STRIPED BASS: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE...

 

I recently came across an article on striped bass on National Fisherman magazine’s web page.  It's header was a photo of a commercial fishing crew and the caption,

“Where have all the stripers gone?”

It then began,

“One of the most commercially important fish species in the United States seems to be disappearing from the Atlantic seaboard.

“The question, of course, is:  Why?

“A dramatic decline in East Coast striped bass landings during the past decade has now combined with three consecutive years of dismally low reproduction in the fish’s major spawning ground, Chesapeake Bay…”

It goes on to observe that

“Commercial net fishermen continue to resist restrictions that would ‘put them out of the bass business,’ but they say they are under increasing pressure as the battle deepens over this most highly coveted inshore species.  The conflict over bass has pitted fisherman against fisherman, state against state, and in some cases, even region against region.

“The age-old fight between sport and commercial fishermen is most intense in the states where the latter still earn a living netting for bass.  This list includes Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, Virginia, and, to a lesser degree, North Carolina.

“Lately, debate has focused on implementing a pending interstate plan to manage the species…”

The article later notes that

“While sport and commercial fishermen and fishery officials lock horns over regulations, the real culprit—pollution—is being ignored, contends…a third-generation Chesapeake fisherman and  the president of the Maryland Waterman’s Association.

“’The problem is not that we don’t have a good brood stock,’ [he] says, ‘After the fish hatch, they don’t materialize.  From a waterman’s point of view, weather and environmental factors control almost everything.’

“…Harvesting and environmental pressures are involved, and the latter may affect both predation by other species and food availability.  Bass stocks are also affected by meteorological conditions over which man has no control…

“Many ask about the health of Chesapeake Bay itself and wonder about its ability to sustain future populations not only of striped bass but also of kindred anadromous species such as perch and shad.

“…Water quality in the bay is deteriorating…

“The submerged aquatic grasses that nurture marine life in the bay have virtually disappeared.  Nutrient levels enhanced by nitrogen and phosphorus have doubled in the last 20 years, causing algae blooms and cutting the amount of sunlight reaching the bottom.  Dangerous toxins are present.

“Moreover, nearly one-third of the bay is oxygen-deficient from late spring through [fall]…

It’s depressing reading, and I suspect that more than a few folks who read the above lines are putting their personal spin on them, thinking either “Yes!  That’s exactly why the ASMFC should have taken some action last month!” or “That’s just what I’ve been saying.  Fishing regulations won’t improve spawning success.  We need to address the real problems facing striped bass in the Bay.”

So before I go on, I ought to point out one more thing.

The article that I’ve been quoting first appeared in the 1983 Yearbook of National Fisherman.  It addresses the last striped bass stock collapse, which occurred over 40 years ago.  It has nothing to do with the striped bass’ current distress.

Still, it is instructive, for as Mark Twain may (or—more probably—may not) have said,

“History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”

So whether or not the striped bass is in exactly the same place it was in four decades ago, there are nonetheless lessons to be learned from the past stock collapse.

One of the biggest lessons may be that it is better to take decisive action, even if that action is somewhat imperfect, than to spend months, perhaps years, looking for the perfect solution.

The last time the striped bass collapsed, it caught just about everyone by surprise.  Just a few years before the collapse began in the late 1970s, 1970 produced the highest juvenile abundance index ever recorded, up to that time, by the Maryland juvenile striped bass survey.  At 30.59, it dwarfed the next-highest figure of 23.50, recorded in 1964; no other year's index had risen above the teens.  Neither fishermen nor fishery managers had an easy time believing that things could have turned bad so soon.  And plenty of big bass were still being caught, which masked the poor recruitment and made it that much harder to believe that the bass was facing a crisis.

And even as the population began to crash, fishery managers and the broader fishing community were slow to take action.  They talked a lot, and tried to find a cause, blaming everything from polychlorinated biphenyls—“PCBs—to sunspots for poor striped bass spawns.

We’re seeing the same sort of thing today.

The comments submitted to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board ahead of its December 16, 2024 meeting include many—in fact, a substantial majority—calling for additional restrictions on the recreational and commercial fisheries, in order to better conserve the striped bass stock.  But the comments also include many dissenting opinions, including a letter from the Cape Cod Charter Boat Association arguing that

“There have been six weak year classes in a row of striped bass spawning in the Chesapeake Bay.  This poor spawning success is not due to overfishing as there is a strong biomass of striped bass, but rather due to environmental factors such as poor water quality.  We would challenge the ASMFC to strongly focus on trying to improve water quality and spawning habitat in the Chesapeake Bay as this seems to be the critical issue.  No cuts or conservation efforts will be successful if the fish cannot spawn successfully.”

They aso include a letter from the Connecticut Charter and Party Boat Association which opposed new restrictions on the recreational fishery because

“One can see by just looking at the ASMFC’s own graphs the exact timeline in which the decline of the menhaden stock and striped bass stock mirror each other.  There currently isn’t enough forage to sustain the present-day striped bass biomass…We are striving to rebuild to an absolute peak target (98% historical high level).  This [target level] was voted on at a time of a healthier Chesapeake and more abundant menhaden stock.”

Another comment, submitted by New Jersey’s Hi-Mar Striper Club, argued

“Increased restrictions on both recreational and commercial Striped Bass fishing, while having many negative economic impacts, have not addressed the problem of poor recruitment.  There are other factors in Chesapeake Bay that are outside of the responsibility for taking action by this Board but must be considered.  These include increased water temperatures, low water levels and pollution from upstream sources, predation of juvenile Striped Bass by the invasive Blue Catfish and the lack of forage due to the allowed decimation of Menhaden stocks by Omega Protein…”

Reading such comments, it’s impossible not to hear echoes of the same arguments made when striped bass faced collapse in the early 1980s, and impossible not to wonder how people have failed to learn from history; how they have failed to hear history rhyme as striped bass recruitment fails and the fish become more at risk of sliding toward another precipitous decline.

Yet people still deny the need for action.  I still have people respond to my blog posts by arguing that regulators are focused on further restricting, and so aren't addressing the heart of the problem, and aren't taking the sort of actions that might rebuild the stock.

To them I respond, “Heed the voice of history; having been in this place before, it will tell us what must be done.”

For the past provides a perfect example.  With the striped bass stock collapsed, and only a single healthy year class, the 1982, to work with, the ASMFC’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board sliced through the Gordian knot of debate and adopted Amendment 3 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass.

Amendment 3 might have been the shortest amendment ever adopted by the ASMFC.  It ran only three pages.  Once all of the introductory and supporting material is stripped away, the meaningful language read

“The [Interstate Fishery Management Plan] for Striped Bass is hereby amended as follows.  The effective date of this amendment is October 10, 1985.

“Objective 1.  That the states prevent directed fishing mortality on at least 95% of the 1982 year class females, and females of all subsequent year classes of Chesapeake Bay stocks until 95% of the females of these year classes have an opportunity to reproduce at least once.  This objective is intended to apply to the fishery until the 3-year running average of Maryland young-of-year index attains 8.0.  Management measures which accomplish this objective include combinations of the following which insure that no fishing mortality occurs on the target year classes:

a)      Target closures of striped bass fisheries.  Where a state whose waters border on or are tributary to those which are closed should take complimentary actions to insure the enforceability of such closures.

b)     Establishment of minimum size limits below which 95% of females have spawned at least once.

c)      Establishment of minimum size limits in combination with seasonal closures which insure that sub-adult females are not taken in open fisheries.

d)     Elimination of any allowably bycatch below minimum lengths.

Such measures need to be made effective prior to the time at which 1982 year class females become exploitable under a given jurisdiction’s regulations.

Objective 2.  That the Striped Bass Board support restoration efforts in the Delaware River system including the Delaware Bay and that a moratorium on striped bass fishing in the Delaware Bay system be implemented upon the onset of restoration efforts.”

That’s it.  No mention of pollution, water temperatures, water levels, aquatic vegetations, predation, forage fish, or any of the other factors that might have an impact on striped bass reproduction. 

Just a simple reduction—a very significant reduction—in fishing mortality, the one thing that fishery managers can control.

And it worked.

In 1995, just ten years after the adoption of Amendment 3, the ASMFC announced that the striped bass stock had been fully restored.

So today, as we face problems that are similar to, if somewhat less severe than, those which plagued the striped bass stock in the early 1980s, managers would be wise to respond in a similar manner to how they responded in 1985:  Take decisive action to reduce fishing mortality and protect what remains of the large year classes needed to rebuild the striped bass stock.

No, such action won’t address the meteorological conditions that have probably suppressed reproduction, although we can hope that this year’s cold winter might lead to a cool, wet spring and the sort of conditions that juvenile bass need to thrive.  No, such action won’t eliminate whatever pollution, hypoxic conditions, or excess predation might be limiting spawning success.  And yes, any decisive action is likely to impact some stakeholders more than others, and cause some to call it “unfair.”

But what such strong and decisive action will do is protect the overfished striped bass resource, help it to rebuild, and make it more likely that the stock will remain at sustainable levels as it enters an uncertain future.

And maintaining a healthy fish stock, regardless of species, should always be the first priority of fisheries managers.  While it is understandable why managers might be concerned about an action's impact on fisheries-related businesses, over the long term, those businesses need, more than anything else, healthy and sustainable fish stocks; thus, in the long run, the fish should always come first.

It was disappointing that the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board failed to put the bass first and take such decisive action when it met last December 16, although given the uncertainty surrounding the 2024 stock assessment update and the Technical Committee’s advice, it’s not surprising that it did not.

But as the Management Board begins the process of drafting the proposed new Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, it needs to heed one important lesson from the past:  Above all else, take care of the bass.

That might not solve all of the problems.  It might not feel “fair” to everyone in the fishery. 

But as we learned a full forty years ago, if we put bass on the road to recovery, we’ve accomplished the biggest part of the job.  Compared to restoring a healthy and sustainable stock, any other issues are minor, and can wait to be addressed until the primary job is done,.

THE PROBLEM WITH STRIPED BASS HATCHERIES

 

The recent drought in striped bass recruitment has now reached all four of the major striped bass spawning areas, spanning the past six years in Maryland, the single most important such spawning area on the East Coast, four years in Virginia, at least three years in the Delaware River (2024 data has not yet been released) and two in the Hudson River. 

The impact of that drought is now being felt by anglers, with coastal anglers between Maine and Virginia noting a dearth of smaller fish—say, bass under five pounds or so—while recreational fishermen in the Chesapeake Bay tell me that striped bass fishing is the worst that they’ve experienced in decades.,

With fishing that slow, and concerns for the future of the striped bass stock growing, it was probably inevitable that some anglers would start talking about the possibility of replacing at least some of the missing natural reproduction with fish grown in hatcheries.  And that can seem like an attractive option, a future where striped bass factories located up and down the coast would flood coastal ecosystems with millions upon millions of manufactured rubber fish—a term that I admittedly stole from conservation writer Ted Williams, because it describes hatchery fish so well—to entertain anglers and support commercial fisheries. 

There would be no need for current, restrictive regulations, because if you started running low on striped bass, you could just whip up a few million more, release them into various bays and estuaries, and have numbers back up in just a few years.

It’s basically what western states have done with steelhead and salmon, and more and more southern states are doing with seatrout and red drum.  The Texas Parks and Wildlife Department admits that its hatcheries are

“a tool used…to manage the marine fishery along the Texas coast to ensure that harvest levels are sustained and stocks are replenished,  [emphasis added]”

and Coastal Conservation Association Texas, by far the largest anglers’ rights advocacy group in the state, declared the release of such hatcheries one billionth fingerling a “monumental conservation achievement.”

Yet, despite such declaration, the conservation value of hatcheries is very open to question. 

A 2022 article in Hakai magazine noted that the first salmon hatchery was built in 1872, and that there are now at least 243 salmon hatcheries located between California and Alaska, and more in Russia, Japan, and South Korea, which collectively release over five billion salmon per year into the Pacific Ocean.  Yet, despite 150 years of hatchery operations, wild salmon stocks are still struggling, while hatchery fish cause real damage to wild populations, with streams

“crowded with juvenile wild and hatchery fish, living fin to fin, competing for food, and ripe for disease and parasites…Hatchery fish also diminish the genetic robustness of wild salmon when, later in their lives, they enter spawning grounds and interbreed.”

Hatchery salmon are also expensive, with the Hakai article noting that

“How much a hatchery salmon costs varies per hatchery, but 20 years ago, a researcher calculated that to keep salmon swimming in the Columbia and Snake River basins in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, the price tag was US $400 per fish.”

 None of those things bode well for a hatchery-supported striped bass fishery, should such a thing ever come to pass, yet some people are urging the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission to give striped bass hatcheries serious consideration.  The December 2024 newsletter of the Jersey Coast Anglers Association carries a long column by Tom Fote, a member of the ASMFC’s Striped Bass Advisory Panel, which addresses the striped bass hatchery issue and notes that

“Hatcheries might be the only way to rebuild the stocks.  This will come down to money and I don’t hold out much hope.  But I feel this may be the only way.”

The column was submitted to the ASMFC as one of the written comments intended to inform its Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board of shareholder sentiment ahead of the Board’s December 16, 2024 meeting, and to the extent that the column also advised that

“Unless we begin really addressing the real reasons we are having low recruitment of striped bass in Chesapeake Bay, just more regulations on fishermen will have no positive impact,”

and given that the Management Board decided to take no action to further conserve the striped bass resource in 2025, it might have had its intended effect. 

But so far, no one at the ASMFC is seriously considering striped bass hatcheries, and that’s a good thing, first because they’d be horribly expensive—far too expensive to be a serious option in today’s political environment.  In addition, it’s not clear that they could make a meaningful contribution to the coastal striped bass population; at a December 2024 meeting of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council, Martin Gary, Director of the Department of Environmental Conservation’s Marine Division, told the Council that, as a young biologist, he worked at a striped bass hatchery that operated in Maryland during the 1980s and that, even though such hatchery produced a lot of young bass, its production was trivial compared to the number of juvenile bass produced naturally, even in a “mediocre” spawning year.

Finally, striped bass genetics would get in the way, for from a genetic standpoint, a striped bass is not just a striped bass.  There are separate genetic strains, which are particularly suited to specific nursery areas and, in some cases, particular waterways.

North Carolina has learned that the hard way.

For many years, the North Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries had stocked striped bass into the lower Cape Fear River, in an effort to supplement natural reproduction that has been impaired by pollution, the construction of dams, and the introduction of non-native predators.  However, the stocked fish failed to spawn successfully, and North Carolina biologists think they know why.  Prior to 2010,

“the broodfish used for hatchery production were taken from the Roanoke River.  The introduction of Roanoke River fish (and their genetics) likely led to the replacement of the original wild strain of Cape Fear River Striped Bass.  Environmental conditions in these two North Carolina rivers are quite different.  Additionally, Striped Bass populations south of Cape Hatteras [including that in the Cape Fear River] typically remain in their home rivers and do not migrate to the ocean, whereas older Striped Bass from the Roanoke River system have been documented migrating as far north as the Gulf of Maine.”

It seems to be a classic example of putting the wrong fish in the wrong place, something that happens quite often when hatchery fish are involved.  So, North Carolina fishery managers now plan to use broodstock from South Carolina’s Cooper River.

“The Cooper system in South Carolina is home to the nearest population of river-resident striped bass.  The switch to South Carolina broodstock is intended to help improve genetic diversity and promote natural reproduction by re-introducing Striped Bass that share a similar riverine life history and experience similar river flows and environmental conditions.”

There is no guarantee that the change will successfully create a naturally-reproducing Cape Fear River population of bass, although hopefully that will occur.  However, the problems that North Carolina fishery managers faced in the Cape Fear River emphasize how important regional differences in genetics can be to the striped bass population, and makes it clear that any hatchery program will have to consider genetics should a striped bass stocking program begin anywhere on the coast.

The South Carolina Department of Natural Resources advises that

“In order to ensure responsible stocking of a species, managers must understand how populations are connected in order to identify appropriate management units.  Over time, populations that are isolated from each other will become genetically different through random processes as well as becoming adapted or best suited for a particular habitat.  If two populations, or rivers in the case of striped bass, have little to no migration of individuals occurring between them, stocking fish from one system into another creates an unnatural migration and could be deleterious to unique beneficial adaptations of the stocked system.”

We should note that, although South Carolina seems to be talking about the geographic isolation of different fish populations, what matters from a genetic standpoint is reproductive isolation; various genetic strains of striped bass might share the same summer feeding grounds, but so long as they spawn in distinctly different areas, they will still be genetically isolated.

South Carolina also informs us that

“Even if fish are stocked into their own system, it is preferable to capture a large number of new broodstock from the wild every year as opposed to maintaining the same broodstock and their offspring over multiple years.  The longer fish are held in captivity, the greater the risk of artificial selection in individuals who survive captivity, which may negatively affect survivability in the wild.  Additionally, if too many few broodstock are used there will not be much diversity in the system since most fish will belong to just a few parents.  Genetic diversity (i.e., genetic health) can be thought of as a toolbox a population has—the more tools in the toolbox the more problems a repairman can fix; similarly, the higher the diversity of a population the more stressors or problems the population can withstand (such as higher summer temperatures the state is experiencing).

While the foregoing comments were specifically intended to address the needs of non-migratory striped bass that reside in southeastern river systems, they are equally applicable to any hatchery program that might be created to augment the migratory population that spawns in the Chesapeake Bay and in the Delaware and Hudson rivers, as those fish also exhibit region-specific genetic adaptations.

About five years ago, the Massachusetts Division of Marine Fisheries released the results of a genetic study that examined the genetic signatures of striped bass sampled between Canada’s Gulf of St. Lawrence and North Carolina’s Cape Fear River.  The study revealed six genetically distinct groups of striped bass.  Three were unique to Canada; the study distinguished between groups of bass in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, New Brunswick’s St. John’s River, and Shubenacadie River in Nova Scotia.

Three distinct groups were also identified along the United States’ East Coast.  One consisted of fish originating in New York’s Hudson River; the same genetic signature occurred in fish from Maine’s Kennebec River, which was stocked with Hudson River fish during the 1980s.  One consisted of fish from both the Chesapeake Bay and the Delaware River.  Ben Gehagen, a Massachusetts biologist, explained that seemingly surprising finding by noting that

“In several tagging studies we’ve observed adult striped bass migrating between upper Chesapeake Bay and the head of Delaware Bay using the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, which was constructed in the early 1800s.  Before the canal was built, fish from each of these estuaries may well have been genetically distinct.  Alternatively, the Chesapeake Bay population may have contributed to the recovery of the Delaware Bay population after the latter collapsed decades ago.”

The third genetic group on the U.S. East Coast consisted of fish from North Carolina’s Roanoke and Cape Fear Rivers; in this case, the stocking of fish from the Roanoke River into the Cape Fear explains why the genetic signatures in bass from the two very different waterways would be the same.

Any striped bass hatchery program would have to keep fish from those three groups separate, or risk introducing bass into the ecosystem that were less genetically fit to survive and reproduce than the natural population.

And even that level of separation might not be enough.  An article in On the Water magazine that discussed the Massachusetts study noted that

“within each of these [genetically distinct] populations, there is likely far finer-scale structuring down to the level of individual tributaries; indeed, the team found some differentiation between fish sampled from eastern and western Chesapeake Bay.”

Although such distinctions are very small and very difficult to determine, and could be masked if just a few individuals from one Chesapeake tributary drifted into and spawned in another, it’s impossible to say whether they might make a significant difference in a bass’ spawning success in one tributary over another.  The question might well depend on whether any fine-scale genetic differences were the result of reproductive isolation and random genetic drift, or whether they represented adaptation to the prevailing conditions in a particular waterway.

Thus, to avoid doing harm while making a meaningful, positive difference in the striped bass fishery, any hatchery program would, first, have to be very large, in order to provide the number of one-year-old (the age at which bass are deemed to recruit into the population) bass needed to substitute for lost natural reproduction.  To do that, without causing long-term genetic harm to the striped bass stock, such hatcheries would have to remove large numbers of broodstock from the population each year, while at the same time assuring that whatever broodstock are taken share the same genetic signatures, not only with respect to the three broad genetic groups, but perhaps down to genetic markers shared only by bass that reproduce in a single river.

Any such hatchery program would, necessarily, be very expensive.  It’s not clear where the funding would come from, as the states are financially strapped, Congress wants to reduce federal spending, and with anglers in New York and New Jersey, at least, unwilling to spend even a trivial amount on a saltwater fishing license, it’s hard to believe that many recreational fishermen would be willing to support a striped bass stamp or similar mechanism that might cost 25, 35, or perhaps 50 dollars or more to build, and then maintain, the hatchery infrastructure.

And hatchery operations would, in themselves, be expensive.  Beyond the cost of breeding the adult fish and growing out fingerling bass until they reached a size likely to survive in the wild, the hatchery would have to engage in an annual effort to obtain fresh broodstock, along with ongoing genetic analysis of such broodstock, to assure that the hatchery wasn’t mixing strains and creating bass less fit to survive in the wild.  And that doesn’t count the ongoing costs of feeding and maintaining the health of the fish as they develop from eggs into fingerlings large enough to release.

In theory, that is all possible, but getting a hatchery program right would take a level of funding and effort that goes far beyond the effort and costs needed to properly manage striped bass by traditional means.  And knowing how government works, it’s all too easy to believe that, even if a hatchery program got off on the right foot, it wouldn’t take long before politicians began cutting corners in the name of “efficiency” and “cost reduction,” so that eventually the striped bass fishery, like that for Pacific salmon, would be dominated by genetically mixed hatchery fish, while native runs languished and perhaps—again like 28 populations of wild salmon and steelhead trout—even earning a listing pursuant to the Endangered Species Act.

Striped bass hatcheries, in the end, would be just lead to new problems, and not to answers.

We already have a wild, reproducing striped bass stock.

The only answer that we need is a good, precautionary management program that will restore it to health, and then ensure that it survives.

 

NMFS SEEKS TO SHARPLY INCREASE SOUTH ATLANTIC RED SNAPPER LANDINGS

 

On January 14, the National Marine Fisheries Service released a proposed rule that, if adopted in its current form, would increase the annual recreational red snapper catch limit in the South Atlantic from 29,656 to 85,000 fish, nearly tripling what it is today, while instituting a comparable increase in the commercial catch limit, raising it from 124,815 to 346,000 pounds.

The same proposed rule, if adopted, is expected to reduce dead discards of red snapper—which represent the primary source of all red snapper fishing mortality in the South Atlantic—by at least 24 percent.

The tradeoff for those benefits is the implementation of a time and area closure, which NMFS euphemistically calls the “Snapper-Grouper Discard Reduction Season,” that would shut down all federal waters between Cape Canaveral, Florida and the Florida/Georgia border to recreational fishermen who seek to fish for, harvest, or possess any species belonging to the South Atlantic snapper-grouper fishery management unit, a complex that includes not only snapper and grouper, but some other reef fish species such as black sea bass, amberjack, and hogfish, for the months of December, January, and February.

Last September, I wrote a piece for the Marine Fish Conservation Network, which explained how recreational bycatch of red snapper in the South Atlantic, and the resulting dead discards, have led to extremely restrictive management measures being imposed on both the recreational and commercial fisheries.  The same piece notes how the South Atlantic Fishery Management Council has refused to take action to reduce such dead discards, how NMFS has failed to step in to end the resulting recreationally-driven overfishing in the red snapper fishery, and how members of the commercial fishing industry ultimately sued NMFS and convinced the agency to enter into a settlement agreement, in which the agency agreed to adopt regulations to rein in the destructive recreational bycatch no later than June 6, 2025.

The proposed rule represents NMFS initial efforts to abide by the terms of its agreement.  In its explanation of the proposed management measures, the agency noted that

“This action is intended to end and prevent overfishing of red snapper while reducing dead discards and providing additional fishing opportunities…

“In the past 2 years, NMFS has been sued three times for the continued overfishing of South Atlantic red snapper.  On August 22, 2024, a Federal District Court approved a settlement agreement between NMFS and the plaintiffs in one of these lawsuits [which requires that a final rule ending such overfishing be published in the Federal Register on or before June 6, 2025]…

“Most of the red snapper fishing mortality is attributed to dead discards in the recreational sector…Recreational fishermen discard red snapper recreational open fishing season and during the closed season when fishers are targeting snapper-grouper species that co-occur with red snapper…approximately 98 percent of all red snapper discard mortalities during 2021-2023 were from the recreational sector.  The current level of discards is resulting in less younger fish, which are more abundant, surviving to the older ages necessary to sustain the population in the long term, particularly if recruitment decreases back to more historical levels.  Additionally, the high level of mortality from discards is reducing and limiting the amount of landed catch.”

It seems like a reasonable argument for the proposed regulations, and even though a lot of folks in northern Florida might not appreciate being singled out for a closed snapper-grouper season, no one has yet come up with a better approach to end overfishing and reduce discard mortality. 

That seems particularly true when once considers that the recreational fishing season for the most important grouper species is already closed in January and February, meaning that the proposed regulation only adds December to the closed grouper season; however, the proposed rule would create a new three-month closure for amberjack, tilefish, and some deep-water snappers, which can currently be caught during that time.

But, reasonable or not, anglers and the angling industry want nothing to do with the proposed regulation.

Some of that resistance comes from anglers choosing not to believe the science, which suggests that the stock is currently on a path to successful rebuilding, but could easily be thrown off that path should recruitment of new fish into the population, which has recently been atypically high, declines to more normal levels.  As noted in an article recently published on the Outdoor Life website,

“anglers say those [red snapper] populations are doing just fine, and that the Feds are trying to fix a problem that doesn’t exist.”

But those angler attitudes are being fed by industry and anglers’ rights organizations that are not presenting a complete nor an entirely honest picture of what NMFS is trying to accomplish, but who are nonetheless being given a lot of free ink by friends in the angling press.

For example, an article in the Daytona Beach News-Press was titled

“NOAA proposes (threatens?) annual 3-month ban on snapper-grouper hookups,”

a heading that would appear intended to predispose readers against the proposed regulations.  But while that article dwells on the downside of the proposed rule—the seasonal closure of the snapper-grouper fishery off northern Florida—it is reasonably honest compared to some of the statements being released by various organizations.

For example, the Outdoor Life article says that

“the American Sportfishing Association points out that the three-month closure would affect all hook-and-line fishing, including trolling,”

but that’s not true.  The proposed regulations would not impact all hook-and-line fishing, but only fishing for species listed as part of the snapper-grouper complex.  Hook-and-line fishing, including trolling, for other species would not be affected.

But don’t take my word for it.  Look at the text of the proposed regulation.  It clearly states

“The discard reduction season…is an area closed to the recreational sector for the harvest of South Atlantic snapper-grouper species by hook-and-line fishing gear (including trolling gear) from January 1 through the end of February and from December 1 through December 31, annually.  The recreational bag limit using hook-and-line fishing gear to harvest South Atlantic snapper-grouper within the discard reduction season closed area…is zero.  During the applicable seasonal closure, no person may harvest or possess any snapper-grouper species in or from the discard reduction season closed area within the South Atlantic EEZ that were recreationally harvested by hook-and-line fishing gear (including trolling gear)…  [emphasis added]”

There’s no mention of sailfish or wahoo, of dolphin or mackerel, or of any other fish at all except those managed as part of the South Atlantic Council’s snapper-grouper management plan, and nothing at all to suggest that “all hook-and-line fishing” would be impacted, as the American Sportfishing Association suggests. 

Thus, the ASA’s comments seem to have unnecessarily alarmed people like north Florida charter boat captain Scott Housel, who was quoted in the Daytona Beach News-Press article as saying

“I don’t understand why they wouldn’t allow trolling during a bottom-fishing closure.  I still have to read all the proposals, but it will really hurt the ‘for-hire’ captains during those months.  We still have bills to pay.”

It would be unfortunate if the American Sportfishing Association’s comments caused captains such as Capt. Housel to oppose the proposed regulations would, based on the false impression that such regulations wouldtsomehow, prevent him for trolling for species that aren’t included in the snapper-grouper management plan.

But then, the American Sportfishing Association is the biggest trade association representing the recreational fishing industry, and the proposed time and area closure would undoubtedly cause some industry members to lose a bit of income, something the ASA acknowledged drove its opposition to the proposed rule.  Martha Guyas, ASA’s regional policy director for the South Atlantic, stated that

“The ASA is deeply disappointed to see NOAA Fisheries propose this drastic action, which may cause irreparable economic damage to the coastal communities and businesses that rely on recreational fishing, as well as recreational fishing manufacturers and suppliers across the country.”

While it would have been nice to see ASA to take the long view, and consider how a fully rebuilt red snapper fishery—perhaps one that even rebuilds ahead of schedule—might benefit the Association’s members, a trade association is, after all, about increasing trade, the ASA’s somewhat breathless resistance to any proposal that might impair a few members’ short-term cash flow is at least somewhat understandable.

Less understandable, and far less forgivable, were the comments made by the Coastal Conservation Association which, according to Outdoor Life, said

“the proposal ’drops [a] solution in search of a problem’ and is proof that the federal management system is broken,”

for blaming the "federal management system"—which presumably means NMFS—for the current effort to reduce recreational red snapper discards, without mentioning that the agency was compelled to do so by a settlement in a lawsuit that it otherwise was just about certain to lose, is in my view nothing short of dishonest and intentionally misleading. 

Anglers are killing far more red snapper as bycatch than they are landing and taking home, and one would think that any group that labels itself a “Conservation Association” would like to reduce such waste of an important natural resource.

Of course, it has been a very long time since the Coastal Conservation Association, at least at the national level, has had much to do with conservation.  Today, it seems to have fully transformed itself into an “anglers rights” organization that seeks to do little besides opposing federal fisheries managers and seeking ways for their members to kill more fish; just about everyone concerned with fisheries management in the southeast has heard CCA's “the federal management system is broken” refrain for so long that, except for politicians receiving campaign contributions from the recreational fishing industry, it is largely ignored.

Yet those well-supported politicians remain a thorn in the side of fisheries managers.

Just three weeks ago, I predicted that, in the upcoming year,

“we can expect to see an activist, conservation-averse Congress shutting down important conservation initiatives [and] interfering in the work of professional fisheries managers,”

and that prediction has certainly come true in the case of South Atlantic red snapper.

On January 22, Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) issued a press release that read, in part,

“Senator Rick Scott joined Congressmen John Rutherford and Darren Soto to introduce the bipartisan, bicameral Red Snapper Act to stop the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) from unilaterally closing the Red Snapper fishery in the South Atlantic until a full South Atlantic Great Red Snapper Count study is complete.  A recreational fishing closure would be devastating for coastal economies in the South Atlantic with widespread impacts on charter captains, anglers, and local businesses.”

Not surprisingly, the press release also notes that

“The Red Snapper Act is also endorsed by the American Sportfishing Association (ASA), Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation (CSF), the Center for Sportfishing Policy (CSP), and Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC).”

It’s not particularly clear what the bill’s sponsors are attempting to achieve, other than preventing professional fisheries managers from doing their jobs.  The “Great Red Snapper Count” concept originated in the Gulf of Mexico, where that same coterie of industry advocates and anglers’ rights groups managed to convince their favored legislators to fund such a study there; although it did provide some surprising new information on red snapper distribution, it ultimately had little impact on management decisions.  In fact, independent scientists questioned whether the Gulf’s Great Red Snapper Count should be incorporated into the population model used in Gulf red snapper stock assessments.

The South Atlantic Great Red Snapper Count could easily meet the same fate. 

While it may—or may not—provide significant new information about South Atlantic red snapper, the South Atlantic Great Red Snapper Count’s usefulness as anything more than a public relations tool for the recreational fishing industry has yet to be demonstrated.  Even now, with the Count not yet completed, biologists seem to believe that they have a good handle on red snapper science; the proposed regulations would set the Acceptable Biological Catch for South Atlantic red snapper only eight percent below the overfishing limit, with that small difference constituting a buffer accounting for any scientific uncertainty.

Thus, by any objective measure, the regulations recently proposed by NMFS seem to represent a rational solution to the problem of recreational red snapper bycatch in the South Atlantic.

There may be better solutions out there, but so far the groups that oppose the proposed rule have not proposed them; instead, they have done nothing more than impede any progress toward resolving the issue.  The angling industry and related organizations have not yet even owned up to the problem posed by recreational bycatch, much less propose their own solution to address the issue, other than to demand that, instead of killing fish and then returning those fish to the water, that they instead be allowed to kill more fish and take them home.

So long as those organizations provide no constructive input to the management process, but choose to merely cast stones at those trying to conserve and rebuild the South Atlantic red snapper stock, the proposed regulation, with its increased landings and reduced recreational discards, is probably the best solution that we’re going to see.

 

 

 

 

 

STRIPED BASS: THE TRUTH ABOUT CATCH AND RELEASE

 

Intentional catch and release—what happens when an angler heads out on the water intending to catch fish, but not intending to kill any or bring any home—is widely recognized as a conservation tool and a valid approach to recreational fishing.

Here in New York, and in many other places throughout the country, some sections of trout streams are designated as “no-kill,” places where anglers may fish, but are required to return all they catch to the water.  In Long Island’s Nassau County, anglers may fish for freshwater bass, but all bass caught must be released.  And throughout the state, with the exception of a few northern counties, anglers are allowed to catch and release freshwater bass even when the season for keeping such fish is closed. 

No one really things twice about such rules, which exist, in some form, in the great majority of states, because catch and release fishing is a generally accepted management tool among freshwater fisheries managers.

In saltwater, things are a little different, and regulations creating catch and release fisheries are far harder to find.  

The reasons for that aren’t completely clear, although the fact that the lines between recreational and commercial saltwater fishermen were very much blurred just a few decades ago probably has something to do with it; even today, supposed “recreational” fishermen often queue up at the fish buyers’ docks to sell tuna and a few other species.  And in the ocean, where the depletion of fish stocks happens more slowly and might be harder to notice than in the constrains of a small river system or freshwater pond, fish have often been viewed as the sort of unlimited resource that makes the need to consider catch and release fisheries seem less urgent to some.

Still, the State of New York provides that

“During the closed recreational season for striped bass, catch and release fishing by angling only is permitted.  Catch and release fishing is defined as a fishery where the fish are returned to the water.  During the closed season all striped bass taken shall be returned to the water immediately without unnecessary injury.”

The National Marine Fisheries Service has also adopted regulations that permit anglers to catch and release fish when all retention of the species is banned.  When NMFS released regulations prohibiting any retention of shortfin mako sharks in July 2022, it noted that

“NMFS disagrees that targeted catch-and-release recreational fishing for shortfin mako sharks should not be permitted when the default retention limit of zero is in place.  The purpose of this action is to implement ICCAT Recommendation 21-09, which prohibits retention of shortfin mako sharks.  Catch-and-release fishing is consistent with the measures in recommendation 21-09…As described in Chapter 4 of the [Environmental Assessment], studies have shown that post-release mortality among recreationally caught shortfin mako sharks is relatively low…Additionally, by allowing fishermen to catch-and-release shortfin mako sharks, data required for stock assessments would continue to be collected.  Specifically, NMFS could continue to collect recreational survey data for shortfin mako sharks, including data on effort and catch rates.  Regarding socioeconomic impacts on the recreational fishery, as described in Chapter 4 of the [Environmental Assessment], prohibiting catch-and-release fishing for shortfin mako sharks would double the estimated loss to supporting businesses and industries in recreational trip expenditures, increasing adverse impacts compared to the preferred alternative…”

So, while catch and release fisheries are far less common in saltwater than they are in inland regions, saltwater fisheries managers have nonetheless created them in at least a few places, and are not blind to the benefits that they can provide.

Thus, it’s somewhat strange, and more than a little frustrating, that some members of the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board seem hell-bent on punishing anglers who catch and release striped bass, and by extension, punishing the businesses that support the catch and release fishery.  Their attitude seems to be based on a somewhat warped sense of “fairness,” and was probably best exemplified by the comments of Emerson Hasbrouck, the Governor’s Appointee from New York, who stated on December 16, 2024 that he supported a motion that might have prohibited catch and release during the closed striped bass season, which

“addresses an issue that has been concerning me, and that issue is equity versus inequity.”

He believed that it was inequitable to permit catch and release angling during the closed season even though, as he acknowledged, it doesn’t remove as many fish from the population as catch and kill, because

“if everyone needs to sacrifice, why should [catch and release] anglers have a chance to continue fishing?...We’ve been ignoring the removals by those who continue to target striped bass during closed seasons and otherwise.”

Such comments demonstrate a clear misunderstanding of not only the catch and release fishery for striped bass, but the striped bass fishery as a whole.

To begin, the recreational striped bass fishery has evolved into a fishery dominated by catch and release.  The ASMFC notes on its website that

“The recreational fishery is primarily prosecuted as catch and release, meaning that the majority of the striped bass caught are released alive either due to angler preference or regulation (e.g., undersized, or the angler already harvested the daily bag limit.)  Since 1990, roughly 90% of the total annual striped bass catch is released alive of which 9% are estimated to die as result of the fishing interaction (referred to as ‘release mortality’ or ‘discard mortality’).  In 2023, recreational anglers released alive an estimated 26.0 million fish, of which 2.3 million are assumed to have died.”

Given the proportion of striped bass that are released by anglers, it is folly to try to separate the catch and release striped bass fishery from the overall striped bass fishery, as the two are one in the same.

The true character of the fishery might have best been described by Ritchie White, who was then New Hampshire’s Governor’s Appointee, at the August 2020 Management Board meeting, when he said

“I think that if you put this to the public, I don’t believe there are two types of fisheries, catch and release and people that harvest.  I think people go out to stripe bass fish, and they enjoy striped bass fishing.  Some of them may decide that they want to harvest a fish, or that is their goal, and some of them may decide that they don’t want to harvest a fish.  But I’ve had a lot of charter boats up and down the east coast, and I’ve never been on a charter boat that you catch your limit in the first half hour and you go home.  Charter a boat for six hours, you fish for six hours.  I believe that is what the anglers want to do.  They want to go out and experience striped bass fishing, and bringing a fish home is important to some people, to some people it’s not.”

In truth, the striped bass fishery is not cleanly divided into catch and release anglers, who never take anything home, and catch and kill anglers, who always keep their catch.  Instead, it is a continuum that begins on one end with a handful of anglers who never bring a bass home, extends through the great majority of fishermen who keep some their catch over the course of a year while releasing the rest, and ends at the other end, where another small group of fishermen who would, if they could, bring a bass home every time they go out.

In my experience, most dedicated striped bass anglers will keep a fish or two—or perhaps a few more—over the course of a season, but release the vast majority of their catch, while recreational fishermen who only target striped bass when they’re abundant, and target something else the rest of the time, are more likely to keep as many bass as they legally can—and perhaps a few more, besides.

But regardless of their intent when they head out to fish, everyone who participates in the recreational striped bass fishery, if they abide by the law, participates in catch and release, either by choice or because they have to sort through a few fish before they catch one that fits in the narrow, 28- to 31-inch slot limit that defines a legally-retained striped bass.

Plus, as Mr. White so accurately noted, once an angler puts a legal bass on ice, they usually keep on fishing, releasing the remainder of their catch, particularly if they’ve paid the fare for a full day on the water.  

That was clearly illustrated last fall, when party boats sailing out of Captree State Park took advantage of a strong striped bass run.  For the better part of the last century, the party boat fishery has followed a business plan reliant on anglers who take their fish home, and is probably the sector most dedicated to catch and keep striped bass angling.  Yet even on those boats, there is a lot of catch and release going on, as demonstrated by fishing reports that say things like

“Today’s 9AM trip caught 355 (Three Hundred Fifty Five) Striped Bass KEEPING A FULL BOAT LIMIT,”

“Today’s 9AM trip caught 425 (Four Hundred Twenty Five) Striped Bass KEEPING A FULL BOAT LIMIT,”

and

“Today’s 9AM trip caught 430 (Four Hundred Thirty) Striped Bass KEEPING A FULL BOAT LIMIT!”

Another Captree boat announced that

“The last 3 days, the [boat’s] 7AM trip saw over 750 Striped Bass keeping full boat limits every day.”

Since one of the boats never takes more than 65 fishermen, and often has fewer on board, while the other carries no more than 85 anglers, and probably fewer on striped bass trips, it’s pretty clear that even on boats catering to the catch and keep fishery, there’s a lot of catch and release going on.

Thus, the need to single out catch and release anglers, and intentionally shut down the fishery to catch and release angling at any point in the year doesn’t make much sense.  It’s hardly inequitable to anyone to limit the fishery to catch and release during the period when harvest is prohibited, since just about everyone practices catch and release at some point anyway, and contributes to whatever release mortality the fishery might generate.

It’s also foolish from an economic perspective.

Fishermen aren’t going to spend money if they have nothing to fish for.  Given that the striped bass fishery is dominated by catch and release, permitting the practice when the fishery is closed to harvest still allows tackle shops, gas docks, and similar businesses to profit from anglers’ activity; a season closed to catch and release angling shuts down the shops’ profits, too.  Similarly, charter boats can continue to book catch and release trips when the season is closed to harvest, even if, particularly for boats who have long encouraged customers to catch and kill, the volume of trips might be less than they can book during the catch and keep season.

Closing the season to catch and release completely shuts the boats down.

Thus, there is little justification for closing down the catch and release fishery, even when the catch and kill season is closed.  Yes, 40 percent of all striped bass fishing mortality is attributable to catch and release, not much below the 49 percent attributable to recreational harvest.  But while a fish that is kept is immediately taken out of the population and can no longer be accessed by the public, a released fish can be caught, on average, eleven times before it is killed, generating social and related economic benefits with each capture (although we should note that a fish might also have been released on one or more occasions before it is caught ant retained). 

And we should be careful not to place too much emphasis on that seemingly high release mortality percentage, for in a fishery where 90 percent of the fish caught are returned to the water, release mortality will naturally constitute a large percentage of overall fishing mortality.  In the fisheries mentioned at the beginning of this essay—trout in no-kill waterways, Nassau county’s largemouth bass, and shortfin makos—release mortality should constitute 100 percent of overall fishing mortality (although the unfortunate reality of poaching will reduce that a bit in the real world), yet I hope no one will suggest that any of those fish would be better off with regulations emphasizing catch and kill.

Instead, those who manage the striped bass fishery need to overcome any personal biases toward catch and kill that they might have, learn how the recreational fishery—including the catch and release fishery—actually works, and develop the understanding that, as Mr. White once told the ASMFC, “there are [not] two types of fisheries, catch and release and people that harvest… people go out to stripe bass fish, and they enjoy striped bass fishing.”

With that understanding, they might finally begin to prioritize the needs of the bass, stop trying to craft artificial distinctions between recreational fishermen, and adopt management measures that will increase striped bass abundance and so benefit everyone.  

For over the course of a season, those who release and those who kill are, for the most part, the same.

MANAGING FISHERIES: EXPERTISE MATTERS

 

There was a big to-do here in New York late last year, when Governor Kathy Hochul vetoed legislation that would have prohibited the harvest of horseshoe crabs in New York’s waters. 

The legislation, dubbed the “Horseshoe Crab Protection Act,” had become a hot-button issue for various environmental organizations within and without the state.  Although it included other provisions which extended the state’s Department of Environmental Conservation’s authority to manage the various species of crab that inhabit New York’s waters (horseshoe crabs, despite their name, aren’t really crabs at all, but rather belong to an ancient family that dates back to the early Triassic period, 250 million years ago, and are the only survivors of the order Xiphosura, which originated about 445 million years ago, in the late Ordovician; they are more closely related to spiders and ticks than to the crustaceans that we know as “crabs”), the language relating to horseshoe crabs read

“No person shall take horseshoe crabs (Limulus sp.), including for commercial or biomedical purposes, from the waters of this state.  Provided, however that this section shall not apply to the taking of horseshoe crabs (Limulus sp.) for bona fide scientific or educational purposes including, but not limited to, public or not-for-profit zoos and aquaria, as determined by the Commissioner pursuant to rules and regulations.  [formatting omitted]”

The bill’s primary sponsor was Assemblywoman Deborah J Glick, Chair of the Assembly's Committee on Environmental Conservation, who represents a district on the lower West Side of Manhattan.  The Senate version of the bill was sponsored by Senator Brad Hoylman-Sigal, who also represents a district on the West Side of Manhattan.  

It’s probably fair to say that neither district hosts a horseshoe crab fishery nor any shallow-sloping beaches where horseshoe crabs might lay their eggs, although there are undoubtedly a few of the creatures that pass by unseen in the murky olive-brown depths of the Hudson River.  It’s also probably fair to assume that neither sponsor has much practical experience with horseshoe crab biology or New York's horseshoe crab fishery, and that whatever knowledge they might have of such subjects was acquired second-hand.

People with first-hand knowledge of horseshoe crabs and horseshoe crab fisheries can be found in the Marine Division of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, and among the various biologists who advise the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, and it’s probably important to note that few if any of them believed it necessary to completely shut down New York’s horseshoe crab fishery, although fishery managers do believe that it should be subject to appropriate management measures.

The ASMFC developed its first horseshoe crab management plan in 1998.  That plan noted that

“The status of horseshoe crab populations along the Atlantic Seaboard is poorly understood and is based on independent spawning surveys, egg counts, and trawl surveys, primarily conducted in the Delaware Bay region.  Concern over increased exploitation of horseshoe crabs, particularly in the mid-Atlantic States, has been expressed by state and federal fishery resource agencies, conservation organizations, and fisheries interests.  Horseshoe crabs are important to migrating shorebirds and federally listed sea turtles as sources of food, and are critical to biomedical research and pharmaceutical testing.  Because horseshoe crabs are slow to mature and easily harvested with minimal financial investments, populations are sensitive to harvest pressure.”

Because, when that first management plan was drafted, there were no biological reference points that could be used to gauge the health of the horseshoe crab population, and because no such biological reference points have yet been developed, 1998 serves as the base year that is used to determine the relative abundance of horseshoe crabs.  Since the overall horseshoe crab stock is composed of a number of local populations, that display small genetic differences throughout the stock’s range, the coastwide stock is not only evaluated on a coastwide basis, but is also broken down into four regions—Northeast, New York (which also includes Connecticut), Delaware Bay, and Southeast—with the relative abundance in each region gauged separately.

According to the most recent stock assessment update, released last May, coastwide stock status is “good,” with more than two-thirds of the surveys conducted finding horseshoe crabs more abundant than they were in 1998, an improvement over the 2019 benchmark assessment, when just under half of the surveys found greater abundance.  The Delaware Bay and Southeast regions also showed the stocks at “good” levels.  Stock status in the Northeast is only rated as “neutral,” with surveys finding abundance roughly equal to what it was in 1998, and better than it was in 2009 and 2013.

But New York is the one exception to the rule of generally increasing abundance.  In New York, horseshoe crab abundance has been decreasing, with the status of the regional population falling from “good” in 2009 to “neutral” in 2013 to “poor” in 2019 and 2024, with 75 percent of last year’s surveys showing lower abundance than in 1998.

It’s clear that New York’s population of horseshoe crabs can use a helping hand, but it’s not clear that a complete closure of the fishery is justified.  The Department of Environmental Conservation has already taken significant action; although the ASMFC awards New York an annual quota of 366,272 horseshoe crabs, the state has voluntarily adopted and still maintains a quota of just 150,000 animals, less than half of what it is allowed.  In addition, to protect spawning horseshoe crabs, the state has adopted four 5-day closures during May and June, which coincide with the lunar periods with the highest tides, when the horseshoe crabs spawn.

New York’s efforts seem to be yielding results; although abundance surveys are not yet showing improvement compared to 1998 levels, three out of the four state surveys conducted in 2023 showed improvement compared to 2022 and three out of the four surveys conducted in 2022 also showed improvement compared to the previous survey.

Whether that improvement is enough to maintain the status quo is open to informed debate.  But it was not such informed debate that gave birth to the bill that the governor vetoed.

Instead, the Horseshoe Crab Protection Act seemed to be born out of emotion rather than hard data, with some organizations even seemingly contradicting themselves in their efforts to close New York’s fishery.  For example, the American Bird Conservancy urged passage of the bill, emphasizing the horseshoe crab’s importance to a shorebird called the red knot, writing

“The Horseshoe Crab is a keystone species that plays a crucial role in its ecosystem.  Its nutrient-dense eggs are vital for a diverse array of shorebirds, including the Threatened Red Knot.  Unfortunately, the Horseshoe Crab population in New York has declined drastically, threatening the species and the various wildlife that rely on them.  [emphasis in original]”

Not only is there no indication that the horseshoe crab population is threatened—the latest stock assessment shows its coastwide status as “good”—but in another of the American Bird Conservancy’s web pages dedicated to the red knot, the organization notes that

“The rufa Red Knot’s spring migration is timed to coincide with the horseshoe crab’s spawning season, as the massive outlay of eggs provides a rich, easily digestible food source for the exhausted birds.  Delaware Bay shores provide the single most important spring stopover area for the Red Knot, hosting within a narrow time window up to 90 percent of the North American population.  Other key U.S. stopover sites include coastal islands off Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia, and Massachusetts.  [emphasis added]”

New York, and the supposed importance of its horseshoe crabs to the red knot, is most notable for its absence from the list of key feeding sites; although some red knots do feed on horseshoe crab eggs in New York’s Jamaica Bay and elsewhere along the state’s coast, from a red knot’s perspective, New York is mostly a “flyover state” that is largely ignored during the birds' jump from Delaware Bay to more northerly climes.

Yet the needs of the red knot were used to justify closing the state’s horseshoe crab fishery, with a spokesman for the National Audubon Society stating, in one of Assemblywoman Glick’s press releases, that during their northward migration,

“Red Knots rely on horseshoe crab eggs for food so they can refuel and complete their migrations…Protecting horseshoe crabs by banning their harvest in New York State is one important step we can take to ensure the survival of the Red Knot…”

Such comment grossly overstates the importance of New York’s horseshoe crab population to the red knot’s survival, which cannot be ensured by anything done in the state.

But when it comes to tugging on people’s emotions, New York’s horseshoe crab debate hit its high point—or, perhaps, its low point—with Assemblywoman Glick’s announcement that

“Dr. Jane Goodall Joins the Fight to Protect Horseshoe Crabs in New York,”

a press release which goes on to note that

“Dr. Goodall penned a letter to Governor Hochul on November 12, 2024, requesting that the Governor sign the Horseshoe Crab Protection Act.  Dr. Goodall’s letter states, ‘I believe New York has an opportunity to lead in this conservation effort.  By signing this bill, you can ensure the survival of the horseshoe crab and the many species that depend on it…”

Now, Dr. Goodall is an extremely well-known and deservedly famous researcher who, with the 1971 publication of In the Shadow of Man, literally wrote the book on chimpanzee behavior.   However, her biography reveals nothing to suggest that she has any particular insights or knowledge relating to New York’s horseshoe crab population, or to horseshoe crabs generally, that would elevate her views on the subject above those of anyone else, and given that the horseshoe crab stock is composed of local populations that range everywhere between New England and Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula, it’s hard to accept that a bill passed in New York can “ensure the survival of the horseshoe crab” throughout its entire range.

Yet it has been this type of emotional appeal that has driven the horseshoe crab bill.  At the January 14 meeting of New York’s Marine Resources Advisory Council, Martin Gary, the Director of the DEC’s Marine Division, noted that no one on his staff was invited to address the merits of the Horseshoe Crab Protection Act before either the New York State Assembly’s or the Senate’s Environmental Conservation Committees, even though there are staff biologists fully capable of educating legislators on the issues relevant to such legislation.  

Instead of basing their actions on hard facts and good data, legislators apparently felt comfortable relying on the slanted narratives provided by various advocacy groups opposed to the horseshoe crab fishery.

Thus, Governor Hochul was put into a position where she was forced to veto the horseshoe crab bill.

In her veto message, Governor Hochul noted that

“While this bill is well-intentioned, the management of marine species is better left to the experts at DEC.”

And that’s the key point.

Maybe there is a good argument for closing New York’s horseshoe crab fishery, at least until local abundance returns to something approaching its 1998 level.  And if that’s the case, advocates for such a closure should assemble their data, bring it to the experts at the DEC, and make whatever rational arguments they can muster, based on fact and not on emotional, overblown arguments that New York’s actions will decide the fate of the horseshoe crab or of the red knot, a bird that makes a 9,000 mile migration from southern South America to its arctic nesting grounds, and faces far greater threats than the health of the horseshoe crab population in a state that most red knots pass over without ever stopping to land.

Whether we’re talking about managing horseshoe crabs, menhaden, striped bass, or any other living marine resource, management decisions should be based on good science and good data, not emotion.  Management decisions should be made by professional wildlife managers, and not by politicians who seek to provide unneeded protections for charismatic species or try to remove needed protections from species that happen to vex constituents and campaign contributors.

There are occasional exceptions to the rule, but far more often than not, when natural resources are managed by largely uninformed legislators rather than by professional wildlife managers, things don’t turn out very well.