NMFS PROPOSES NEW RECREATIONAL SHARK REGULATIONS

 

For many years, if you were an Atlantic- or Gulf-Coast angler, a shark was a shark, at least for regulatory purposes.  There was no distinction made between species at all.

Then, in 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Service implemented regulations that designated five shark species as “prohibited species” that may not be retained.  But for all other sharks, with the exception of dogfish and the Atlantic sharpnose shark, the rules were the same, with a 2-fish per boat limit and no minimum size.

Over the years, more species were added to the prohibited list, and recreational regulations became more restrictive, with a one-shark-per-boat limit and a 54-inch (fork length) minimum size.  Owners of boats participating in the recreational shark fishery are now required to obtain an Atlantic Highly Migratory Species Permit before going fishing, and to watch a brief on-line video, and pass a brief on-line quiz, to obtain or renew such permit each year.  Along most of the coast, shark fishermen fishing with bait—which includes most of the fishery—are also required to use non-offset, non-stainless steel circle hooks to minimize the number of sharks that are fatally hooked in the gut or gills.

A sharp decline in the number of hammerheads resulted in the minimum size for them being increased to 78 inches, and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, reacting to a sharp decline in the abundance of shortfin mako sharks in the North Atlantic, prohibited fishermen in member states from landing any shortfin makos at all.  But outside of those changes, and with the exception of a couple of inshore species, the 54-inch size limit and 1-fish-per-boat bag applied to all other non-prohibited sharks, regardless of their size at maturity or their abundance.

But in the case of shark regulations, one size (or bag limit) really doesn’t fit all.

Now, NMFS has taken its first big step toward developing management measures that are more tailored to the species being managed.

On January 5, the agency published a set of proposed regulations that could make a big difference in how the recreational shark fishery is managed (the same proposed regulations would also revise some aspects of the commercial fishery for blacknose sharks, but that need not be addressed today).  If adopted, the proposed rule would separate shark species into groups, based on appearance, habitat, size other factors, and tailor management measures to the species within each group. 

The proposed groups would include

“Atlantic sharpnose, bonnethead, and smoothhound sharks:  Atlantic sharpnose and bonnethead sharks could be caught in similar areas using similar fishing techniques.  Currently, Atlantic sharpnose, bonnethead, and smoothhound sharks are similarly managed in the recreational shark fishery (i.e., no minimum size limit)…Thus, these species are grouped together.

 “Blacknose and finetooth sharks:  Blacknose and finetooth sharks have similar sizes at maturity.  Additionally, they look similar and can be very difficult to distinguish.  To avoid misidentification during recreational fishing activities, these species are grouped together.

“Blacktip and spinner sharks:  Blacktip and spinner sharks look similar and can be very difficult to distinguish.  To avoid misidentification during recreational fishing activities, these species are grouped together.

“Great hammerhead, scalloped hammerhead, and smooth hammerhead sharks:  Hammerhead species have similar sizes at maturity.  Additionally, they look very similar and distinguishing hammerhead sharks from each other is quite difficult even for the most seasoned fishermen.  However, hammerhead species can be distinguished easily from other [large coastal sharks].  Thus, these species are grouped together.

 “Bull, lemon, nurse, and tiger sharks:  These [large coastal sharks] are grouped together because most of them have similar sizes at maturity, and they could be caught in similar areas using similar fishing techniques.”

“Blue, common thresher, and porbeagle sharks:  These pelagic shark species are grouped together because they have a similar size at maturity and they could be caught in similar areas using similar fishing techniques.”

With those species groups established, NMFS would have the ability to abandon its current one-size-limit-fits-all approach, and adopt limits more appropriate for each species group.  As the proposed rule states,

“[T]he default recreational minimum size limit would be based on a midpoint value of the female sizes at maturity for the shark species in that group, or else it would remain constant with the current HMS regulations…The recreational minimum size limit range would encompass the female sizes at maturity for all shark species in each group, and allow the minimum size limit to be set above the female sizes at maturity for each group.  This proposed approach is a change from the status quo…where all sharks, unless otherwise specified, must be at least 54 inches (137 cm) [fork length]; and there is no size limit for Atlantic sharpnose, bonnethead, or smoothhound sharks.”

Such an approach is long overdue, because all sharks just aren’t the same.

Consider blacktip and spinner sharks, one of the proposed species groups.  Female blacktips mature, on average, at about 123 centimeters fork length, just over 48 inches, and the species reaches a maximum size of about 180 cm (71 inches).  Spinner sharks get a little bit bigger, reaching a maximum fork length of around 200 cm (79 inches), with females maturing when about 140 cm (55 inches) in length.

For blacktips, the current 54-inch minimum size is arguably overly conservative, although it seems to fit the spinner shark pretty well.

On the other hand, the common thresher shark, which is probably the most sought-after shark, grows quite a bit larger.  Ever since ICCAT prohibited landings of shortfin makos, it is the most targeted shark in the northeast and upper mid-Atlantic, and also the species most often taken home for food (although porbeagles are frequently landed, if they’re encountered, up off New England).  Female common threshers don’t mature until they’re about 83 inches long, fish that would weigh somewhere between 250 and 300 pounds.

That makes the 54-inch size limit an extremely ineffective conservation measure; over the nearly 50 years that I’ve been chasing sharks off New York and Rhode Island, most of the common threshers that I’ve encountered probably weighed more than 250, but I’ve only seen a very few that would have measured less than 54 inches.

So the proposed rule, which would establish a default minimum size of 48 inches, with a possible minimum as large as 70 inches, for spinners and blacktips, while allowing a minimum size as large as 95 inches for common threshers, is a step in the right direction—although the 54-inch default size for threshers that has long been in effect should be replaced by a higher limit that provides immature females with some real protection.

The proposed rule would also allow NMFS to make mid-season adjustments to the bag limit for the different species of sharks.

“At the start of each fishing year…the default recreational limits will apply.  During the fishing year, NMFS may adjust retention limits within the range specified…based on the inseason trip limit criteria listed [elsewhere in the existing regulations]…The adjusted retention limit(s) will remain in effect through the end of the fishing year or until otherwise adjusted.”

The default bag limit for most shark species which may currently be landed is one per vessel per trip, consistent with the existing management measures, although for each species the range may vary between zero and one (shortfin mako), zero and three (most non-prohibited species), zero and four (Atlantic sharpnose and bonnethead), and zero and five (blacktip).  For sandbar sharks, silky sharks, and any of the prohibited species, there is no permissible range; the only option is zero retention.

The flexibility allowed by the proposed rule would let NMFS increase the bag limit for abundant species such as blacktips, which can probably sustain a higher recreational harvest, while also allowing it to easily prohibit landings of any species that appears to be overfished or otherwise imperiled. 

I sit on NMFS’ Highly Migratory Species Advisory Panel and, the last time these issues were discussed there, happily supported a number of the management changes embodied in the proposed rule, most particularly grouping species with similar characteristics into distinct species groups, and better matching the minimum size limit to the female size at maturing for the different species—particularly the common thresher, which is attracting more directed attention from recreational fishermen than it attracted a decade ago.

The proposed rule can be found at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/01/05/2025-24264/atlantic-highly-migratory-species-revisions-to-commercial-atlantic-blacknose-and-recreational, where interested parties can also find instructions on how to submit public comment.

The public comment deadline is March 6, 2026.

Although I expressed my views on some of these topics at the Advisory Panel meetings, I intend to submit favorable comments on the proposed rule, and urge those interested in the recreational shark fishery on the Atlantic coast, or in the conservation of Atlantic shark species, to do the same.

 

 

 

A NEW THREAT TO STRIPED BASS CONSERVATION

 

The American Sportfishing Association is the largest trade organization representing the fishing tackle industry.

Twenty-five or so years ago, it was an active advocate for fisheries conservation.  I still recall when, back in the late 1990s, I was very involved with the Coastal Conservation Association, and we worked with the American Sportfishing Association and The Billfish Foundation to advocate for legislation that would allocate funds for buying out a significant part of the pelagic longline fleet, in order to reduce its bycatch and dead discards of billfish and other non-target species.

The legislation had a decent chance of passing until recreational fishing organizations from New Jersey, led by the now-defunct Recreational Fishing Alliance, went out of their way to lobby against it, seemingly for no better reason than the fact that it wasn’t originally their idea.

There was no question that the ASA was a legitimate conservation advocate back then, and a little bit later, too, when it again joined with CCA and other organizations to ensure that the 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act didn’t roll back the conservation provisions that had been made a part of the law a decade before.

But times have changed, and the recreational fishing industry has, for the most part, turned its back on conservation concerns.  The change can probably traced back to the creation of the Center for Sportfishing Policy (originally, the Center for Coastal Conservation) in 2006, which brought the ASA, CCA, the National Marine Manufacturers Association, and a number of other industry and “anglers’ rights” groups together within a single umbrella organization. 

While the original intent of the Center was benign—I was around at the beginning, and it really was intended to focus on conservation work when it started out—it soon became an industry-dominated voice for the tackle and boating industries, dedicated to dismantling the federal fisheries management system in order to win more “access”—a euphemism it often employs, in lieu of “more dead fish”—for recreational fishermen, which it hopes will translate into more profits for angling-related industries.

Conservation is no longer a concern.

So we have seen the ASA and its affiliated organizations attack federal red snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico and the South Atlantic, as it seeks more “access”  for recreational fishermen.  And we have seen it actively support “Recreational Management Reform” in the mid-Atlantic, advocating for a management approach that would allow anglers to exceed the recreational harvest limit, and even the annual catch limit, with complete impunity, in the name of increased “access.”

Thus, as someone who has been a striped bass fisherman for more than 60 years, and who has been very active in striped bass management issues for a very long time, I have to admit that I felt more than a little trepidation when I read an American Sportfishing Association press release that outlined the organization’s “policy priorities” for the upcoming year.

Some of its priorities would be good for everyone, such as reauthorizing the Dingell-Johnson Act, which assesses a 10% excise tax on fishing tackle and some sales of motor boat fuel, and passes that money on to the states to fund recreational fisheries management.

Some are the sort of self-serving priorities one would expect of any trade organization, intended to provide economic benefits to its members, even if they don’t necessarily serve the public interest.

But down toward the bottom of that list, amongst some of the small print, was the priority that set alarm bells off in my head:

“improve access to striped bass.  [emphasis added]”

Not “rebuild the striped bass stock.”

Not “address poor striped bass recruitment.”

Not even “seek ways to reduce the number of striped bass that die after release.”

Instead, it was “improve access to striped bass,” which, when the euphemisms are all stripped away, means “find ways for anglers to kill more striped bass (so ASA members can sell more striped bass stuff).”

And when you see the ASA saying that, knowing that its efforts to derail striped bass conservation efforts have in the past been and will in the future be supported by such well-funded and politically savvy groups as the Coastal Conservation Association, National Marine Manufacturers Association, and other members of the Center for Sportfishing Policy, the threat to the bass’ future becomes clear.

For a very long time, striped bass seemed to fly under the American Sportfishing Association’s radar; the ASA rarely commented at the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board’s meetings, and rarely if ever mentioned striped bass in its press releases.  But that all began to change in 2024, during the American Sportfishing Association’s annual trade show, ICAST, when Michael Waine, ASA’s Atlantic Fisheries Policy Director, appeared on a podcast, where he said, among other things,

“the question becomes like how far are we willing to go from a management and policy side to meet these very ambitious conservation goals, and you can see the byproduct of that, we have a very narrow slot limit.  And so where we, where we’re currently focused is where do we go from here?  We want to avoid the scenario like southern flounder and a scenario like red snapper [where recreational landings are sharply curtailed].  We want to make sure that management…is aware of the headwinds but also allows for access for anglers to go out and catch a fish, and so how do we balance these values?  How do we balance building back a population to a conservation level that we can all agree on, which we never likely will, with the ability to actually go out and catch these fish, and what worries me, worries on this specifically is like we’ll go too far, meaning we’ll actually tell people to stop fishing for striped bass, which is where I think everyone loses…  [emphasis added]”

It was a relatively innocuous statement, which expressed concerns about the impact of needed conservation measures on recreational fishing effort (with less effort, of course, likely to mean lower revenues for the fishing tackle industry), but didn’t yet take a hard stand against striped bass conservation efforts.  Yet it marked a line where, for the first time, an ASA spokesman suggested that there was a point where conservation efforts might need to be curtailed to “[allow] for access for anglers to go out and catch a fish,” regardless of how such curtailment might impact stock rebuilding.

Waine, and so the American Sportfishing Association, took a harder line when the Management Board met on December 16, 2024, to decide whether to adopt management measures intended to reduce fishing mortality and protect the slightly above-average 2018 year class as it grew into the recreational slot size limit in 2025; with striped bass recruitment over the previous six years the worst that had ever been recorded (poor recruitment in 2025 has now extended the recruitment drought to seven years), most fishery managers believed that the 2018 year class would be needed to rebuild the stock by the 2029 deadline imposed by the management plan.

An overwhelming majority of the public comment on the issue supported reducing landings in order to better protect the 2018s; out of 3,370 comments received, 2,853—84.7%--favored reductions that would protect the 2018s and the striped bass stock as a whole.

But Waine, and the ASA, demurred, arguing that no action should be taken for the 2025, season; instead, Waine argued that a new addendum, which would become Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, should be initiated.  He effectively asserted that the Management Board should discount the great majority of public comment in support of a harvest reduction, saying

“I look at the public comments, and I know there’s millions of striped bass anglers out there.  Millions.  And I’m only seeing twenty five hundred comments from a lot of the same people that we know have been commenting.  And so, as an organization, we’re going to work with our members to try to get more people integrated into this process.  We know that the recreational fishery is very diverse, and I don’t feel the public comments really are a good reflection of that diversity…Don’t talk to the same folks you’ve been talking to all the time.  Find the people who care about this resource in a way that their voices should be heard, too.  And that’s what we’ll do as an organization ourselves.”

Once again, the motivation for the ASA’s position was perfectly clear.  For many years, striped bass have been the single most important recreational fish on the New England and mid-Atlantic coasts, and people who fish for striped bass collectively buy a lot of fishing tackle.  To the extent that regulations which make it harder to take a striped bass home discourage some anglers from going fishing, imposing more regulations for the 2025 season would probably mean less income for ASA members.

In the end, the Management Board decided to adopt no new management measures for 2025, and instead move forward with Addendum III, as Waine had hoped.  And when the debate on Addendum III came to a head at the October 2025 Management Board meeting, the American Sportfishing Association was very well prepared to oppose the proposed conservation measures. 

It had used its “Keep America Fishing” website to argue against any further restrictions, and convinced 660 individuals to sign onto its form letter opposing any harvest reductions; another 269 persons altered the form letter in some regard, and were counted as individual comments opposing the conservation measures (how many of those individuals actually participated in the striped bass fishery, and how many just clicked on the link to send in a form letter because they subscribed to the website, but had no real interest in striped bass, is something that we can’t know).  In addition, it had rallied the Center for Sportfishing Policy, Coastal Conservation Association, Boat Owners Association of the United States, Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, and National Marine Manufacturers Association to join them in a letter that argued against the proposed measures, writing, in part, that

“The economic value of the recreational striped bass fishery cannot be overstated:

·       In 2016, striped bass trip and equipment spending across Atlantic coastal states generated approximately $13 billion in total economic output, supported over 104,000 jobs, and contributed more than $7.7 billion to regional GDP.

·       On a per-pound basis, the recreational sector generates 17 times more retail sales value, 8 times more economic activity, and nearly quadruple the jobs compared to the commercial sector.

The proposed season closures—whether prohibiting harvest or targeting—will undoubtedly erode these substantial economic benefits and disproportionately impact coastal small businesses, bait and tackle shops, marinas, boat manufacturers, charter operators, and the entire recreational fishing and boating supply chain.

We represent the entire recreational fishing and boating community, including businesses that serve all anglers regardless of economic background or preferred fishing technique.  Maintaining consistent seasons is the most equitable solution: it preserves both regional economic stability and angler access across preference lines, without inflicting unnecessary economic hardship.  [emphasis added]”

So there is clearly a lot of money at stake for ASA members, and the ASA’s response to Addendum III has made it completely clear that it will do its very best to oppose striped bass conservation measures that might have negative economic impacts on the recreational fishing industry.

But it’s not just about opposing new management measures.  Remember that, when it listed its 2026 policy priorities, the American Sportfishing Association expressed its intent to “improve access to striped bass.”  That “improve access” language suggests that the ASA isn’t going to be happy just maintaining the status quo; it seemingly plans to be proactive, and find ways to pile more dead striped bass on the dock—because that’s what “improve access” really means.

In addition, the Management Board has no current plans to adopt additional management measures before the next benchmark stock assessment is released in the first half of 2027.

So how can the ASA work to “improve access” in the meantime?

There are two ways, both of which have greater long-term implications for the striped bass stock than merely opposing one harvest reduction.

The first would involve influencing the “Work Group” created at the October Management Board meeting, which will be tasked with considering various issues related to striped bass management, and providing advice on issues, which could include changing the reference points used to manage the striped bass stock, that will inform the Management Board when it decides to draft—or not to draft—its next set of management measures.  If the ASA could push the Work Group into recommending a lower biomass target and threshold, it would be in a better position to advance its arguments for higher recreational striped bass kill (which it would, of course, describe as “improved access”).

The second, and potentially more harmful, influence it could have would be to convince the Management Board to amend the terms of reference used in the stock assessment itself, by choosing lower reference points for the spawning stock biomass target and threshold.  By essentially “moving the goalposts,” and lowering the biomass reference points, the Management Board would be able to declare that the stock was no longer overfished, and perhaps even fully recovered, which would in turn allow more liberal regulations that would let anglers bring more dead bass home (and so, “improve access”).

There is a particularly high risk of that happening in the striped bass stock assessment, because the current reference points are not biological reference points derived from the population model used in the assessment, but rather “empirical reference points” based on spawning stock biomass in 1995, the year that the stock was declared fully recovered after it collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s.  Because the reference points are not model-derived, it is very easy for the ASA, and other advocates for higher landings, to argue that another base year, when the population was lower, could be used to determine the reference points, thus damning the striped bass stock to a smaller spawning stock biomass, with a truncated age structure, that is more vulnerable in the long term.

Based on its conduct over the past two years, the American Sportfishing Association and other affiliates of the Center for Sportfishing Policy could well emerge as the greatest obstacle to striped bass conservation over the next few years.  Should that occur, they will prove a formidable opponent, as the organizations are well-funded, employ capable lobbyists, and have purchased the attention of many members of Congress through the Center’s political action committee.

The only thing that conservation advocates have on their side is the weight of striped bass science, and their determination to prevent the stock from ever collapsing again.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MARINE FISHERIES 2026: THE CLOUDS CONTINUE TO GATHER--PART II

 

Last Thursday, I posted the first part of an overview of the 2026 marine fisheries management landscape, and the issues likely to arise over the next year.  That post focused on the highest federal government levels, the administration and Congress, which drive federal fisheries policy, but rely on the regional fishery management councils to turn that policy into practice.

However, with a few exceptions, federal fishery managers lack the authority to manage fish in state waters, so the actions of state managers also can have a significant impact on the health and sustainability of fish stocks.  Along the East Coast, states have joined together to manage fish stocks cooperatively through the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, which manages some species that are not governed by federal fisheries management plans while acting cooperatively with the National Marine Fisheries Service to manage others.

Today’s post will address issues that they will probably confront in 2026.

At the regional fishery management councils

One of the biggest issues that all of the regional fishery management councils will face in 2026 is a lack of timely scientific advice, resulting from the cuts in federal funding for NMFS regional fishery science centers and the resultant layoffs and voluntary departures of many fisheries scientists.  As noted in a press release issued by the New England Fisheries Management Council,

“The Council held an update on recent reductions to federal science and management resources including a total loss of 545 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) positions, including 50 staff positions within the Northeast Region alone.  These reductions have not only delayed management actions, but directly affected stock assessments, surveys, and data streams.

“In 2025, several planned stock assessments were replaced with ‘data updates,’ which are ‘summaries of new data that have become available since that last management track assessment.  Specifically, they update (1) U.S. catch (landings and discards) by commercial and recreational sector, as appropriate, and (2) aggregated [Northeast Fisheries Science Center] survey indices.’  Data updates are expected for many stocks in 2026 as well…  [emphasis in original]”

Such cuts can only render fisheries management more uncertain and less responsive to changes affecting fish stocks, creating greater risks to long-term sustainability and making it more likely that overfishing may occur, that overfished stocks may not recover, and that already stressed stocks will decline further and possibly become overfished, thus causing long-term harm not only to the stocks themselves, but to the recreational and commercial fisheries that they support.

Given the ongoing debate over federal spending, the January 30 deadline to put an appropriations bill in place, and both parties’ apparent intent to avoid a government shutdown, it appears unlikely that significantly more money will be available for fisheries science in the upcoming year, so the current situation is likely to fester for a while.

With that in mind, these are the issues likely to arise at some of the regional fishery management councils over the course of the year.

Atlantic herring/river herring

After a federal district court vacated Amendment 8 to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan in 2022, deciding that its findings of localized depletion and the need to create nearshore areas that excluded midwater trawlers were not supported by substantial evidence, the New England Fishery Management Council decided to address the issue again in the pending Amendment 10 to the herring management plan.

Amendment 10 was originally intended to

“minimize user conflicts, achieve [optimum yield], and support rebuilding of the herring resource,”

as well as create catch caps and time and area closures intended to protect river herring and shad.

Although Amendment 10 is still considered a “multi-year priority,” it was subordinated to an omnibus amendment intended to address management flexibility measures in 2025.  Now, in view of it being specifically mentioned by stakeholders as a measure contrary to the President’s April 17, 2025 Executive Order, there is a significant possibility that Amendment 10 could be abandoned in 2026, and that the proposed additional protections for shad and river herring will not be put in place.

Private anglers to be subordinated in the Mid-Atlantic

Since 2019, the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council, working in conjunction with the ASMFC, has been engaged in what it calls its “Recreational Reform Initiative,” which has essentially been an effort to “increase management flexibility,” which might be interpreted by some (and I’m among them) as an effort to sidestep some of the management provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act in order to allow recreational fishermen to kill more bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass than a strict application of the law would otherwise allow.

Needless to say, the recreational fishing industry has been very supportive of the Initiative, as it views larger annual catch targets as necessary for increased sales and higher profits.  But whether or not the Initiative was in the long-term interest of anglers and the fish they pursue, one thing that could be said was that, up to now, it treated all anglers equitably.

In 2026, that may no longer be the case.

The Council and the ASMFC are now engaged in developing a “Recreational Sector Separation Amendment” that would apply to the bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass fisheries.  As the Council describes it,

“the amendment may consider options for managing for-hire recreational fisheries separately from other recreational fishing modes (referred to as sector separation), as well as options related to for-hire permit and reporting requirements.”

Right now, the Council’s fishery management plans recognize only the commercial and recreational sectors, with anglers fishing from for-hire vessels subject to the recreational rules.  However, along with definitions for “commercial fishing” and “recreational fishing,” Magnuson-Stevens also includes a definition for “charter fishing,” which reads

“The term ‘charter fishing’ means fishing from a vessel carrying a passenger for hire…who is engaged in recreational fishing.”

So, if what the Council and ASMFC were planning to do was to separate the charter fishing sector from the rest of the recreational sector, allocate it its own annual catch limit based on its recent share of recreational landings, and give it regulations different from those governing the recreational sector, which would keep the sector’s landings at or below its ACL, it probably would not present a problem.

But that’s not what’s going on.

The for-hire fleet doesn’t want to be locked into its current landings levels; instead, it is seeking to stay within the recreational annual landings target, but to enjoy more favorable regulations that will allow its share of the landings to expand at the expense of the private-boat and shore based fishermen.  That intent was made clear in various comments made at the November 3, 2025 meeting of the Bluefish and the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass advisory panels.  The report of that meeting noted that Connecticut charter boat captain Michael Pirri

“recalled when he first entered the for-hire fishery, it was widely understood that for-hire vessels harvested more than 10% of the total scup, black sea bass, and summer flounder.  Currently, those estimates have dropped to around 3-4%, depending on the fishery.  He noted that a key goal of the amendment should be to ‘privilege’ the for-hire fleet enough to result in a share of harvest closer to that 10%.  [emphasis added].”

Another way of expressing that is that he wanted to disadvantage the majority of recreational fishermen enough that they surrendered six or seven percent of overall landings to the much smaller group of anglers who fish from the for-hire boats.

So how small is the for-hire fleet’s contribution to the relevant fisheries?  The Council has historically compared the for-hire and private sectors by comparing landings, noting that

“scup and black sea bass have a higher percentage of harvest from the for-hire modes (11% of pounds harvested) compared to summer flounder (5% of pounds harvested).”

But one would expect anglers benefitting from the knowledge and skill of a professional captain and crew to land a disproportionately high share of the catch compared to recreational fishermen, who must depend on their generally more limited skills.  A more accurate gauge of public participation, and indirectly of each sector’s contribution to the social and economic benefits gleaned from each fishery, can be found in the number of trips taken.

There, data from the 2024 season (complete 2025 data is not yet available) shows that in the mid-Atlantic region, the for-hire fleet accounted for 15,485 (0.62%) out of an estimated 2,492,355 trips primarily targeting bluefish, 135,796 (1.60%) of the estimated 8,465,850 trips targeting summer flounder, 52,976 (3.94%) of the estimated 1,346,101 trips targeting scup, and 93,376 (11.83%) of the estimated 789,468 trips targeting black sea bass.

Given that data, there seems to be little reason to disadvantage the vast majority of recreational fishermen, and relegate them to the status of second-class anglers, in order to provide special advantages to what can only be described as a privileged few.

Yet that may be what we see in 2026.

 A draft of the sector separation amendment is almost certain to be completed in the first half of 2026, and go to public hearings soon after that.  Given that recreational fishermen are virtually unrepresented on the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, with just about all of the supposedly “recreational” seats being held by members of the for-hire fleet or others closely tied to the recreational fishing industry, despite that fleet’s relatively tiny contribution to the overall fishery, the disadvantaging of the private-boat and shore-based angler is very likely to occur.

South Atlantic red snapper

The problem besetting the South Atlantic red snapper fishery is very easy to describe but not at all easy to remedy:  Too many red snapper are being caught by recreational fishermen during the closed season, and are subsequently discarded dead.  As a result, recreational and commercial red snapper regulations are extremely restrictive.

On paper, that’s easy to fix.  All NMFS has to do is close an area of the ocean off Georgia and northern Florida for three months or so, to drive down the number of snapper caught as bycatch in other recreational fisheries, which would actually allow the number of red snapper taken home by recreational fishermen to nearly triple.

In the real world, a fix is nearly impossible, as the recreational fishing industry and militant recreational fishing organizations refuse to take responsibility for their own excesses.  Thus, we see the recreational sector continually trying to impeach the federal fisheries management system and transfer red snapper management to the states, where managers are much more vulnerable to political pressure, and have far more authority to ignore overfishing.

Efforts to replace the Marine Recreational Information Program, used to collect recreational data, with unproven state programs are well underway, as are efforts to transfer management authority from NMFS to state fisheries managers.  At the federal level, NMFS seems willing to give in to at least some of the recreational demands; last June, it reneged on an agreement to settle a lawsuit challenging its tolerance for recreational overfishing, backing off a proposed regulation to put the needed area closure in place.

In 2026, with a sympathetic federal administration, a regional management council that is also sympathetic to the recreational sector, and state managers willing to accept responsibility for managing red snapper, along with local congressmen that have already designated a willingness to support recreational demands, we can expect efforts to undermine federal red snapper management not only continue, but accelerate.

A transfer of some or all of the management authority to the states could very well take place.

And the South Atlantic red snapper stock could easily decline again.

Gulf of Mexico Amberjack

Greater amberjack in the Gulf of Mexico have suffered from severe overfishing.  In 2024, recreational fishermen caught more than twice their allocated quota, which meant that, pursuant to the accountability measures contained in the management plan, the 2025 recreational amberjack season should not have opened at all.

However, NMFS failed to prevent the season from opening, and allowed it to run for an entire month before shutting it down on September 27.  Most Gulf states followed NMFS lead, and also shut their seasons down in late September.  The one exception was Louisiana, which allowed fishermen to continue to land amberjack supposedly caught in state waters through October 31, the originally-scheduled close of the federal season.

As part of the announcement that Louisiana would not close its season in concert with the federal closure, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries said,

“Governor Jeff Landry and Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (LDWF) Secretary Tyler Bosworth sent a letter to NOAA Fisheries earlier this month, requesting that management of Greater Amberjack be transferred to the state level.”

Not surprisingly, on its Facebook page, the Louisiana chapter of the Coastal Conservation Association, an “angler’s rights” organization that is very closely affiliated with the fishing tackle and boating industries, stated that it

“applauds the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries and Governor Jeff Landry for their actions and stance on Greater Amberjack.”

Given that the Coastal Conservation Association is one of the organizations most aggressively supporting state management of South Atlantic red snapper, and given that it had taken a similar position with red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico, it is highly likely that, in the event that the 2026 Gulf amberjack season is either curtailed or completely cancelled, we will see another effort to undercut federal fisheries managers and the federal management system, by a group of people who know that state management provides the easiest route to evading science-based management measures, and avoiding the consequences of their own overfishing.

And in the current political environment, they could well succeed.

The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission

Although striped bass will never be a low-profile species at the ASMFC, it will probably not be the most controversial topic at the management table in 2026, as members of the Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board look toward the benchmark stock assessment scheduled for release in the first half of 2027.

Atlantic menhaden

Instead, Atlantic menhaden will probably take the spotlight.  Last October, faced with data that suggested that total allowable catch would have to be cut by well over 50% in order to keep landings at or below the fishing mortality target, the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board only set the total allowable catch for a single year, 2026, rather than for the full three-year period, as was originally planned.  While the 2026 TAC is 20% lower than the total allowable catch in 2025, it did not reduce landings, as menhaden landings have been about 80% of the TAC in recent years.

So, in 2026, the menhaden management board will have to decide whether to further reduce the total allowable catch and, if their answer is yes, whether to reduce it all the way down to the point that would probably keep fishing mortality below the target level. 

There will undoubtedly be substantial public comment, driven by the conservation and angling communities, to make the full cut; if this year’s debate is any guide, the same interests will call for a complete prohibition on the so-called “reduction fishery,” the fleet of large purse seine vessels that dominate the commercial menhaden fishery, catching fish that will be “reduced” into fish meal, oil, and other industrial products.

That fleet is based in Virginia, where it provides employment for hundreds of individuals in an area where good-paying jobs can be hard to find.  It is certain that the reduction industry will strenuously resist a significant cut in the menhaden TAC, and it would obviously do all it can to oppose a complete closure of the reduction fishery.  Whether the other members of the Management Board will insist that landings reductions are taken, or whether the majority will accede to Virginia’s demands, cannot yet be predicted.

But the overall menhaden quota is not the only issue that will be on the table in 2026.  The Atlantic Menhaden Management Board has also agreed to initiate a new addendum to the management plan, which might reduce the cap on reduction fishery landings within the Chesapeake Bay by as much as 50%.

The current Bay cap of 51,000 metric tons was adopted in order to avoid the possibility of localized menhaden depletion in the Chesapeake Bay.  That has been a hot issue over the past couple of years, with some arguing that a shortage of menhaden in the Bay, allegedly due to reduction fleet landings, has led to a host of ills, ranging from a decline in striped bass abundance to nesting failure impacting the Bay’s osprey population.

The problem is that, while a lot of people talk about localized depletion, no one has ever been able to demonstrate that it exists.  So, while it is likely that the debate over a reduced Bay cap will be long on emotion, it is not clear whether a reduced cap will be supported by any hard data.  And it is unclear whether, should hard data be lacking, emotion will be enough to put a Bay cap in place when the Management Board meets to decide the issue in October 2026.

The federal threat

Regardless of the species that it is attempting to manage, the ASMFC has no inherent authority to require its member jurisdictions to comply with its fisheries management plans.  Instead, it must rely on a provision of the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act that reads,

“Within 30 days after receiving a notification from the Commission [that a state has failed to comply with an ASMFC management plan] and after review of the Commission’s determination of noncompliance, the Secretary [of Commerce] shall make a finding on (1) whether the State in question has failed to carry out its responsibilities [to comply with a management plan], and (2) if so, whether the measures that the State has failed to implement and enforce are necessary for the conservation of the fishery in question…

“Upon making a finding…that a State has failed to carry out its responsibilities [to comply with a management plan] and that the measures it failed to implement and enforce are necessary for conservation, the Secretary shall declare a moratorium on fishing in the fishery in question within the waters of the noncomplying State.  [formatting omitted]”

And that may turn out to be a problem when it comes to enforcing its fisheries management decisions this year, as the current administration is more concerned with deregulating fisheries than in conserving fish stocks.

Consider the two menhaden issues discussed above.

Say that the Atlantic Menhaden Management Board, at its October meeting, decides to phase in a reduction in menhaden landings over the next few years, dropping landings from somewhere around 186,840 metric tons in 2026 to 108,450 metric tons in 2029.  And say that Virginia, which is allocated about three-quarters of all commercial menhaden landings, decides that such cuts would do too much harm to its menhaden fishermen, refuses to put the new, lower landings levels in place, and goes out of compliance, arguing to the Secretary of Commerce that the 186,840 metric ton annual catch limit does not lead to overfishing, and thus further reduction are not “necessary for the conservation of the fishery.”

And say that, in considering Virginia’s noncompliance, the Secretary looks to the Executive Order that President Trump signed on April 17, 2025, notes its intent to “unburden our commercial fishermen from costly and inefficient regulations” and to “promote…sale and export of United States fishery and aquaculture products,” recognizes that most of the menhaden  caught by Virginia fishermen are sold to a Canadian buyer, and decides that such considerations override the Management Board’s preference to reduce fishing mortality to the target level, because even a 186,840 metric ton harvest will not lead to overfishing, so the reduction is not necessary for the conservation of the Atlantic menhaden fishery.

Under such hypothetical conditions, the Secretary of Commerce could easily excuse Virginia’s noncompliance.

Or, instead of a Virginia refusing to comply with a reduced annual catch limit, consider what would happen if it refused to comply with a reduction in the cap for reduction fishery harvest within the Chesapeake Bay, particularly if no one can provide statistically valid data supporting the claim that the reduction fishery is causing localized depletion in the Chesapeake Bay.

Under such conditions, it would almost be expected that the Secretary would find that a reduced Bay cap is not necessary to conserve the menhaden resource.

And menhaden are only one example.  Given the last April’s Executive Order, and given the current administration’s propensity to monetize natural resources for the highest possible short-term gain, it is very possible that the Secretary will tend to support states that go out of compliance with ASMFC fishery management plans.

That possibility is likely to have a chilling effect on ASMFC management actions, and make the ASMFC less willing to adopt even modestly precautionary management measures in 2026, regardless of the species in question.

An increasingly aggressive recreational fishing industry

One of the things that we have seen over the past decade is a recreational fishing industry that is becoming more and more aggressive in its opposition to conservation-oriented fishery management measures, and in its promotion of new approaches to fisheries management that will lead to increased recreational landings and, at least in theory, to higher industry profits.

The industry and industry-affiliated organizations such as the Coastal Conservation Association and the Theordore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership first targeted the red snapper fisheries in the South Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico, seeking to weaken  the federal fisheries management system in favor of state managers who are more susceptible to political pressure and more likely to tolerate overfishing if that’s what local stakeholders want.

However, in recent years the industry and its fellow travelers have become more and more aggressive.  If Social Security has been deemed the “third rail” of the political process—that is, the program that no one can contest if they want their political career to survive—then striped bass could reasonably be called the third rail of fisheries politics on the upper East Coast; no organization who wanted to have a viable presence among salt water anglers could take a stand against striped bass conservation.

But that changed in 2025, when industry and industry-affiliated organizations such as the American Sportfishing Association, the Center for Sportfishing Policy, Marine Retailers Association of the Americas, National Marine Manufacturers Association and others opposed a 12% reduction in striped bass fishing mortality needed to better ensure that the stock would be fully rebuilt by 2029.

We can expect the sportfishing industry to take advantage of the current administration’s hostility toward conservation measures, and its support for corporate profits, and become ever more aggressive in weakening federal fisheries management while trying harder to warp state and regional fisheries management toward greater exploitation and greater short-term economic benefits for the fishing industry, regardless of the long-term impacts on fish stocks.

The bottom line

The current political environment is extremely hostile to fisheries conservation efforts and to precautionary management approaches that are most likely to benefit fisheries in the long term.

Conservation advocates are being forced to take a defensive stance, with emphasis on limiting their losses rather than making any meaningful gains.  This situation existed throughout 2025, and even under the best circumstances is likely to extend into the first few weeks of 2029.  Depending on who ends up in the White House and in Congress, it could last far longer.

The one ray of hope on the horizon is the 2026 mid-term elections.  If control of at least one house of Congress can pass to persons who aren’t actively trying to tear apart the federal fishery management system, and who might actually care about the long-term health of fish stocks, we might not see any progress on important conservation issues, but we are at least likely to enjoy a deadlock where, at the legislative level at least, no more harm is being done.

It's sad that such is the best we can hope for, but that is the current reality for everyone who cares about the long-term health of the nation’s fish stocks.

 

MARINE FISHERIES 2006: THE CLOUDS CONTINUE TO GATHER

 

As One Angler’s Voyage enters 2026, it is time to once again survey the fisheries management landscape, and make some predictions as to what problems and what solutions may arise in the upcoming year. 

Last year, as I set out on that task, I noted, with respect to 2025, that

“I don’t think that I have seen a year with so much potential for things to go wrong in the past quarter-century.”

And as I noted in last Thursday’s post, a lot did go wrong in 2025. 

Unfortunately, all of the forces that combined to make last year a bad one from a fisheries conservation perspective—a federal administration intent on weakening environmental laws and Hell-bent on monetizing the nation’s natural resources as quickly as possible, without regard for long-term sustainability; a Congress equally dedicated to undoing a half-century of progress on conservation issues in order to serve the short-term interests of the corporate donors that keep them in office; an Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission that seems unable and/or unwilling to make hard but needed decisions; and an increasingly aggressive recreational fishing and boating industry that, along with allied “anglers’ rights” organizations, is rapidly expanding its efforts to block fisheries conservation efforts and weaken the federal fishery management system in the name of “angler access” (that is, more dead fish in anglers’ coolers, regardless of how that might impact the stock) and the supposed “economic benefits” that such dead fish generate for the angling industry—remain in place.

What also remains in place are the seeds that those forces planted in 2025, initiatives that might have had relatively little or even no impact last year, but which laid the groundwork for a potentially devastating assault on the current fisheries management system, beginning in 2026.

At the same time, we also saw some modest conservation initiatives launched in 2025, which may or may not bear fruit in the upcoming year.  Without exception, such initiatives occurred at the state/ASMFC level which, while historically a place where conservation efforts have gone to die, currently offers the best hope of properly managing at least some of our coastal fish stocks.

With that introduction out of the way, let’s take a look at what the new year might bring, beginning right at the top.

Executive Order 14276 and the National Marine Fisheries Service

On April 17, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 14276, “Restoring America’s Seafood Competitiveness.”

When an executive order laments that

“Federal overregulation has restricted fishermen from productively harvesting American seafood including through restrictive catch limits, selling our fishing grounds to foreign offshore wind companies, inaccurate and outdated fisheries data, and delayed adoption of modern technology,”

and establishes, as policy, the intent to

“unburden our commercial fishermen from costly and inefficient regulation,”

it’s clear that the administration has fisheries managers and the fishery management system in its crosshairs.

But Executive Order 14276 goes further than merely setting a policy of deregulation.  It instructs the Secretary of Commerce to

“consider suspending, revising, or rescinding regulations that overly burden America’s commercial fishing, [and]…identify the most heavily overregulated fisheries requiring action and take appropriate action to reduce the regulatory burden on them,”

and to

“request that each Regional Fishery Management Council…provide…updates to their recommendations…to reduce burdens on domestic fishing and to increase production.  Building upon the earlier goals, identified actions should stabilize markets, improve access, enhance economic profitability, and prevent closures.”

It is probably significant that nothing in the Executive Order requires the Secretary to ensure the continued health and long-term stability of the fisheries subject to the intended deregulation.

Executive Order 14276 didn’t have too much impact on fisheries management in 2025, although it undoubtedly colored at least some NMFS decisions.  Rather than immediately engaging in a deregulation process, the agency spent most of 2025 seeking input from the regional fishery management councils and the public on what fisheries should be addressed first and what regulations should be revised or rescinded.  The final comment period on such matters didn’t close until December 15.

However, with the comment period closed, we can expect the deregulation process to begin in earnest in 2026.  While we can’t know exactly what form such deregulation might take, we can probably take some guidance from stakeholder comments submitted to NMFS and to some of the regional fishery management councils.        

The comments addressing conservation, as opposed to purely economic and trade issues (e.g., providing emergency relief to fishermen or restricting competition from foreign seafood imports) generally fell into a few general categories. 

Many of the comments sent to both NMFS and to the Mid-Atlantic and New England fishery management councils sought commercial access to protected areas such as the New England Canyons and Seamounts Marine National Monument and the Papahanaumokuakea Marine National Monument off northwestern Hawaii.  In a similar vein, various commercial fishermen and commercial fishing organizations sought access to areas off the Atlantic and Gulf coasts that are currently closed to pelagic longlining, while scallop fishermen and organizations representing the ocean quohog and surf clam fisheries asked to be able to dredge in habitat areas of particular concern intended to protect Atlantic cod spawning and nursery areas, and also in what is currently designated the Georges Bank Paralytic Shellfish Poisoning Closed Area.

Another significant portion of the comments asked that NMFS provide relief from Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammals Act requirements, whether those requirements are intended to protect Atlantic right whales from entanglement in lobster trap lines or Pacific humpback whales from entanglement in fixed fishing gear, protect endangered runs of Pacific salmon from accidental harvest, or protect sea turtles and various marine mammals from being hooked and drowned in pelagic longline gear.

Other efforts at reducing bycatch, such as time and area closures to prevent the incidental catch of river herring, also had their opponents.  But it was notable that, by and large, the comments made by commercial fishermen and commercial fishing organizations did not generally seek to set aside science-based catch limits or similar regulations.

Perhaps for that reason—that commercial fishermen did not generally complain about the “restrictive catch limits” or similar management measures cited in the Executive Order—NMFS reopened the public comment period for an additional 15 days in December, presumably seeking more evidence of “regulations that overburden America’s commercial fishing” industry.

Yet, although the Executive Order repeatedly referenced commercial fishing, and didn’t mention recreational fishing at all, recreational fishing organizations also provided comments on what they considered “burdensome” regulations, and their comments were much more focused on catch limits and other specific management measures. 

For example, a few party/charter boat associations asked that the recreational Atlantic bluefin tuna quota be increased, while in the South Atlantic, a large recreational industry group, the Center for Sportfishing Policy, characterized NMFS’ proposal for a seasonal closure of the snapper/grouper fishery off Georgia and northern Florida

“a federal bureaucracy run amok,”

and

“a convoluted response to a paper crisis,”

even though the proposed Secretarial amendment underlying such closure was drafted as part of a settlement agreement in a lawsuit brought by commercial fishermen fed up with NMFS’ failure to rein in chronic recreational overfishing, and high levels of dead discards,  in the South Atlantic red snapper fishery.

The Jersey Coast Anglers Association provided a more varied list of regulatory complaints, seeking more relaxed regulation of the recreational black sea bass fishery in the mid-Atlantic and complaining that

“The overpopulation of Smooth Dogfish in areas such as Sandy Hook and Raritan Bay is disrupting ecological balance by outcompeting other species for forage.  Current management appears insufficient to address this issue.”

The Association also complained that summer flounder and bluefish populations remained low and did not seem to be responding to current management initiatives, although it was not clear how those comments related to the Executive Order’s theme of overregulated fisheries.

Thus, what we have seen so far have been commercial fishing interests primarily addressing regulations that might be best characterized as presenting structural issues—areas closed to fishing, restrictions arising out of the Marine Mammal Act and Endangered Species Act, requirements for paid observers, etc.—while recreational interests have been more focused on what appears to be the primary concern of the Executive Order, regulations that restrict the ability to harvest fish.

While it’s not clear how NMFS will ultimately implement the Executive Order, it isn’t hard to predict that the agency will not be striking a precautionary stance, but rather will set annual catch limits at the highest levels permitted by law and the most liberal interpretations of the available data and scientific advice. 

We will probably see the agency seek inventive ways to circumvent the requirements imposed by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, perhaps adopting new regulations that resemble the “Percent Change Approach” adopted by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, which might comply with the strict letter of the law but flaunt the statute’s intent of constraining the commercial and recreational landings to an annual catch limit established by the biologists who staff each regional fishery management council’s Scientific and Statistical Committee.

Thus, while we can’t be certain of precisely how the Executive Order will be implemented, we can be pretty sure that any implementation will weaken the federal fisheries management process and threaten the long-term sustainability of the nation’s fish stocks.

A conservation-averse Congress

While the current administration is clearly opposed to fisheries conservation efforts and the regulations needed to maintain healthy fish stocks, the current Congress presents a greater long-term threat to the health of marine fish stocks, as it has the ability to make changes to federal law that might take years, if not decades, to undo.

Such legislation is likely to take one of three forms:  It will either override a regulation issued by NMFS that is unpopular with the recreational and/or commercial fishing industry (although it is doubtful that NMFS will issue such a rule, given Executive Order 14276 and the administration’s views of fisheries regulation), make significant changes to Magnuson-Stevens and/or the Marine Recreational Information Program that is used to collect and analyze recreational effort, catch, and landings data, or it will amend another federal statute that impacts the health of fish stocks (e.g., the Endangered Species Act).

There are currently at least three bills pending in the House of Representatives that exemplify such legislation.

One, the Red Snapper Act, H.R. 470, would prevent NMFS from closing any portion of the ocean off the South Atlantic coast to fishing for snapper or grouper (or other species included in the snapper-grouper fishery management plan, until a study known as the “Great South Atlantic Red Snapper Count” is completed and its results incorporated into a red snapper stock assessment. 

As a practical matter, H.R. 470 isn’t going anywhere, as NMFS’ decision not to institute such a bottom closure off Georgia and northern Florida has rendered it moot.  However, to the extent that other regulations, perhaps including those already in place, displease the fishing industry, other bills seeking to override such regulations are likely to be introduced.

Another bill, H.R. 5699, the “Fisheries Data Modernization and Accuracy Act,” remains a threat to the viability of the Marine Recreational Information Program and to federal fisheries science.  It would encourage states to develop their own recreational data collection programs, require the data from those programs to be used in fisheries management decisions in place of data developed by MRIP, and also require NMFS to contract out at least some of its research projects, while mandating that the results of those projects be included in stock assessments regardless of the views of NMFS’ scientists.  The latter provision would reduce the amount of funding available for NMFS’ regional science centers and scientific staff, as well as the influence of NMFS’ science on the management process.

H.R. 5699 remains very much in play, and constitutes an ongoing threat to the federal fisheries management system.  We can probably expect to see additional legislation, which also seeks to reduce the role of the Marine Recreational Information Program, weaken the conservation provisions of Magnuson-Stevens, and/or shift the management of some species from federal to more politically vulnerable state fisheries managers, in the course of the upcoming year.

The third bill, H.R. 181, is untitled.  It was introduced by Rep. Tom McClintock (R-CA), and would primarily impact Pacific salmon, although in theory, any anadromous fish stock, and perhaps some purely coastal species, could be affected.  A bill description reads

“This bill requires naturally propagated animals (e.g., wild animals) and artificially propagated animals to be treated the same under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).

“Specifically, distinctions between naturally propagated animals and artificially propagated animals may not be made when the federal government makes determinations under the ESA, such as determinations to designate endangered species, threatened species, or critical habitats.

“In addition, the bill requires the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service to authorize the use of artificial propagation of animals of a species when mitigation is required under the ESA.

“This bill applies to all endangered or threatened species regardless of when they were listed as endangered or threatened.”

In other words, the bill would allow a natural run of salmon, steelhead, or any other species—the various sturgeon come to mind—to be extirpated, so long as there was a hatchery that was ready, willing, and able to keep the species, or fish from a particular run, from being wiped out.  The fact that the fish were incapable of maintaining themselves naturally, did not interact with their ecosystem in a natural manner, and were more suited to artificial propagation than to natural spawning would be irrelevant.

Thus, mining, timber, shipping, agricultural, hydropower, ranching, or other interests would be able to degrade or destroy habitat essential to an animal’s life cycle—say, critical spawning or nursery areas—and instead of those doing the damage being required to mitigate it and/or discontinue the harmful activity, NMFS and/or the Fish and Wildlife Service would be required to substitute artificial propagation for natural reproduction while the destruction is allowed to continue.

While such bills are a sort of niche legislation that won’t impact most marine fish stocks, similar legislation that relieves industry of responsibility for harming marine ecosystems and/or critical habitat is likely to emerge in the upcoming year should industry deem them necessary.

The only bright spot is that we’re in an election year, and given the controversies already raging over funding the federal government, various political scandals, and intraparty quarrels, legislators may find little time left to pursue fisheries legislation, particularly since, during the second half of the year, they will be more concerned with raising money and getting reelected than in anything that might resemble legislation.

As for Part II

Congress and the administration aren’t the only entities impacting marine fish stocks.  The regional fishery management councils, the ASMFC, the states, and various private entities all have their role to play.

But this post has already run long enough.  I’ll deal with those other entities when Part II comes out on Sunday.