years ago, found that the Atlantic menhaden population is above the target reference point, and an October 2024 assessment revealed that the Gulf menhaden stock was also doing well.

Now, a new study recently concluded by The University of Southern Mississippi, which was funded by the Science Center for Marine Fisheries, may finally help at least some of those people place menhaden in their proper ecological context, which is best described in the header of the school’s press release announcing the study's findings:

“What Do Gulf Predators Really Eat?  Groundbreaking Study Finds Menhaden Play a Smaller Role Than Expected.”

That conclusion probably doesn’t come as a surprise to fishermen who’ve spent much time on the water, and realize that predators can’t choose to be picky.  Most are opportunists that will feed on whatever might be around at the time, whether that forage is mullet, river herring, Atlantic herring, pilchards, bay anchovies, various species of shad, shrimp, mackerel, juvenile weakfish or bluefish, menhaden, or anything else. 

Menhaden, with their big, splashy, surface-hugging schools are often the most obvious baitfish, particularly on the inshroe grounds, and fish feeding on menhaden can be extremely easy to catch, but neither of those things has any real bearing on menhaden’s actual importance as forage.

Yet, fueled by “the most important fish in the sea” distortions and the continuing availability of foundation and other grants that support well-publicized anti-menhaden industry campaigns, far too many people have come to believe that menhaden have a disproportionately large impact on coastal ecosystems

The University of Southern Mississippi study will hopefully bring a few more facts—and hopefully a bit of rationality—to what has become an emotion-driven menhaden debate.

What the Mississippi scientists did was take a long look at what fish in the Gulf of Mexico were actually eating.  They employed a two-pronged approach, which combined the analysis of hundreds of stomach-content studies dating back as far as the 1950s with stable isotope analysis of fish’s tissue samples, which provide a definitive look at what fish are eating.

The press release described isotope analysis this way:

“Stable isotopes are heavier forms of elements, like carbon and nitrogen, that are present in all species and at all points in the food web.  Because these isotopes do not decay, they accumulate in predator species in different proportions, depending on the diet of the predator.  By analyzing the levels of stable carbon and nitrogen isotopes in predator species, the study authors are able to determine what types of diet sources the predators generally rely on, as well as what trophic level they predominantly feed on.  This technique offers a much broader view of predator diets than stomach content analysis alone.

“’When an animal eats a prey item, there is a differential uptake in the carbon and the nitrogen,’ said Dr. Kevin Dillon, another author of the study and a Associate Professor at the University of Southern Mississippi’s Gulf Coast Research Laboratory.  ‘So, we can measure those small differences to try to piece this together and look at each organism’s trophic position within that food web.  So, we’re able to tell from a fish’s isotopic signature whether the fish was eating phytoplankton or if it was eating another fish that had eaten phytoplankton.’”

So, what did the study reveal about the importance of menhaden in the Gulf food web?

“’We looked at some 30-plus predator species, many of them exceptionally well-studied.  We did not find any single species where we would say Gulf menhaden were the most important fish in their diet,’ said Dr. Robert Leaf, one of the authors of the study and Director of the School of Ocean Science and Engineering at the University of Southern Mississippi.

“’When you look at the information that we have, what we find is that Gulf menhaden are a prey item—certainly they play a role in the trophic dynamics of predators—but not to the extent of other prey items, which are also very important—in fact, more important,’ Dr. Leaf continued…

“The scientists found that species like red drum, summer [sic] flounder, and spotted sea trout are general, opportunistic feeders that do not rely solely on a single prey species.  Instead, their diets vary depending on factors such as seasons, prey availability, and other climactic conditions.

“Species like Gulf menhaden are important parts of the diet, but there is no single prey species that these predators overwhelmingly rely on.  There is no ‘most important’ prey species in the Gulf.  [emphasis added]”

The Cult of the Menhaden, and particularly its ministers and ecclesiastics—that is, public relations flaks and consultants—who are paid to proselytize and spread the faith, will undoubtedly reject the study’s conclusions, as cults always reject truths that conflict with dogma.

And it is always possible that the study’s conclusions won’t be transferrable to the Atlantic menhaden that inhabit waters off the East Coast; Atlantic coast ecostems and habitats aren’t the same as those in the Gulf, and many East Coast species engage in much longer seasonal migrations than are typical of spotted sea trout or drum.  It’s not inconceivable that menhaden are more important there.

But anyone who has ambushed striped bass in coastal creeks, when the fish follow spring alewife runs; who has fished the August “whitebait” runs at Montauk; who has frozen their hands in the post-Thanksgiving cold, when bass blitzed on Atlantic herring, understand that striped bass, like the predators in the Gulf, are opportunistic predators.  Anyone who has ever cut open a bass, to find a gut filled with flounder, blackfish (tautog), black sea bass, scup, mantis shrimp, squid, mackerel, crabs, or a host of other creatures knows that the fish’s diet extends far beyond menhaden.

And anyone who has gutted a bluefish, weakfish, summer flounder, or just about any other East Coast predator knows that they are also not fussy eaters, but opportunistic predators that will feed on whatever is slow enough to catch and small enough to fit between their jaws.

So, there’s a pretty good chance that the findings of the Gulf study will be relevant to the East Coast as well.

None of this means that the menhaden isn’t important.  To the contrary, the menhaden is unquestionably an important forage fish, one of a number of important forage fish on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.

None of this means that menhaden can’t, in certain places and at certain times, be the dominant forage species, and that a local decline in menhaden abundance can’t harm local ecosystems, although there remains insufficient evidence to say, with anything approaching certainty, that such harm really occurs.

And none of this means that menhaden shouldn’t be carefully managed, that conservative quotas shouldn’t be imposed, or that scientists shouldn’t expend serious effort looking into the question of localized depletion, and whether it really exists.

All of those things matter, and should be pursued.

But the results of the University of Southern Mississippi menhaden study debunk the notion that menhaden are “the most important fish in the sea,” and sharply undercut the Cult of the Menhaden’s dogma.  And it is more than past time to put such dogma aside and, whether managing menhaden or any other fish, allow good science and good data, rather than myth and emotion, prevail.