"MODERN" SPORT FISHING: I DON'T SEE THE POINT

 

Sometimes it seems that I’m the only person I know who doesn’t spend their free time watching YouTube and similar videos.

As entertaining or informative as such videos can supposedly be, I don’t have the time to watch them unwind, particularly when the host spends too much time concentrating on product endorsements and self-promotion, and far too little on meaningful information.  When I want to learn something, I still prefer the brevity, clarity, and convenience of the well-written word.

But sometimes I end up in a doctor’s waiting room or an auto repair shop or somewhere else where it’s too noisy or too awkward to read and I need to kill time, so like just about everyone else within cell tower range I pull out my phone, check email and the news, and end up scrolling through someone’s fatuous media posts while waiting for my name to be called.

That’s when I can end up scanning fishing videos, and if what I see there represents the “modern” approach to recreational fishing, I’m happy that I’m hardcore old school, because a lot of what I see doesn’t look like much fun at all.  I’m not even sure why someone who’s not in the fish-selling business would even bother to do it.

Many of the videos that I’m talking about fall into the broad category of deep-dropping with electric reels.

They tend to open with a shot of a bent-over rod, the tip maybe bouncing a bit, still stuck in a holder, accompanied by a lot of breathless dialogue about the “big fish” that’s being winched to the surface by an electric reel, which is dutifully grinding away in the foreground, while the supposed fishermen speculate about what might have taken the bait—which usually turns out to be either a tilefish or some kind of grouper, although deep-water snappers and various exotics sometimes make a cameo appearance.

The last video of that sort that I happened to view starred a warsaw grouper that slowly emerged from the depths displaying signs of severe barotrauma, with bulging eyes and a bloated swim bladder that testified to the difference between the pressure at the surface and that which prevailed 1,000 feet below.  

I suppose, if they were sentient, the reel and the rail of the boat would have been very proud of the role that they played in vanquishing the decent-sized grouper, although given all the hooting and self-congratulations coming from the people on board the boat, one would almost think that they played some meaningful role in the fish’s capture, outside of baiting the hook (at least they haven’t yet figured out how to automate that part of the process) and pressing whatever button or throwing whatever lever was necessary for the reel to do its work.

In truth, I wasn’t quite sure what they were hooting about. Spending a very substantial amount of money on a boat, engines, and related equipment, along with the ongoing expenses of dockage, insurance, maintenance, and fuel, just to go out on a vast and often unfriendly ocean to watch your reel catch a fish, seems like a strange way to waste cash.  

It would be quite a bit cheaper, in both money and time, to just buy the grouper at a local market, at which point the folks in the video could have had their fish without needing to deal with the spray and the slime and the sunburn, and could then have spent all their time and money playing video games that didn’t involve any physical exertion—which, in the end, was just about all that their supposed fishing expedition amounted to.

Most of the other videos also fall into the “letting the boat catch the fish” category, although they at least leave out the electric reels.

Almost always, large pelagic fish are involved.  Most often, they’re giant bluefin tuna, although yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna and, for some reason, wahoo also appear.  These videos typically depict the alleged recreational fisherman standing in the cockpit of a boat, next to a heavy, bent-butt trolling rod that, as in the case of the electric reel shots, remains firmly seated in a rod holder.  The rod bends with the weight of a hooked fish, and as the boat and the rod holder struggle mightily against the strength and the mass of their struggling opponent, the “angler” continues to stand there, taking whatever opportunity arises to crank in a little line, often pulling it down toward the reel with his other hand.  Eventually, the fish weakens enough to be cranked to the boat, at which point it is inevitably dispatched, typically with a harpoon.

Such behavior wouldn’t be remarkable if performed by a commercial fisherman.  After all, a commercial fisherman’s job is to put valuable fish in the boat, so that they might be sold to support the fisherman and the fisherman’s family.  To accomplish that job, a commercial fisherman will employ any and all legal means that might help to get the job done—and rightfully so, because the more quickly and efficiently such fisherman can fill up the boat and offload at the local buyer, the more profitable the trip will be.

But recreational fishing isn’t about efficiency or profit, it’s about recreation (if you think you’re a recreational fisherman, but sell any part of your catch, you’ve been mislabeling yourself, for the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which governs all fishing in federal marine waters, defines recreational fishing as

“fishing for sport or pleasure,”

and commercial fishing as

“fishing in which the fish harvested, either in whole or in part, are intended to enter commerce or enter commerce through sale, barter or trade,”

so if you sell even a few of your fish, you clearly fall into the commercial category.) 

Recreational fishing for large pelagic fish is about pitting the angler’s endurance, strength, and skill against the weight and strength of the fish.  Ernest Hemingway once described fighting a giant bluefin as

“a back-sickening, sinew-straining, man-sized job even with a rod that looks like a hoe handle.  But if you land a big tuna after a six-hour fight, fight him man against fish until your muscles are nauseated with the unceasing strain, and finally bring him up alongside the boat, green-blue and silver in the lazy ocean, you will be purified and will be able to enter unabashed into the presence of the very elder gods, and they will make you welcome.”

The supposed recreational fisherman who never takes the rod from the holder denies themselves such experience, and certainly earns the old gods’ scorn.

Why they would record themselves taking such ignoble actions, and post them online for all to see, is something that I can’t comprehend.

And then we have the videos that combine the worst of both worlds, fighting a great gamefish from the rod holder—with an electric reel.

The broadbill swordfish has long been seen as the ultimate catch for a blue water angler.  That was particularly true in the past, before longer-ranged boats equipped with cutting edge electronics opened up new ways to find them.  Traditionally, the only way to hook a sword was to find one “finning out” on the surface of the sea, and then try to present a bait.

That wasn’t easy. 

A 1958 article in Sports Illustrated magazine described swordfishing this way:

“To meet a swordfish in combat a man must spend long days on a bright and shimmering sea, searching until his eyes burn for two black fins which tell him a swordfish, belly heavy with squids and fishes, has surfaced to sun and rest.  He faces the disheartening fact that a satiated swordfish will more often than not disdain his bait, and that he will have to hunt on.  And, if at the end of some exhausting hunt a man hooks a swordfish, he must be ready for hours of punishing battle.  A swordfish will not often run with the speed of a tuna or jump with the frenzy of a marlin, though he can and may do both.  He fights deep and with unbelievable determination.  And, to compound the unique physical and emotional stresses of swordfishing, the angler knows that his broadbill is very likely foul-hooked or snarled in the cable leader and may escape, and that even if he is fairly hooked in the mouth his jawbone is so fragile that the hook might pull out at any moment…

“It was not until 1913, in fact, that the swordfish fell victim to a sporting angler and thus formally entered the ranks of the world’s great game fish.  And the man who caught him, William C. Boschen, even today is a legendary figure…

“Boschen took the world’s first broadbill on rod and reel.  It weighed 355 pounds.  He had fought it for an hour and a half with nothing but a rod belt, and his line tested only 42 pounds.”

Since then, anglers have learned that they could be much more successful by abandoning the search for swords on the surface, and instead drifting baits at various depths near the edge of the continental shelf at night.  That technique was pioneered in Florida, as recreational fisherman began copying a method long employed by Cuban small-boat commercial fisherman (Santiago, the Cuban fisherman created by Ernest Hemingway in The Old Man and the Sea, was fishing in that manner when he hooked his great blue marlin), and has since spread all along coast.

More recently, recreational fishermen have begun deep-dropping baits for swordfish during the day, drifting them near the edges of submarine canyons and over humps and bottom structure 1,000 feet and more beneath the surface.

The new approaches to swordfishing have proven much more effective than presenting baits to finning fish.  Where the Sports Illustrated article noted that

“In the almost half-century of big-game fishing since 1913, fewer than 750 broadbill have been taken by barely 200 men and women,”

National Marine Fisheries Service data suggests that recreational fishermen on the Atlantic Coast of the United States landed over 6,300 swordfish in 2023 alone, although that figure is subject to substantial uncertainty.  It is not only the numbers of today’s recreationally-landed swordfish that contrast sharply with those caught in the past, but also their size.  While the fish baited on the surface tended to be large, rarely weighing less than 200 pounds, the average weight of recreationally-landed swordfish in 2023 was a mere 70.8 pounds; given that a fair number of triple-digit swords are still encountered, that low average suggests that many truly small fish are also being killed.

But it’s not so much the size of the swordfish being killed that’s disturbing—although that, too, seems somehow wrong—as how so many of those fish are caught.  Because of the great depths involved, and the heavy weights needed to get baits down to the fish—and because too many of today’s anglers are lazy, and just want a dead fish for their media feeds, while putting in as little effort as possible to earn it—deep-drop swordfishermen have, for the most part, adopted electric reels.  While some do it the right way, using the motor only to reel in heavy weights and empty hooks, while fighting a fish in the traditional manner, others use reels that don’t even provide an opportunity for hand-cranking.

And, to further insult their quarry, such fishermen typically don’t even deign to pick up the rod when a swordfish strikes, instead leaving the rod in its holder while using the reel’s motor to winch the fish to the surface, as if it was a crab pot or maybe an anchor instead of the greatest blue water gamefish of them all.

That’s how they do things these days, but I have to admit that such modern forms of angling leave me cold.

I have been fishing blue water for over forty-five years, and in all that time, I have never caught a swordfish, although I’ve seen a few finning out.

I’ve also never used an electric reel, and never left a rod in the holder after the strike.

I still hope to catch a swordfish one day.  I hope to be out on the edge this season, dropping down baits, waiting for that one special take.  If and when the bite comes, I will fight the fish from a belt and harness, however long that may take, and the only way line will come back on my reel is if I turn the handle with the strength of my arm and put it there.

Having said that, I realize that I’m no longer young—or even middle-aged, and I very well might lose the race with time.  Before I get a chance to pit myself against a quality sword, I may no longer be up to the challenge of fighting the fish.

And if that’s how things work out, so be it.

I won’t dishonor the fish—or myself—with an electric reel or a rod that stays in its holder. 

I see no point in catching my fish the modern, mechanically assisted way. If I can’t pay for my big fish with cramps and sore muscles, with blisters and bruises from fights that, on occasion, tear the skin from my palms and leave me almost too weak to stand, I’d rather not have them at all. 

 

 

THE NOT-SO-GREAT RED SNAPPER COUNT

 

I have probably observed the debate over the recreational red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico for close to twenty years, if not a bit more, and if anything has proved true over that time, it’s that the folks who represent the private-boat recreational red snapper fishery have are particularly averse to two things: accepting their share of the responsibility for the health of the red snapper resource, and telling the unvarnished truth about what is really going on with red snapper management.

From the time that I first became familiar with the fishery, I have seen representatives of the large and growing private-boat recreational fleet blame some or all of the red snapper fishery’s problems on the commercial fishery, on shrimp trawler bycatch (that one, at least, contains a kernel of truth), on the catch-share program that ended commercial overfishing, on the limited fleet of for-hire vessels, on environmental organizations that seek to limit fishing mortality, on federal fishery managers, on the statisticians supporting the Marine Recreational Information Program and, most recently, even on the sharks that have been swimming in the Gulf’s waters for millions upon millions of years.

About the only people those anglers’ rights groups opt not to blame are the recreational fishermen themselves, despite data demonstrating chronic angler overharvest that continues, mostly unabated, for years.  Instead of accepting their responsibility for angling overages, every time recreational fishermen are found to exceed their annual harvest limit, they react like the spoiled four-year-old caught with his hand in the cookie jar who, instead of admitting to the transgression, takes the offensive and wails that “Nobody loves meeee!”

And like a spoiled child, those red snapper anglers will dissemble, skewing the truth in a desperate effort to elicit sympathy and convince someone—just about anyone—to take their side.

The most recent example of such behavior emerged this week, in the form of an opinion piece titled “The Great Red Snapper Count:  A Costly Disappearing Act,” which appeared on the website of the Coastal Conservation Association, arguably the most militant of the anglers’ rights groups involved in the red snapper debate.

The primary thrust of the opinion piece was that the results of the so-called “Great Red Snapper Count,” which was supposed to be an extensive survey of the red snapper population in the U.S. portion of the Gulf of Mexico, have been squandered, because

“the $12 million independent study funded by Congress…is gathering dust on a shelf at NOAA.  Anglers have seen no substantive changes in management of the fishery.  Almost a decade after the funding was approved, it’s almost as if the [Great Red Snapper Count] never happened.”

And that bothers the Coastal Conservation Association and its red snapper-hungry members, because

“The [Great Red Snapper Count] was finalized in 2021 and found a red snapper population that was at least three times larger than NOAA’s estimates…When it was released, Sen. Shelby [who was primarily responsible for obtaining the appropriation funding the study] said via Twitter that he was ‘proud to have led the efforts in Congress to fund the Great Red Snapper Count.’  He added, ‘Hopefully this data will allow for more red snapper fishing opportunities in the Gulf.’”

There is little doubt that more red snapper was what the CCA and its members wanted, too, and they were considerably piqued when they didn’t get them.

It was that pique that led to more dissembling and more misleading comment.

The opinion piece told readers that

“NOAA pledged to take the findings of the [Great Red Snapper Count] and incorporate them into its next assessment of red snapper, which was scheduled to begin in 2021,”

and tried to convince them that

“it would have been reasonable to expect the results of the [Great Red Snapper Count] to simply become the new benchmark,”

but that’s not how science works.  Data needs to be validated before it can be accepted.

And that’s when the CCA opinion piece really began to blow smoke, alleging that

“In January 2024—eight years after Congress funded the independent study and three years after it was finalized—NOAA announced that it was unable to produce a viable stock assessment for red snapper, the most studied species in the Gulf reef fish complex.  It turns out that NOAA’s red snapper stock assessment model contains more than a stunning 2,900 parameters, each with its own level of uncertainty and bias.  The model simply could not stand under its own weight.  Due to the model’s remarkable instability, reviewers recommended NOT including the findings from the Great Red Snapper Count at all.”

But that's not exactly what went on.

It’s true that the most recent Gulf red snapper stock assessment, formally known as SEDAR 74, the Stock Assessment Report for Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper, did not pass peer review and will not be used for management purposes.  Sometimes that happens.  The point of a so-called “benchmark” stock assessment is to consider new approaches to managing a particular species (in this case, SEDAR 74 included both the Great Red Snapper Count data and a proposal to divide the Gulf red snapper fishery data into three areas instead of the two used before), and the point of performing an independent peer review of such an assessment is because sometimes, when trying to explore new approaches, the assessment scientists will, unfortunately byt perhaps inevitably, get a few things wrong.

Apparently, that happened in SEDAR 74.

As for the rest of the claims made by the CCA, perhaps it’s best to refer to the presentation made to the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee on February 28, which set out the reviewers’ objections to SEDAR 74.

Doing that, it appears that the peer review panel wasn't unduly concerned with SEDAR 74 ‘s “stunning 2,900 parameters” (although it did feel that the model was “too complex”) and their related uncertainty (all scientific data contains some level of uncertainty).  It also appears that there is little evidence that “the model simply could not stand under its own weight.”  Nor is their any evidence that, as the CCA opinion piece claimed, the Great Red Snapper Count data wasn’t included in SEDAR 74 because of “the model’s remarkable instability.”

Instead, the peer reviewers listed five main concerns with SEDAR 74:  Criticisms of it as a so-called “research track” stock assessment that took a new management approach to red snapper; how the assessment treated age and length data; how the assessment identified the red snapper stock; uncertainty in catch and landings data; and the Great Red Snapper Count data itself.

Yes, that’s correct.  The Great Red Snapper Count data didn’t fall victim to a faulty stock assessment.  Instead, the incorporated Great Red Snapper Count data was part of the reason why the assessment failed to pass peer review.

Let’s look at that in a little more detail.

Far from the Coastal Conservation Association’s contention that “it would have been reasonable to expect the results of the [Great Red Snapper Count] to simply become the new benchmark,” thepeer review panel, which was composed of members of the National Academy ofSciences Council of Independent Experts, and so had no inherent biases for oragainst the stock assessment, determined that

“It was premature to include the [Great Red Snapper Count] estimates in the model as potential biases have not been quantified and composition data were not available.”

The difference between the two comments was as stark as the difference between amateurs and professional fisheries scientists interpreting a set of data, and the difference between advocates for a particular result and disinterested researchers evaluating a particular source of information.

While the amateurs and the advocates are quick to decide that the Great Red Snapper Count’s findings justify an increase in red snapper harvest, the educated, professional fisheries scientists are far more reluctant to grant their imprimatur to a study that remains open to question.  At best, the professionals from the Council of Independent Experts found that the Great Red Snapper Count data could be used as ancillary information, even if the data does not fit into the assessment model.

Thus, despite the fact that, in funding the Great Red Snapper Count, Congress described its purpose as

“Estimating the absolute abundance of red snapper in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico,”

the peer review panel questioned whether the Count was a true absolute abundance estimate, and asked whether it should be treated as such.  During the panel discussion, there was some question as to whether the Great Red Snapper Count was even meant to be used as part of the stock assessment process.

In fact, the peer review panel had sufficient questions about the Great Red Snapper Count that it suggested that a new research team, separate from the team that developed the Count, examine some aspects of the data.  The panel recommended that such new team, ideally in consultation with the principal investigators from the Great Red Snapper Count, explore and quantify biases in the Count—if such exploration is even possible.  The peer review panel also recommended that such new, separate team examine the County’s catchability estimates, an issue that is closely tied to the issue of bias.

Beyond that, the peer review panel felt that additional inquiry was needed to determine whether the different survey methods and survey gear used in the Great Red Snapper Count caught snapper at the same rate, whether the Count truly selected all Age 2+ red snapper throughout the Gulf of Mexico, and whether the estimates provided by the Great Red Snapper Count are more or less reliable than estimates achieved through other methodologies, particularly when such estimates conflict.

There was also apparently a real question about whether the length composition data provided by the Great Red Snapper Count was representative of red snapper size distribution throughout the entire Gulf of Mexico.

The bottom line was that, while the Coastal Conservation Association is trying to convince its members, as well as the general public, that the Great Red Snapper Count is the most accurate gauge of red snapper abundance (and so justifies a substantial increase in the recreational red snapper kill), the fisheries professionals on the Council of Independent Experts who reviewed SEDAR 74, and reviewed the Great Red Snapper Count in a SEDAR 74 context, disagree.  They view the Great Red Snapper Count as a possibly useful study that may nonetheless be beset by biases and some questionable data.

In order to produce a benchmark stock assessment more likely to survive the peer review process, the peer review panel suggested that the stock assessment team revisit a number of issues, including recreational landings and discard data; age and length composition data; returning the stock assessment to a two-area, rather than a three-area, structure; the model’s sensitivity to changes in the steepness, natural mortality, and landings values; the evaluation of the starting year of the model, and shrimp trawl bycatch data.

The peer review panel also suggested that the stock assessment team revisit the Great Red Snapper Count data, but admitted that it didn’t really know how that ought to be done.

Thus, the Great Red Snapper Count was probably nowhere near as great as its proponents would have you believe.

After all of the hype, all of the effort, and all of the money spent on counting red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico, it appears that the results of the Count are far less impressive than the Coastal Conservation Association and other angling industry and anglers’ rights organizations had predicted and hoped.  In the end, the Great Red Snapper Count represents a very big data set that provides fisheries managers with some new, and some very flawed, information, which represents not a panacea, but merely another set of numbers to be crunched, analyzed, and put in their proper context by state and federal fisheries managers in the Gulf of Mexico.

The Great Red Snapper Count data is not “gathering dust on a shelf,” as the CCA claims.

It was included in SEDAR 74, as NOAA Fisheries had promised.

But the simple truth is, the Count is flawed, and should not be used to justify any fishery management action until more research is done.  The CCA and the rest of the anglers’ rights community can whine and complain that the Count wasn’t accepted at face value, and that anglers still can’t take home as many red snapper as they might like.

But the fact remains that the Great Red Snapper Count appears to be flawed, and that much more work is required before it might be ready to use to manage red snapper.

The anglers’ rights folks don’t like that fact, but it is fact just the same.

The Great Red Snapper Count just is not as great as the CCA and its allies pretend it to be.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MAKING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS MAKE A LITTLE MORE SENSE

 

Long-time followers of this blog know that I am a skeptic when it comes to marine protected areas, or at least when it comes to those MPAs that enact blanket closures on all types of fishing.

According to the National Marine Fisheries Service,

“Executive Order 13158 defines ‘MPA’ as, ‘Any area of the marine environment that has been reserved by Federal, State, territorial, tribal or local laws or regulations to provide lasting protection for part or all of the natural and cultural resources therein.’”

NMFS goes on to note that

“Without further clarification, the key terms of ‘area,’ ‘marine environment,” ‘reserved,’ ‘lasting,’ and ‘protection’ found in the MPA definition are subject to a range of interpretations and lead to an uncertain scope…Without clear definitions for these five key terms, identifying the sites that should be considered MPAs…would be unclear and efforts to fully implement the Order would be fragmented, diffused, and ultimately unsuccessful.”

With respect to the “protection” provided by an MPA, NMFS says that such area

“Must have existing laws or regulations that are designed and applied to afford the site with increased protection for part or all of the natural and submerged cultural resources therein for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing the lasting conservation of these resources, beyond any protections that apply outside the site.”

Of course, those definitions apply to MPAs created in federal waters, although the concerns about defining what an MPA is and how an MPA should function wherever such an area might be located.

In 1999, California adopted the Marine Life Protection Act, which created a system of MPAs in that state’s coastal waters.  The Act includes eight legislative findings, including three which state that

“California’s marine protected areas (MPAs) were established on a piecemeal basis rather than according to a coherent plan and sound scientific guidelines.  Many of these MPAs lack clearly defined purposes, effective management measures and enforcement.  As a result, the array of MPAs creates the illusion of protection while falling far short of its potential to protect and conserve living marine life and habitat.”

“Fish and other sea life are a sustainable resource, and fishing is an important community asset.  MPAs and sound fishery management are complimentary components of a comprehensive effort to sustain marine habitats and fisheries.”

And

“For all of the above reasons, it is necessary to modify the existing collection of MPAs to ensure that they are designed and managed according to clear, conservation-based goals and guidelines that take full advantage of the multiple benefits that can be derived from the establishment of marine life reserves.”

That seemingly reasonable language, when read closely, explains why I tend to be skeptical about MPAs, particularly when one realizes that the Act defines “marine life reserves” as

“a marine protected area in which all extractive activities, including the taking of marine species, and, at the discretion of the [Fish and Game] commission and within the authority of the commission, other areas that upset the natural ecological functions of the area, are prohibited.  While, to the extent feasible, the area shall be open to the public for managed enjoyment and study, the area shall be maintained to the extent practicable in an undisturbed and unpolluted state.”

My skepticism arises from the fact that, while the Act might include a legislative finding that California’s network of MPAs needed to be reorganized

“To ensure that California’s MPAs have clearly defined objectives, effective management measures, and adequate enforcement, and are based on sound scientific guidelines, [emphasis added]”

the Act nonetheless calls for the establishment of “marine life reserves” which prohibit all fishing, even if such fishing targets a species that is in no need of additional protection and causes no harm to living marine resources or to the relevant habitat, despite the legislative finding that “fish and other sea life are a sustainable resource, and fishing is an important community asset.”

Too often, whether in California or elsewhere, MPA advocates seek to arbitrarily shut down all fishing activities, including such activities that cause no measurable harm to marine resources or marine ecosystems.

Recently, a commercial fisherman in California challenged such arbitrary closures off the southern California coast, filing a petition with the California Fish and Game Commission requesting that it open three areas, designated the Footprint, Gulf Island, and Santa Barbara Island marine life reserves, to low-impact fishing activities.

The fisherman, Blake Hermann, is engaged in the harpoon fishery for swordfish, and is seeking to modify the three MPAs to allow the harvest of various pelagic fish species within their boundaries.  His preferred management action would allow the recreational harvest of highly migratory species, commercial hook and line fishing for highly migratory species, commercial harpooning of swordfish, and the possession of, but not fishing for, coastal pelagic species (defined by the State of California to include certain species of anchovy, sardines, mackerel, and squid) within the entirety of the three named MPAs, along with the use of deep-set buoy gear within the MPA’s federal portions.

However, Mr. Hermann would settle for modifications that allowed for the commercial and recreational harvest of highly migratory species caught by “surface fishing methods” (a term that specifically includes trolling, casting bait and lures, and drifting baits near the surface, but specifically excludes deep-dropping), commercial harpooning of swordfish, and the possession, but not fishing for, coastal pelagic species.

It's a logical request, at least with respect to swordfish and other highly migratory species.

The three MPAs in question are small; in the aggregate spanning only 39.75 square miles of ocean.  However, they do include a wide range of depths, reaching from the shoreline into water more than 2,000 feet deep.  Access to deep water makes the area attractive to swordfish, which often feed at substantial depths.  Their proximity to coastal islands’ shores also makes them attractive to Mr. Hermann, who says that when the wind blows, he can shelter in the lee of such islands when looking for swordfish, which can be difficult if not impossible to spot in a choppy sea.

According to the National Marine Fisheries Service, Eastern Pacific swordfish are not overfished.  Even if they were, it’s difficult to argue that closing less than 40 square miles of ocean would make a meaningful contribution to conserving the swordfish resource, given NMFS’ advice that

“Scientists know little about the migration of Pacific swordfish, but tagging data suggest swordfish move eastward from the central Pacific, north of Hawaii, toward the U.S. West Coast.”

In addition, the California Ocean Protection Council notes that

“Bycatch in the harpoon fishery is close to zero.”

It’s impossible to successfully argue that closing less than 40 square miles of ocean to swordfishing is going to have any impact on the swordfish resource, or that the swordfish harpoon fishery, with its “close to zero” bycatch, is going to do harm to any species residing within the three named MPAs.

It’s not that the three MPA’s aren’t otherwise beneficial.  As Mr. Hermann stated in his petition,

“The Footprint was originally established with the primary intention to protect the unique rocky reefs and rebuild the rockfish populations.  The [impact statement required by the California Environmental Quality Act] discussed the depleted groundfish stocks at the time and mentioned how they would benefit the most from the MPA’s implementation.  The Gulf Island and SBI reserves also discuss deep water reefs and rockfish, but focus more on endangered bird nesting grounds, abalone populations, and the more diverse, nearshore species along the islands they border.  The broad implications of the MPAs in the CEQA was the intention that local populations of fish, birds, and mammals inside the MPAs would, ‘respond to protection within the reserve through with increased density, individual size, and reproductive potential.’

“This logic is something we see echoed today in the modern MPA overviews of the three MPAs and the goals of the MPA Master Plan.  In the MPA overviews under, ‘Why was this location chosen for a state marine reserve?’ we still sea reasons such as the protection of canyons, rocky reefs, pinnacles, kelp forests, and rocky nearshore habitats for local non-pelagic species including copper rockfish, sheepshead, cowcod, and bocaccio.  However, there is zero mention of any pelagic or HMS in these overviews…  [citations omitted]”

But the issue illustrates why I’m skeptical about the use of MPAs. 

They can be very valuable tools when tailored to address a particular need, whether that need is protecting unique areas of live bottom, hard bottom habitat, or populations of non-migratory fish.  But the key phrase is “address a particular need.”

Too often, MPAs are viewed as a panacea, and their proponents’ often seek to shut down all access to living marine resources, including those populations that don’t need such radical protections, and regardless of whether a particular fishing method causes any environmental harm.  

Such advocates are fond of creating arbitrary goals.  They’ll cry, “Let’s protect 30 percent of the ocean!” without ever demonstrating, with statistically valid data and peer-reviewed science, why 30 percent, and not 20 or 25 percent—or 45 or 50 percent—is the appropriate figure, just as they will call for much of that 30 percent to be composed of no-take marine reserves, without explaining how or why closing one relatively small piece of sea will provide meaningful protection for species like swordfish that can and do traverse thousands of miles over the course of a year.  They will call for such closures without explaining why strict, science-based fishery management won’t, in most instances, provide needed protections without placing publicly-owned fisheries resources off-limits to the public.

Their failure to make a credible case for no-take MPAs also creates an unfortunate rift between the fishing community, many members of which support effective, science-based fisheries management, and the larger marine conservation community who, by advocating for marine reserves, become a threat  to continued fishing activities and so create a new legion of fishermen who are hostile to conservation efforts.

What is really needed, by the fish and the fishermen, is what Mr. Hermann seems to be asking for: Not an end to MPAs, but a new beginning, where MPAs are created to address a particular problem, and do not arbitrarily shut down activities that offer no threat to either marine resources or marine ecosystems.

That sort of more sensible MPA would benefit everyone.

 

 

 

 

NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AGAIN CONSIDERS HERRING BUFFERS

 

A little over three years ago, the New England Fishery Management Council adopted Amendment 8 to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan.  Upon its adoption, the Council stated that

“This amendment establishes an acceptable biological catch control rule that accounts for herring’s role in the ecosystem and prohibits midwater trawling in inshore waters from the U.S./Canadia border to the Rhode Island/Connecticut border.  Amendment 8 is intended to support sustainable management of the herring resource and help ensure that herring is available to minimize possible detrimental biological on predators of herring and associated socioeconomic impacts on other user groups.”

The adoption of Amendment 8 was hailed by a wide range of stakeholders, ranging from members of the small-boat and shore-based herring fishery to environmental groups to recreational fishermen and the whale-watching fleet, all of whom believed that the mid-water trawlers caused localized depletion of Atlantic herring, which left insufficient herring in inshore waters for the small-boat commercials to catch, and too few herring for the larger fish and whales sought by anglers, commercial fishermen and whale-watchers to eat.  Such stakeholders all claimed that the mid-water trawlers were causing real environmental and economic harm.

About the only people who were upset about Amendment 8 were the mid-water trawlers themselves, who denied that they were causing any environmental or economic harm to anything or to anyone, but knew with absolute certainty that Amendment 8 was causing economic harm to them.  In comments sent to NMFS opposing adoption of Amendment 8, the mid-water trawlers argued, among other things, that

“The best available science does not indicate localized depletion, nor does it find a difference in fishery removals by midwater trawl vessels compared to purse seine vessels, and this measure makes no attempt to align the restricted area with associated analyses and is an illegitimate political compromise,”

“The allocation of fishing grounds is not fair or equitable and does not promote conservation,”

“Restricting midwater trawling in inshore waters has no conservation benefit and does not minimize economic impacts,”

and

“Prohibiting midwater trawling inshore is arbitrary and capricious.”

After NMFS adopted Amendment 8 over the mid-water trawlers objections, the trawlers challenged the amendment in court.

And they won.

In finding for the plaintiffs, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which decided Sustainable Fisheries Coalition v. Raimondo, wrote that

“the Court finds that the Secretary has failed to find a rational connection between the facts found ant the choice to implement the exclusion zone.  A primary purpose of the rule is to ‘minimize local depletion and its associated user group conflict when midwater trawl vessels harvesting herring overlap with other user groups[.]  Yet, the Secretary could not identify any scientific evidence of localized depletion, let alone establish a link between [mid-water trawl] vessels and localized depletion…Though the Secretary contends that the agency was entitled to rely on the overlap analysis [showing that mid-water trawl vessels fished for herring in the exclusion zone at the same time that other user groups and predator species were present] as an alternative to the inconclusive localized depletion analysis, she fails to put forth any evidence that overlap is associated with localized depletion.  The overlap analysis may accurately predict user group conflict, but it is not a suitable replacement for independent evidence of localized depletion linked to [mid-water trawl] vessels for a rule justified as addressing localized depletion.  For this reason alone, the Court finds the rule arbitrary and capricious.

“The Court notes a further problem with the localized depletion justification and analysis:  the record fails to clearly define localized depletion spatially or temporally…

“The Secretary highlights a series of public comments from fishery users describing the negative impacts of the [mid-water trawl] fleet…Though these comments can certainly provide anecdotal support for the final rule, they are not an adequate substitute for scientific evidence of localized depletion and its link to [mid-water trawl] vessels…

“…In sum, the Secretary’s findings concerning localized depletion do not justify such a sweeping and economically consequential ban even under this deferential standard of review [applicable to judicial review of NMFS’ actions].  [citations omitted]”

Although Amendment 8’s regional depletion argument, as well as its inshore exclusion zone, was invalidated by the court, the New England Fishery Management Council still believes that there is reason to limit the harvest of herring on the inshore grounds, perhaps by placing restrictions on the high harvests of the mid-water trawlers.  Thus, on February 16, the Council released the Scoping Document for Amendment 10 to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan, stating that

“The purpose of this action is to develop and implement management actions designed to attain optimum yield and improve the conservation status of Atlantic herring by accounting for its critically important role as a forage species in the ecosystem and minimizing user conflicts created by competing interests on the herring resource between the directed herring fishery and other important user groups, including commercial and recreational fisheries, whale watching, and tourism.

“The Council will explore a range of management alternatives to minimize user conflicts, including spatially and temporally explicit gear restrictions, area closures, and possession limits.  The geographic scope of potential management measures will consider, but not be limited to, the spatial extent of the Midwater Trawl Restricted Area approved by the Council in Amendment 8, with a particular focus on areas not already subject to seasonal closures for midwater trawling.

“The current management measures to address catch of shad and river herring in the directed Atlantic herring fishery have catch estimation challenges and were instituted when the abundance and landings of Atlantic herring were much higher than they presently are.  This action will augment efforts to restore and maintain runs of river herring and shad through consideration of management alternatives for the directed Atlantic herring fishery that enhance river herring and shad avoidance and catch reduction (e.g., time/area closures and/or reconsideration of catch caps).”

The Council is now holding hearing and seeking public comment on the Scoping Document, to help it to determine what issues should be addressed in Amendment 10, should the Council decide to move forward with that management action.

Given the court’s decision with respect to Amendment 8, there’s little doubt that Amendment 10, if adopted, will face a similar legal challenge, so the Council is doing its best to address the court’s findings and ensure that Amendment 10 won’t meet a similar fate.  For example, the only times the term “localized depletion” appears in the Scoping Document is when that document discusses past amendments, including Amendment 8; it is not used with respect to Amendment 10 at all.

The Scoping Document also seems to be placing a greater emphasis on user conflicts and on ecosystem issues, in particular the bycatch and dead discards of shad and river herring in the directed Atlantic herring fishery, an issue that is particularly relevant to the mid-water trawl fleet.  The Scoping Document’s suggestion that the Council may consider the implementation of possession limits suggests that it might attempt to exclude the mid-water trawls from certain waters not by explicitly prohibiting their use, as was the case in Addendum 8, but by establishing possession limits that would, as a practical matter, be too low to allow the big vessels to operate profitably.

Still, it’s clear that the mid-water trawl fleet will not willingly accept such restrictions.  At a scoping hearing held in South Kingstown, Rhode Island on March 19, Meghan Lapp, speaking on behalf of the commercial fishing company Seafreeze, commented that

“This amendment is following the same exact arguments, the same exact thought patterns, the same exact trajectories, the same exact as the previous amendment that was shot down in court.  It seems to me that it is a solution looking for a problem, the problem statement and even the scoping document is like, tell us the problems that exist rather than identifying an issue that does exist and attempting to fix it.  To me, that is backwards.  The problem statement is nonsensical, you cannot attain optimum yield by creating unnecessary gear restrictions, area closures, and the like.  The forage issue was addressed in Amendment 8’s ABC control rule…that was not challenged at all by the previous lawsuit, that remains in place…I do not think that with this action the [Plan Development Team] is going to have any more substantial information than it did the last time.  I do remember looking through, there was extensive PDT analysis about space and user conflicts, from what I remember in that document there was like one place in space and time where there were conflicts identified, and it was somewhere up off of Gloucester in a particular time of year…”

Her arguments weren’t without merit.  A memorandum sent to the Council’s Herring Committee by the Herring Plan Development Team, dated June 9, 2023, noted that

“the PDT would like clarification as to what the problem is.  The draft statement mentions ‘user group conflicts,’ but the statement does not identify specific stakeholders or conflicts.  Does the Committee wish to specifically identify the user group conflicts?  It may be better to state this as competing interests that could be a source of user group conflicts.  The ecosystem impact of having less herring available is a source of conflict.  [numbering omitted]”

The memorandum also reported that

“The PDT notes the data supporting the analysis conducted for A8 had limitations.  Furthermore, those limitations persist in the data.”

Considering the findings of the Court in Sustainable Fisheries Coalition v. Raimondo, those comments give cause for concern.  At the same time, they are far from fatal to Amendment 10’s prospects.

If Amendment 10 is to survive, the Council must develop an administrative record that supports the Amendment’s stated goals.  Amendment 8’s restrictions on mid-water trawls were invalidated not only because they rested on claims of “localized depletion” that were unsupported by any scientific studies, but also because the key concept—“localized depletion” itself—was not clearly defined.  The anecdotal information provided in support of the Amendment, absent such definition and statistically valid data, was not enough to support the agency action.

Because Amendment 10 does not focus on localized depletion, the Council may be able to create an administrative record sufficent to defeat a court challenge.  Whether the Council will successfully do so is yet to be seen, but the Scoping Document represents the start of its efforts.

There are two scoping hearings yet to be held.  One will be a hybrid live hearing/webinar, held in conjunction with the April Council meeting, at the Hilton Hotel in Mystic, Connecticut between 6:00 and 8:00 p.m. on April 17.  The other is a webinar scheduled for 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. on April 22.

The Council will also be accepting written comments on the Scoping Document through 8:00 a.m. on April 30.

Anyone with insights into the issues addressed in the Scoping Document would do well to make their thoughts known.

 

 

STRIPED BASS ADDENDUM II: MARYLAND HINTS AT NONCOMPLIANCE

Last Tuesday, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board met to review state plans to implement Addendum II to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.

Such plans had been submitted to the ASMFC on or before March 1, in order to allow members of the Atlantic Striped Bass Plan Review Team and Atlantic Striped Bass Technical Committee to review them and determine whether they met the requirements of Addendum II.  While the Plan Review Team generally had few problems with the implementation plans, a few of the state proposals did raise red flags. 

The Plan Review Team listed the outstanding issues in a memo to the Management Board. 

With respect to recreational size limits, bag limits, and seasons, it noted that Pennsylvania had proposed delaying implementation of its new slot size and bag limit until 2025, because

“changing the slot size in the middle of the 2-month April-May season in 2024 would be procedurally burdensome and likely to lead to angler confusion and noncompliance and enforcement issues.”

Also,

“Pennsylvania noted the current (pre-Addendum II) regulation is published in the 2024 Pennsylvania Fishing Summary,”

which anglers consult when determining the relevant regulations.

With respect to the requirement that the racks of any striped bass filleted at sea or at a shoreside location be retained, and that no more than two fillets per rack be in anglers’ possession, the Plan Review Team raised questions about many states’ existing regulations, questioning whether the states’ interpretations of their rules met Addendum II’s requirements.

Finally, addressing what were probably the most serious shortcomings of some of the implementation plans, the Review Team noted that

“Maryland, Virginia, and the Potomac River Fisheries Commission have not implemented the required 7% commercial quota reduction for their Chesapeake Bay commercial fisheries.  Maryland has also not implemented the reduction for their 2024 ocean fishery.  Maryland, Virginia, and PRFC note that due to the timing of the Bay commercial fisheries starting prior to Addendum II approval, and the fact that commercial tags were already distributed, the 7% quota reduction could not be implemented in 2024.  PRFC and Virginia note that their commercial landings in recent years have been below the new Addendum II reduced quota level, so they do not anticipate an overage of the Addendum II quota level in 2024…

“Regarding the payback of potential overages, Maryland and PRFC note that if an overage occurs above the Addendum II quota level in 2024, that overage will be deducted from their 2026 quota.  They note that the 2025 quota will have already been distributed to permit holders before the end of the 2024 fishing year, so the deduction could not occur until 2026.  This is inconsistent with Addendum II, which states:  In the event a state exceeds its allocation, the amount in excess of its annual quota is deducted from the state’s allowable quota in the following year.  In the case of a 2024 overage, the payback should occur in 2025.  Virginia noted any potential 2024 overage payback would occur in 2025.”

With those issues highlighted by the Plan Review Team, the Management Board began its review of the states’ implementation plans.

Maryland chooses not to act in accordance with Addendum II

Perhaps not surprisingly, Maryland’s inaction with respect to required changes in its commercial fisheries drew the first question, with Roy Miller, the Governor’s Appointee from Delaware, noting that even though Virginia did not reduce its Chesapeake Bay commercial quota, it did implement a reduction in its commercial ocean quota, and asking why Maryland could not have done the same.

Pat Geer, the Virginia fisheries manager, followed up by noting that, on average, Virginia commercial fishermen have only landed about 77% of their quota in recent years, and so are expected to stay under Addendum II’s reduced quota in 2024; however, he also remarked that Virginia would be monitoring the 2024 landings, and could close the fishery if an overage appeared likely.

Dennis Abbott, New Hampshire’s Legislative Proxy, then turned the focus back on Maryland, asking whether, given the Board’s discussions last fall and the likelihood that a commercial quota reduction would be adopted for 2024, Maryland didn’t consider acting proactively to reduce its commercial quota in anticipation of the Board doing so at the ASMFC’s Winter Meeting.  He also addressed a second question to Maryland,

“Would you have the ability to close the season to avoid an overage?”

Michael Luisi, Maryland’s fisheries manager, addressed the questions posed by both Mr. Miller and Mr. Abbott.  In response to Mr. Miller, he said that Maryland’s commercial season opened on January 1, well before Addendum II was adopted, that some fishermen held so little quota that they might land it within a single day, and so Maryland intended to allow the harvest of fish pursuant to the quota that existed on the day that the season opened.

His responses to Mr. Abbott were more detailed, as well as more defiant, foreshadowing the uncooperative stance he would take throughout the meeting.  Mr. Luisi noted that there was some discussion within his department about Addendum II quota reductions, but because they did not know the ultimate outcome of the reduction proposal, because the commercial fishery produced only a small percentage of overall fishing mortality, and because the intent of Addendum II was not to manage the commercial fishery, Maryland fishery managers didn’t feel that they were in a position to “guess” what any quota reduction might be.  He said that Maryland lacked the administrative ability to send out a held-back portion of tags later in the year, particularly because some fishermen’s quotas were so small that the later mailing might consist of only a single tag.

And he reminded the Management Board that he had warned them in October what Maryland’s situation would be if Addendum II wasn’t adopted until January 2024.

Maryland’s Luisi then continued his response to Mr. Abbott, saying that while it has in-season harvest records, because of its individual transferrable quota system and December 31 season close,

“We would not close the season in the middle of the season.  Fishermen have the understanding that they have the whole season”

to land their fish.

With that statement, he made it clear that whether or not it had the ability to take the required action, Maryland had little intention to adhere to the explicit requirements of Addendum II.

New York’s Governor’s Appointee, Emerson Hasbrouck, called him out on his comments, saying that he could not support Maryland’s—or the Potomac River Fisheries Commission’s—implementation plans, particularly because they did not provide for paying back any 2024 overages until 2026.  He said that he hadn’t heard Maryland provide any good reason why they couldn’t issue reduced allocations to its commercial fishermen to account for any overage, but that

“They are just not willing to do it.”

Mr. Luisi naturally took objection to that.

At last January’s Management Board meeting, he had tried to delay the commercial quota cuts by a year, complaining that Maryland’s season had already started.  That effort failed, so he began his response to Mr. Hasbrouck with the complaint that

“This all could have been avoided.  We could have done something completely different had the Board considered the administrative burden.”

He then went on to inform the Management Board that Maryland would manage its 2024 commercial fishery to the pre-Addendum II quota, that it won’t have final 2024 commercial landings data until April 2025, and that it will begin distributing commercial striped bass tags for the 2025 season sometime around October 2024.  That time sequence, he argued, means that Maryland can’t pay back 2024 overages until 2026.

He never conceded that there was even a possibility of Maryland amending its current procedures in order to comply with Addendum II’s payback requirements.  Instead, he merely expressed his hope that no payback would occur, and then minimized the impact of any possible overage, arguing that 7% of Maryland’s pre-Addendum II quota, at about 100,000 pounds, would be small when compared to other sources of fishing mortality.  

He again tried to blame the Management Board for Maryland’s unwillingness to conform its actions to the dictates of Addendum II, saying that he hoped that the Board wouldn’t find Maryland out of compliance

“for an administrative burden that didn’t have to be a part of this discussion had a different decision been made in January.”

He refused to consider Maryland’s obligation to conform its actions to the dictates of the management plan.  Everything was couched in terms of what actions Maryland might be willing to take without incurring too much inconvenience.

The difference between what Maryland was able to do, and what it was willing to do, surfaced moments later, after Doug Grout, the Governor’s Appointee from New Hampshire, asked whether it was possible for Maryland (or the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, which claimed to be in a similar position as Maryland, but didn’t openly defy the Management Board) to issue a portion of its commercial striped bass tags—perhaps 80%--prior to the 2025 season, and hold back the rest until the 2025 landings data were finalized.  He noted that other states had managed to accommodate next-year paybacks “for many years.”

Mr. Luisi responded by saying

“There is a way to do anything,”

thus admitting that Maryland could find a way to conform to Addendum II’s requirements, but then added,

“but whether or not it’s worth the challenges for the administration and worth the challenges to our resource”

was a different issue, again underlining the fact that Maryland’s failure to comply was, in the end, a matter of preference, and not of necessity.  He then fell into another line of attack that revealed his continuing bias against the recreational fishery, claiming that everyone was getting concerned about a possible, but “biologically insignificant” commercial overage, while asking

“What’s the accountability on the recreational fishery?”

and arguing—perhaps forgetting about the emergency measures that the Management Board adopted in May 2023, which applied solely to the recreational fishery—that real-time accountability for the recreational fishery would not occur.  

Mr. Luisi declared the measures needed to ensure prompt paybacks for overages “too burdensome” and then declared,

“We are not going to jump over hoops, and we are not going to do it,”

with “it” referring to paying back 2024 overages in 2025.

Mr. Abbott responded by saying that

“There’s a keen awareness of what’s been going on in the striped bass fishery for years now,”

referring to the Management Board’s past (but, fortunately, not current) propensity to let states cut corners and get special exceptions to the management plan’s rules.  He noted that states are expected to comply with the Board’s actions.

A motion takes shape

At that point, the Maryland issue was briefly set aside as the Management Board addressed the other issues raised in the Plan Review Team’s memorandum, including Pennsylvania’s plan to adopt the slot and bag limits for its spring fishery in 2025 and other states’ efforts to clarify that their rules on filleting striped bass at sea were, in fact, in compliance with Addendum II.  But it wasn’t long before Megan Ware, the Maine fisheries manager who chairs the Management Board, called for a motion on the states’ implementation proposals.

Not surprisingly, Maryland’s Luisi was quick to put a motion on the floor, which simply read,

“Move to approve Addendum II state implementation plans as discussed today.”

Such motion was seconded by Stephen Train, Maine’s Governor’s Appointee.

Mr. Luisi tried to soft-sell his motion, saying that Board members had asked some good questions, and that there will inevitably be some issues related to process and administrative workload.  He said that all states made “fair attempts” to implement Addendum II, but there are hurdles, and that if his motion was passed, the Management Board could try to work in the future to allow implementation

“on a timeline that is more amenable to administration.”

In a supporting statement, Mr. Train expressed sympathy for Mr. Luisi, saying that

“I don’t think that what we have is perfect.”

But then he said something interesting, that unintentionally reinforced Mr. Abbott’s most recent comments:

“We are the ASMFC, we are not National Marine Fisheries.  We don’t come down heavy-handed”

but instead give states a chance to take actions that might not be in complete accord with the management plan.

Long-time readers of this blog will recall that I’ve criticized the ASMFC in the past for just such an attitude—for not fully enforcing the terms of its management plans (for example, failing to enforce the requirement to begin a 10-year rebuilding plan after the 2013 stock assessment tripped a management trigger in Amendment 6 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, which required initiation of such a rebuilding plan)—and I’m more than pleased to report that, in recent years, that attitude seems to have been replaced among most state delegates with one that takes a more rigorous stand on management issues.

Thus, I was pleased to see that Mr. Train’s comments received little support.

Instead, Dr. Michael Armstrong, the Massachusetts fishery manager, rose to make a substitute motion which eventually read (once some minor amendments were made),

“Move to approve Addendum II state implementation plans as discussed today, with the following exceptions:

·        CT, MD, VA, NC, PA: not planning to the two-fillet per legal fish possession limit rule for recreational filleting allowances;

·        PA: not planning to adhere to the May 1 implementation deadline; and

·        MD, PRFC: not planning to adhere to the commercial quota overage payback provision for deductions to occur in the following year.

“These jurisdictions must submit revised implementation plans by April 12, 2024.  The Management Board will review and consider approval of the revised state implementation plans at its May 1, 2024 meeting.”

His motion was seconded by Mr. Hasbrouck.

In his statement supporting the motion, Dr. Armstrong focused on Addendum II’s requirement that states pay back overages in the next year, observing that such requirement was nothing new.  Despite all of Maryland’s claims that it created an unreasonable administrative burden, such payback requirement had actually been a part of the ASMFC’s striped bass management plan since it adopted Amendment 5 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass in 1995.  Given that, Dr. Armstrong observed,

“At some point we need to follow the rules that we have made.”

Mr. Hasbrouck expanded on his earlier observation, saying that while he sympathized with Maryland’s administrative concerns,

“What I hear is not that Maryland cannot do it, but that they won’t do it, doesn’t want to do it.”

Most of what happened after that was anticlimactic.

The Management Board votes

Connecticut’s fisheries manager, Dr. Justin Davis, made a motion to amend the substitute motion by deleting the first bullet point related to filleting fish, which was seconded by Pennsylvania fisheries manager Kris Kuhn.  Such motion passed easily, 10 in favor, 3 opposed, 1 abstention, and 1 null vote, without any need for discussion.

Mr. Kuhn then moved to amend the substitute motion by deleting the bullet point relating to Pennsylvania’s plan to delay adopting new size and bag limits for its April/May fishery until 2025.  Such motion was seconded by New York fisheries manager Martin Gary.

Mr. Kuhn argued that the spring fishery provides many Pennsylvania anglers with their only opportunity to catch a striped bass, and that the state would face a substantial administrative burden in implementing the new regulations by May 1, when they would only impact the fishery for two weeks or so, and opined that the impact of the delay would not be biologically significant, but Dr. Armstrong responded with the comment that

“’Burdensome’ is not a reason not to put in regulations, or try your darndest to,”

and noted that Massachusetts frequently changes its regulations, even though it supports a large fishery.

In the end, Mr, Kuhn’s motion failed on a vote of 5 in favor, 7 against, 1 abstention, and 2 null votes.

That vote, which expressed the Management Board’s reluctance to allow even a minor exception to Addendum II’s requirements, was a good indication that Maryland would not get its way on the payback issue.  Thus, instead of trying to amend the substitute motion, Mr. Luisi merely engaged in a last bit of rhetoric. He said,

“We have lost our way if we are at the point in time right now, [where] within a year’s time”

the Management Board took emergency action and adopted Addendum II, and then exhibited

“the complete lack of caring as to the burden…by continuing to press the issue on things that are not biologically significant.”

He objected to Mr. Hasbrouck’s comment that Maryland “doesn’t want to” comply with every detail of Addendum II, even though his earlier comments effectively admitted that such was the case.  He commented that

“The Board just seems lost in this detail,”

as if timely paybacks of commercial overages, something that Maryland had been obligated to do for nearly three decades, was a new and insignificant matter, and baldly told the Board that Maryland’s revised implementation plan will probably not address their concerns.  He observed that a new stock assessment update was coming out, and that the Board may have to begin the process of revising management measures all over again.

When his soliloquy was done, the Management Board approved the substitute motion on a vote of 8 in favor, 5 opposed, 1 abstaining, and 1 null vote.  The substitute motion then became the main motion, and was approved on a vote of 11 in favor (ME, NH, MA, RI, CT, NY, NJ, DE, DC, VA and NC), 3 opposed (PA, MD, and the PRFC) and the National Marine Fisheries Service abstaining.

What happens next?

The big question is what comes next.

For most states, that answer is simple.  They will comply with Addendum II.

In the case of Maryland, though, things may be different, for immediately after the final vote, Mr. Luisi asked when Maryland might be found out of compliance with the Addendum.  He asked whether that finding might occur on the May 1 implementation date, if the state’s revised implementation plan isn’t approved, or only after any overage that might occur is not paid back in 2025.

Robert Beal, the ASMFC’s Executive Director, noted that whether—and when—Maryland might be found out of compliance is up to the Management Board, which decides whether to refer a noncompliance finding to the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior for further action.  Mr. Beal also noted that

“There’s more conversations to be had before we go down the road to noncompliance.”

But given the defiant stance that Maryland has taken so far, and its seeming refusal to comply with Addendum II’s payback requirements, even if such conversations are held, there is little reason to believe that they will do too much good.