On
April 17, the White House issued a new executive order, with the hope of “Restoring
American Seafood Competitiveness.” It
will take some time to determine how close that executive order will come to
achieving its goal. But whether or not
it is ever deemed successful, the new executive order will undoubtedly impact
and almost certainly impair the federal fisheries management process.
Although
substantially shorter, the new executive order is, in substance, similar to
Executive Order 13921, which was titled “Promoting American Seafood
Competitiveness and Economic Growth,” which was issued by President Donald
Trump on May 7, 2020. Both executive
orders (and it’s probably important to note that Executive Order 13921 remains
in effect) seek to minimize the regulation of commercial fisheries. Both have
the laudable goal of reducing IUU (illegal, unreported, and unregulated)
fishing. Both seek in increase the
safety of imported seafood, increase the United States’ seafood exports, and
support aquaculture, although the latter issue was more completely addressed in
EO 13921.
But there is one very big difference between the two
executive orders, and that difference is timing.
Trump’s loss in the 2020 election meant that his administration would have to cede power only eight months after EO 13921 was issued. Thus, despite the ambitious policy initiatives outlined in that order, there was little time to put them in place.
Some directives contained in the earlier
executive order couldn’t even be carried out before Trump was voted out of
office. For example, one section of the earlier order read
“Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of
Commerce shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant to the
President for Domestic Policy, and the Chair of the Council of Environmental
Quality a report evaluating the recommendations [to reduce the number of
regulations affecting the commercial fishing industry] and describing any
actions taken to implement those recommendations. The report shall be updated annually for the
following 2 years.”
Before the specified 1-year period had run, Trump was no
longer in office, so his administration had no opportunity to create or review
the specified report, and the two years of required updates quickly became irrelevant. Existing fisheries regulations
remained in place, other than for routine adjustments.
This time, things are different.
The new executive order was issued when the current
administration has about 3 ¾ years yet to run, which provides more than enough
time for its provisions to be implemented.
When a provision reads,
“The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and with input from the United States fishing
industry, shall immediately consider suspending, revising, or rescinding
regulations that overly burden America’s commercial fishing, aquaculture, and
fish processing industries at the fishery-specific level. Within 30 days of the date of this order, the
Secretary of Commerce shall identify the most heavily overregulated fisheries
requiring action and take appropriate action to reduce the regulatory burden on
them, in cooperation with the Regional Fishery Management Councils, interagency
partners, and through public-private partnerships, as appropriate…”
we can reasonably expect to see some regulations put on the
chopping block fairly quickly.
Of course, picking which regulations are going to get the
axe is going to be an interesting process.
The most recent executive order targets “regulations that overly burden
America’s commercial fishing,” those creating “the most heavily overregulated
fisheries,” “unnecessary regulatory burdens,” and “outdated and unnecessarily
burdensome regulations,” while seeking “additional streamlining of fishery
regulations.”
But what criteria will be used to determine that a regulation is “overly” or “unnecessarily” burdensome? Or to determine that a fishery has become “heavily overregulated?”
Such questions become
particularly important when the recent executive order itself concedes that, in
recommending the “suspending, revising, or rescinding” of supposedly unnecessary
fisheries regulations,
“Recommended actions shall be consistent with the
requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), the
Marine Mammals Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.) and other applicable
laws.”
Given that existing
regulations were only put in place after a full rulemaking process, which involved
publishing the proposed rules, followed by a public comment period, revisions
made in consideration of such public comment, and a final review by agency counsel
to determine that the regulations themselves were consistent with applicable
law, it wouldn’t seem that may current rules could be abolished or amended
while remaining within the executive order’s (and well-established law’s) “consistent
with the requirements” standard.
“Conservation and management measures shall prevent
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each
fishery for the United States fishing industry.”
“Optimum,” with respect to yield, is defined as
“the amount of fish which will provide the greatest overall
benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and
recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine
ecosystems; is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield
from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological
factor; and in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a
level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.”
Thus, given that current regulations must, by law, already
be designed to achieve optimum yield, which in most cases will be something close to maximum sustainable yield, it’s difficult to believe that many
existing regulations will be ripe for “suspending, revising, or rescinding,” if
the administration truly wishes to increase commercial landings only by taking action “consistent with the
requirements of…Magnuson-Stevens.”
However, Magnuson-Stevens also provides that
“The Secretary [of Commerce] shall also establish advisory
guidelines (which shall not have the force and effect of law), based on the
national standards [for fishery conservation and management], to assist in the
development of fishery management plans.”
Revising such guidelines could provide the administration
with a way to increase fish landings without running afoul of Magnuson-Stevens,
albeit at additional risk to managed fish stocks. To look at just one example, the
guidelines issued to help regional fishery management councils meet the
objectives of National Standard 1 include guidance on
“specifying maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and [optimum
yield]; specifying status determination criteria…so that overfishing and
overfished determinations can be made for stocks and stock complexes in [a
fishery management plan]; preventing overfishing and achieving [optimum yield],
incorporation of scientific and management uncertainty in control rules, and
adaptive management using annual catch limits…and measures to ensure
accountability…; and rebuilding stocks and stock complexes. [formatting omitted]”
The guidelines direct that
“When specifying limits and accountability measures, Councils
must take an approach that considers uncertainty in scientific information and
management control of the fishery,”
and provide advice for doing so. However, there is no explicit language in Magnuson-Stevens that requires regional fishery management councils to consider uncertainty (although there is language requiring such councils not to set catch levels above the levels recommended by their scientific and statistical committees, which typically consider uncertainty when establishing the acceptable biological catch).
Thus, the National Marine
Fisheries Service could, if it chose, rewrite the guidelines to eliminate references
to uncertainty of any kind.
If that was done, higher catch limits could be set, although ignoring
uncertainty would make it more likely that such higher limits could unintentionally
lead to overfishing.
The risk of such higher limits causing harm to fish stocks is increased, since any quota increases would be adopted at a time when other administration actions promise to increase the amount of uncertainty that fisheries managers will have to contend with. Current administration proposals would reduce NMFS funding by roughly 30 percent, and lead to cuts in the agency’s scientific staff.
That will
mean that stock assessments, critical to determining the status of fish stocks,
wouls be prepared less often, making changes in stock status harder to detect, and
making it more likely that a stock will become overfished, or become subject to
overfishing, before managers have enough information to prevent such conditions from developing. Under such conditions,
eliminating or even reducing the uncertainty buffers built into catch limits
could cause long-term harm to fish stocks.
Yet, pursuant to the latest executive order, such a thing
could easily occur.
And while any fish stock could be affected, the executive
order instructs agency management to focus on “the most heavily overregulated
fisheries.” It’s darkly entertaining to speculate
about just what those fisheries might be, as it’s difficult to find a commercial
fishermen who, to a greater or lesser degree, doesn’t feel that their own
fishery is overregulated.
New England groundfishermen have historically fought back hard
against any threat of regulation; despite the dire
condition of cod stocks, they’re still
putting up a struggle in their efforts to catch the last one. Many New
England fishermen were also staunch Trump supporters ahead of the 2024 election,
so it’s not impossible that they might earn the coveted “most heavily
overregulated” designation.
The
pelagic longline fleet, much of which is also based in New England, could be
another contender for the title. For
many years, it has had to take steps to reduce its once-notorious bycatch of various
sharks, sea turtles, marine mammals, billfish, and other creatures, all of
which supposedly reduced its landings of target species while increasing fleet
expenses. Regulatory changes, which impact
not only the fishermen and their target fish species, but also marine mammals
and other endangered species, could put bycatch concerns on the back burner and
allow longliners to fish without worries again.
Other commercial fisheries will almost certainly seek to
qualify, and many could probably make as
good a case as the New England groundfishermen or the longliners might. There is little doubt that the effort to be
named “most heavily overregulated” will be intense.
Yet, when discussing the executive order, it’s important to
note that only commercial, and not recreational, fisheries are considered.
Were recreational fisheries omitted through oversight? Will another executive order addressing only
recreational fisheries be forthcoming?
Or is it just possible that commercial landings might be increased by
reducing recreational harvest?
It’s more plausible than it might at first appear.
After all, fisheries management is, in the end, a zero-sum
game. In most federally-managed
fisheries, landings are split between the commercial and recreational sectors; increasing
one sector’s share of a fishery’s landings inevitably means reducing the
share of the other.
Thus, with a species’ biology strictly limiting the overall
number of fish that might be sustainably landed, the simplest way to increase commercial fishermen's landings is to
increase the amount of fish allocated to the commercial fishery, while making a
corresponding reduction to the recreational allocation. While such a change wouldn’t be too popular
with the angling public, and might even cause a net reduction in the economic
benefits provided by a particular fishery, it would certainly be in accord with
the plain language of the executive order, which doesn’t mention recreational
fisheries at all.
And it might be the only way to meaningfully increase
commercial landings that doesn’t result in overfishing, or cause a stock to become overfished. In fact, because
commercial fishermen must typically adhere to hard-poundage quotas, while
anglers are only expected to stay somewhat close to largely aspirational
recreational harvest limits—one management plan created by the Mid-AtlanticFishery Management Council even allows anglers to routinely exceed such limits without meaningful consequences—a
reallocation of fish from the recreational to the commercial sector could
conceivably lead to a substantial increase in commercial landings while, by placing
greater restrictions on the recreational fishery, causing overall landings to modestly
decline.
It's extremely doubtful that the executive order was
intended to cause such a result; nevertheless, such result would certainly be
in accord with that order’s explicit goals.
Certainly, last week’s executive order could have consequences
beyond those contemplated herein. The
direction to open national marine monuments to commercial fishing could support
an essay in itself. But whatever the
consequences of the executive order may be, once they begin to accrue, we can expect
them to endure, unlike the administration that spawned them, for far more than just four years.