FISH FARMS UNDER FIRE

 

It wasn’t long ago that aquaculture—fish farming—was widely viewed as a benign activity that promised to feed people while freeing wild fish stocks from the stresses caused by commercial fishing.  Analogies were drawn between the evolution of hunter/gatherer societies into more advanced agricultural communities, as many predicted that the eventual prohibitions of market hunting and the commercialization of most freshwater fish species would logically and inevitably lead to prohibitions on commercial fishing for marine fish species, too.

But somewhere along the way, harsh realities intervened, and—at least to some people—fish farming no longer seems to be the panacea that it once appeared.  As noted in an article released by the Associated Press,

“as [aquaculture] has grown, the problems associated with large-scale farming have grown with it…The farms and the waste from them can degrade and pollute nearby ecosystems, diseases can quickly sweep through the tightly packed fish, and gathering the feed for the animals can cause distant environmental problems.”

One critic argued that

“Approximately 20% of the global catch of wild fish goes toward making fishmeal, and much of it is directed to feed farmed aquatic animals.  This demand has intensified over the years, creating a troubling feedback loop where the aquaculture industry depletes wild fish stocks to sustain itself.  The depletion of smaller forage fish is particularly concerning, as these fish play an essential role in marine ecosystems, supporting larger species, including wild fish, marine mammals, and seabirds.”

The Conservation Law Foundation, an advocacy group that focuses on conservation issues in the New England region, noted that

“up to hundreds of thousands of fish crowd each floating pen.  The fish eat and grow at astounding rates—and defecate.  A typical industrial farm of several hundred thousand fish produces around one million pounds of waste annually.  That’s roughly the same amount of waste generated by Maine’s largest city, Portland, in a year.

“…[The waste] is not captured or treated.  Instead, it floats out through the pens to pile up on the ocean floor.  The waste accumulates over time to form a layer of foul-smelling black sludge that is toxic to small bottom-dwelling creatures.  Eventually, the seafloor around an industrial salmon farm will transform into a lifeless landscape.

“Fish also produce a lot of nitrogen waste.  Nitrogen pollution mixed with warm water creates perfect conditions for toxic algae outbreaks…Nitrogen pollution also clouds the water, blocking eelgrass nurseries on the seafloor from essential sunlight.”

The Conservation Law Foundation also noted the threat that farmed fish can pose to their wild counterparts.

“Contagious diseases quickly spread through the penned fish.  The salmon industry uses antibiotics to prevent disease, but that increases the risk of antibiotic resistance in humans who consume the farmed fish.

“…[S]mall crustaceans, known as sea lice, cling to salmon and eat their skin.  In natural conditions, sea lice parasites attach in small numbers, making them a minor issue that doesn’t affect a fish’s health.  But in industrial salmon farms, they spread easily between captive fish…To control sea lice, the salmon industry has historically used chemical treatments and pesticides—including some that kill crustaceans like lobsters.

“Disease outbreaks and sea lice infestations at industrial salmon farms also threaten nearby endangered wild salmon and fish species that are key to fishermen.  Viruses and sea lice larvae travel through the water from captive fish to wild fish.  Escaped farmed fish…can also transmit disease and parasites.”

After one or more seals damaged net pens that Cooke Aquaculture had installed in the waters off Cutler, Maine two years ago, allowing 50,000 juvenile salmon to escape into the state’s coastal waters, groups such as the Atlantic Salmon Federation expressed concern that the escaped fish could interbreed with endangered, wild salmon, and thus lower the wild fish’s chances of survival.

The National Marine Fisheries Service acknowledges such concerns, but claims that such threats are receding while also providing the reassuring comment that

“Marine aquaculture in the United States operates within one of the most comprehensive regulatory environments in the world.  Farms sited in U.S. waters must meet a suite of federal, state, and local regulations that safeguard environmental health, water quality, food safety, and public health.”

Even so, public sentiment seems to be swinging against fish farms, not only in the United States, but elsewhere in the Americas.

The current antipathy toward fish farms probably had its roots in the 2017 failure at another net pen facility, also owned by Cooke Aquaculture, in the State of Washington, which allowed about 250,000 Atlantic salmon to escape into Washington waters.  Cooke blamed the event on unusually strong tides, but state officials disagreed, finding that the pen had survived similar tides in the past.  Instead, Washington blamed the escape on Cooke’s failure to properly maintain the pen, finding that the company allowed excessive marine growth to build up on the pen, to the point that the aggregate weight of the fouling built up on the pen was six times the weight of the pen itself, and caused the pen to collapse.

The State of Washington, as well as many of its residents, including coastal tribes with long traditions of salmon fishing, were outraged by the escape and Cooke’s alleged negligence, fearing that the escaped Atlantic salmon might survive and compete with already threatened runs of native Pacific salmon.  As a result, in 2018, Washinton legislators passed a ban on farming Atlantic salmon in state waters.

In 2022, Washington informed Cooke that it would not renew the company’s leases, which allow it to establish aquaculture facilities in state waters.  The state alleged that Cooke had violated the terms of the leases, and that it had

“determined that allowing Cooke to continue operations posed risks of environmental harm to state-owned aquatic lands resulting from lack of adherence to lease provisions and increased costs to [the Washington Department of Natural Resources] associated with contract compliance, monitoring, and enforcement.”

Early last January, Washington took the last logical step, issuing regulations that banned all net-pen fish farms, regardless of the species involved, in waters leased by the state.

That ban is being challenged by the fish farmers, in the form of a group calling itself the Northwest Aquaculture Alliance, which claims that the rulemaking process leading to the ban was invalid, because its outcome was predetermined.  It’s never easy to predict what a court might decide, and it is possible that the Aquaculture Alliance could prevail, but it’s probably safe to say that in the State of Washington, aquaculture proponents, like salmon returning to spawn, will have to swim against some very strong currents if they expect to achieve their goals.

Farther north, 2024 saw the adoption of a new rule that would ban net pen fish farms in the Canadian province of British Columbia.  Canadian Fisheries and Oceans Minister Diane Lebouthillier announced that the farms must be shut down by 2029.  While they may continue operations until then, the farms' sea lice management measures will be more closely controlled, they will face stricter reporting requirements, and their interactions with marine mammals will be more closely monitored.

Things aren’t too much different far to the south where, by a unanimous vote of its legislature, the Argentinian province of Tierra del Fuego banned net-pen salmon farms in 2021.  According to the website Patagonia Works, which reported on the ban,

“Consequences of salmon farming include massive salmon mortalities, intensification of toxic algae blooms (such as red tide), introduction of exotic species, the loss of local fauna, generation of dead zones, entanglement of marine mammals and bacterial resistance [to antibiotics].  According to a Just Economics report, the salmon industry seeks to grow fivefold over the next 10 years, threatening the waters of the Beagle Channel.”

Such growth, and the threats to the marine ecosystem that it would create, was unacceptable to the residents of Tierra del Fuego, who sought and received the political support to shut down the net pen farms.

Even in Chile, Argentina’s neighbor and one of the world’s biggest producers of net pen-farmed salmon, people are beginning to question the practice. 

About one year ago, the New York Times has reported,

“a report from the United Nations called salmon farming ‘one of the main threats to the environment’ in Patagonia.  David R. Boyd, an associate professor at the University of British Columbia, who prepared the U.N. report, recommended suspending ‘the expansion of salmon aquaculture pending independent scientific analysis of adverse environmental impacts’—a call that the industry rejected.”

The Times also reported that

“Arturo Clement, the president of the industry association, SalmonChile, acknowledged that, in the past, the sector had ‘made mistakes and we still have much room for improvement…We are convinced that it is possible to make environmental care compatible with economic development.”

Others are not as certain.  They point to the same issues identified elsewhere—antibiotic use, pollution from fish waste creating hypoxic “dead zones” and harmful algae blooms—as threatening Chile’s marine environment.  The Times described Tarsicio Antezana, a retired oceanographer who lives on an island off the coast of southern Chile, seeing

“heaps of garbage and fish waste abandoned by salmon companies…when they leave.  The trash sits on shorelines for months, and in some cases, he said that only outrage from local residents forced the companies to clean up.”

The fish farms are now moving into an area in southernmost Chile, a Patagonian region known as the Magallenes, which is still largely wilderness.  Fish farm opponents argue that increasing the farm’s presence in the Magallenes will have a “catastrophic” impact on the Magallenes ecosystems, which collectively house about one-third of the Earth’s marine biodiversity.  The Times noted that

“Leticia Caro, a member of the Indigenous Kawesqar community, said she has already seen devastating effects of the salmon industry on her people’s ancestral territory in the Magallanes.  She described seafloor contamination, the loss of native fish species her community relies on for food and the dumping of industrial waste in Kawesqar fishing areas.”

Yet, while there are many voices in Chile that oppose expanding the farms, there are also many who seek the economic benefits that the farms provide.  Thus, while the Chilean farms are under fire from some quarters, it is not clear whether the government will take any action to significantly curb their activities.

The global opposition to fish farms has generally focused on salmon net pens sited in cold-water environments.  Land-based production is generally considered a viable, ecosystem-friendly alternative to the open water farms.  Thus, the newest challenge to fish farming might be something of a surprise.

In Maryland—hardly traditional salmon country—the Chesapeake Bay Foundation is seeking judicial review of a permit that would allow a proposed land-based salmon farm to discharge as much as 1.9 million gallons of water per day into the Susquehanna River, the largest and arguably most important tributary of the Chesapeake Bay.

The Foundation’s concerns stem from the fact that AquaCon, the proposed plant’s operator, plans to build the farm just five miles above the Susquehanna Flats, an important spawning area for striped bass and other species such as American shad, hickory shad, alewife, and blueback herring.  The Foundation fears that, just as in the case of net pens, the land-based farm’s discharge water would contain too much waste matter, could promote algae blooms and resulting hypoxic “dead zones,” and so cause substantial harm to the flats’ submerged aquatic vegetation as well as to the many fish that gather on the flats to spawn.

The publication National Fisherman quoted Paul Small, the Foundation’s vice president for litigation, who observed that

“Land-based salmon farms are relatively new and unpredictable.  Knowing the prior failure of these types of plants, and that the Susquehanna River is already overloaded with nutrient pollution, [the] permit must protect against these risks.”

The publication noted that the Chesapeake Bay Foundation is not seeking to prevent the AquaCon plant from ever operating.  Instead,

“CBF will be working to ensure [the] permit is strengthened to adequately consider the imminent threats to the Susquehanna Flats and nearby aquatic habitats.”

Open-water fish farms have, in the past, done significant harm to the waters where they were cited.  As land-based farms are proposed as alternatives, it only makes sense to ensure that they are properly regulated before they begin operations, so that both the farm and the surrounding environment can thrive.

Yet not everyone believes that fish farming ought to be thoroughly regulated.

On April 17, President Donald Trump issued an executive order intended to support the growth of aquaculture in the United States, which requires that the Secretary of Commerce,

“in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and with input from the United States fishing industry, shall immediately consider suspending, revising, or rescinding regulations that overly burden America’s commercial fishing, aquaculture, and fish processing industries…”

and

“in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, shall develop and implement an America First Seafood Strategy to promote production, marketing, sale, and export of United States fishery and aquaculture products and strengthen domestic processing capacity…”

During Trump’s first term, he also made efforts to promote fish farming.  In support of those efforts, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued a nationwide aquaculture permit in 2020, which would have opened the door to open-water fish farms for various species, first in the Gulf of Mexico, and then elsewhere along the United States’ coasts.  But on March 17, a judge for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against the issuance of such permit.

The lawsuit, brought by the Center for Food Safety and a group of environmental organizations, argued that the Corps’ permit failed to properly address fish farms’ environmental threats.  The federal district judge, Kymberly K. Evanston, issued an initial ruling last fall which criticized the Corps for not acknowledging the harm that fish farms cause the environment.  Her March ruling vacated the permit altogether.

The court’s decision points out the difficulties that the administration faces in its efforts to promote fish farming.  Earlier court decisions, in 2018 and 2020, also ruled against offshore aquaculture in the Gulf of Mexico.  In another instance, the federal government provided some funding for a pilot fish farming project that would have been located about 45 miles off Florida’s Gulf Coast.  However, public opinion was so strongly set against the project—regulators received almost 45,000 comments opposing it—that it was eventually cancelled.

Paul Zajicek, executive director of the National Aquaculture Association, believes that the opposition is misplaced, and that would-be fish farmers are unreasonably burdened by

“a permitting system that is too lengthy, too costly, and too subject to legal challenges from groups opposed to commercial aquaculture.”

Given the recent court decision, he believes that companies may now be required to seek permits on an individual project-by-project basis, instead of relying on permits that cover a broad expanse of federal waters.  Such an approach is likely to add time and effort to the permitting process.

But Marianne Cufone, executive director of the Recirculating Farms Coalition, sees no problem with that.

“Florida is not Maine.  California is not Texas.  And in just the Gulf of Mexico, there are significantly different habitats [and] different fish species that could be affected…

“Claiming one size fits all doesn’t seem realistic, and the court agreed.  Now they can’t use one big permit to speed these things through.”

Despite the recent setbacks, fish farming is not a dead issue in the United States.  There are many in the industry who want to see it not only continue, but also expand.

But the rapid growth of aquaculture promoted in Trump’s executive order is unlikely to occur.  Even if regulations governing aquaculture are relaxed—and, in fact, aquaculture isn’t actually regulated by NMFS or by any other federal agency, although some, like the Army Corps of Engineers, might have regulatory authority over some aspects of aquaculture operations—public opposition to such a private appropriation and likely degradation of the nation’s public waterways ensures that any proposed fish farms receive thorough review, to make sure that such projects meet all biological and legal standards.

Given the past problems that fish farms have caused, both in the United States and elsewhere, the public is right to insist that no more be built until all of the public’s concerns are addressed.

 

 

 

NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER TO IMPACT FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

On April 17, the White House issued a new executive order, with the hope of “Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness.”  It will take some time to determine how close that executive order will come to achieving its goal.  But whether or not it is ever deemed successful, the new executive order will undoubtedly impact and almost certainly impair the federal fisheries management process.

Although substantially shorter, the new executive order is, in substance, similar to Executive Order 13921, which was titled “Promoting American Seafood Competitiveness and Economic Growth,” which was issued by President Donald Trump on May 7, 2020.  Both executive orders (and it’s probably important to note that Executive Order 13921 remains in effect) seek to minimize the regulation of commercial fisheries.  Both have the laudable goal of reducing IUU (illegal, unreported, and unregulated) fishing.  Both seek in increase the safety of imported seafood, increase the United States’ seafood exports, and support aquaculture, although the latter issue was more completely addressed in EO 13921.

But there is one very big difference between the two executive orders, and that difference is timing.

Trump’s loss in the 2020 election meant that his administration would have to cede power only eight months after EO 13921 was issued.  Thus, despite the ambitious policy initiatives outlined in that order, there was little time to put them in place.

Some directives contained in the earlier executive order couldn’t even be carried out before Trump was voted out of office.  For example, one section of the earlier order read

“Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce shall submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, and the Chair of the Council of Environmental Quality a report evaluating the recommendations [to reduce the number of regulations affecting the commercial fishing industry] and describing any actions taken to implement those recommendations.  The report shall be updated annually for the following 2 years.”

Before the specified 1-year period had run, Trump was no longer in office, so his administration had no opportunity to create or review the specified report, and the two years of required updates quickly became irrelevant.  Existing fisheries regulations remained in place, other than for routine adjustments.

This time, things are different. 

The new executive order was issued when the current administration has about 3 ¾ years yet to run, which provides more than enough time for its provisions to be implemented.  When a provision reads,

“The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and with input from the United States fishing industry, shall immediately consider suspending, revising, or rescinding regulations that overly burden America’s commercial fishing, aquaculture, and fish processing industries at the fishery-specific level.  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce shall identify the most heavily overregulated fisheries requiring action and take appropriate action to reduce the regulatory burden on them, in cooperation with the Regional Fishery Management Councils, interagency partners, and through public-private partnerships, as appropriate…”

we can reasonably expect to see some regulations put on the chopping block fairly quickly.

Of course, picking which regulations are going to get the axe is going to be an interesting process.  The most recent executive order targets “regulations that overly burden America’s commercial fishing,” those creating “the most heavily overregulated fisheries,” “unnecessary regulatory burdens,” and “outdated and unnecessarily burdensome regulations,” while seeking “additional streamlining of fishery regulations.”

But what criteria will be used to determine that a regulation is “overly” or “unnecessarily” burdensome?  Or to determine that a fishery has become “heavily overregulated?”  

Such questions become particularly important when the recent executive order itself concedes that, in recommending the “suspending, revising, or rescinding” of supposedly unnecessary fisheries regulations,

“Recommended actions shall be consistent with the requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.), the Marine Mammals Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq.) and other applicable laws.”

Given that existing regulations were only put in place after a full rulemaking process, which involved publishing the proposed rules, followed by a public comment period, revisions made in consideration of such public comment, and a final review by agency counsel to determine that the regulations themselves were consistent with applicable law, it wouldn’t seem that may current rules could be abolished or amended while remaining within the executive order’s (and well-established law’s) “consistent with the requirements” standard.

Magnuson-Stevens’ requirements for fishery management plans, plan amendments, and related actions are, in the end, very clear.  Among other things, the statute includes National Standard 1, which reads,

“Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing industry.”

“Optimum,” with respect to yield, is defined as

“the amount of fish which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and recreational opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine ecosystems; is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic, social, or ecological factor; and in the case of an overfished fishery, provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the maximum sustainable yield in such fishery.”

Thus, given that current regulations must, by law, already be designed to achieve optimum yield, which in most cases will be something close to maximum sustainable yield, it’s difficult to believe that many existing regulations will be ripe for “suspending, revising, or rescinding,” if the administration truly wishes to increase commercial landings only by taking action “consistent with the requirements of…Magnuson-Stevens.” 

However, Magnuson-Stevens also provides that

“The Secretary [of Commerce] shall also establish advisory guidelines (which shall not have the force and effect of law), based on the national standards [for fishery conservation and management], to assist in the development of fishery management plans.”

Revising such guidelines could provide the administration with a way to increase fish landings without running afoul of Magnuson-Stevens, albeit at additional risk to managed fish stocks. To look at just one example, the guidelines issued to help regional fishery management councils meet the objectives of National Standard 1 include guidance on

“specifying maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and [optimum yield]; specifying status determination criteria…so that overfishing and overfished determinations can be made for stocks and stock complexes in [a fishery management plan]; preventing overfishing and achieving [optimum yield], incorporation of scientific and management uncertainty in control rules, and adaptive management using annual catch limits…and measures to ensure accountability…; and rebuilding stocks and stock complexes.  [formatting omitted]”

The guidelines direct that

“When specifying limits and accountability measures, Councils must take an approach that considers uncertainty in scientific information and management control of the fishery,”

and provide advice for doing so.  However, there is no explicit language in Magnuson-Stevens that requires regional fishery management councils to consider uncertainty (although there is language requiring such councils not to set catch levels above the levels recommended by their scientific and statistical committees, which typically consider uncertainty when establishing the acceptable biological catch).  

Thus, the National Marine Fisheries Service could, if it chose, rewrite the guidelines to eliminate references to uncertainty of any kind.  If that was done, higher catch limits could be set, although ignoring uncertainty would make it more likely that such higher limits could unintentionally lead to overfishing.

The risk of such higher limits causing harm to fish stocks is increased, since any quota increases would be adopted at a time when other administration actions promise to increase the amount of uncertainty that fisheries managers will have to contend with.  Current administration proposals would reduce NMFS funding by roughly 30 percent, and lead to cuts in the agency’s scientific staff.  

That will mean that stock assessments, critical to determining the status of fish stocks, wouls be prepared less often, making changes in stock status harder to detect, and making it more likely that a stock will become overfished, or become subject to overfishing, before managers have enough information to prevent such conditions from developing.  Under such conditions, eliminating or even reducing the uncertainty buffers built into catch limits could cause long-term harm to fish stocks.

Yet, pursuant to the latest executive order, such a thing could easily occur.

And while any fish stock could be affected, the executive order instructs agency management to focus on “the most heavily overregulated fisheries.”  It’s darkly entertaining to speculate about just what those fisheries might be, as it’s difficult to find a commercial fishermen who, to a greater or lesser degree, doesn’t feel that their own fishery is overregulated.

New England groundfishermen have historically fought back hard against any threat of regulation; despite the dire condition of cod stocks, they’re still putting up a struggle in their efforts to catch the last one.  Many New England fishermen were also staunch Trump supporters ahead of the 2024 election, so it’s not impossible that they might earn the coveted “most heavily overregulated” designation.

The pelagic longline fleet, much of which is also based in New England, could be another contender for the title.  For many years, it has had to take steps to reduce its once-notorious bycatch of various sharks, sea turtles, marine mammals, billfish, and other creatures, all of which supposedly reduced its landings of target species while increasing fleet expenses.  Regulatory changes, which impact not only the fishermen and their target fish species, but also marine mammals and other endangered species, could put bycatch concerns on the back burner and allow longliners to fish without worries again.

Other commercial fisheries will almost certainly seek to qualify, and many could  probably make as good a case as the New England groundfishermen or the longliners might.  There is little doubt that the effort to be named “most heavily overregulated” will be intense.

Yet, when discussing the executive order, it’s important to note that only commercial, and not recreational, fisheries are considered. 

Were recreational fisheries omitted through oversight?  Will another executive order addressing only recreational fisheries be forthcoming?  Or is it just possible that commercial landings might be increased by reducing recreational harvest?

It’s more plausible than it might at first appear.

After all, fisheries management is, in the end, a zero-sum game.  In most federally-managed fisheries, landings are split between the commercial and recreational sectors; increasing one sector’s share of a fishery’s landings inevitably means reducing the share of the other. 

Thus, with a species’ biology strictly limiting the overall number of fish that might be sustainably landed, the simplest way to increase commercial fishermen's landings is to increase the amount of fish allocated to the commercial fishery, while making a corresponding reduction to the recreational allocation.  While such a change wouldn’t be too popular with the angling public, and might even cause a net reduction in the economic benefits provided by a particular fishery, it would certainly be in accord with the plain language of the executive order, which doesn’t mention recreational fisheries at all.

And it might be the only way to meaningfully increase commercial landings that doesn’t result in overfishing, or cause a stock to become overfished.  In fact, because commercial fishermen must typically adhere to hard-poundage quotas, while anglers are only expected to stay somewhat close to largely aspirational recreational harvest limits—one management plan created by the Mid-AtlanticFishery Management Council even allows anglers to routinely exceed such limits without meaningful consequences—a reallocation of fish from the recreational to the commercial sector could conceivably lead to a substantial increase in commercial landings while, by placing greater restrictions on the recreational fishery, causing overall landings to modestly decline.

It's extremely doubtful that the executive order was intended to cause such a result; nevertheless, such result would certainly be in accord with that order’s explicit goals.

Certainly, last week’s executive order could have consequences beyond those contemplated herein.  The direction to open national marine monuments to commercial fishing could support an essay in itself.  But whatever the consequences of the executive order may be, once they begin to accrue, we can expect them to endure, unlike the administration that spawned them, for far more than just four years.

 

 

 

 

IS IT TIME TO CONSIDER RECREATIONAL STRIPED BASS TAGS?

 

NOTE:  The inspiration for today's essay comes from a veteran fisheries biologist, with whom I correspond from time to time.  He recently raised the idea, and the more that I thought about it, the more sense that it seemed to make.  Yet, while the original idea wasn’t mine, please understand that a number of the ideas presented below are products of my own speculation, and shouldn’t be blamed on anyone else.

Anyone who has listened to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Atlantic Striped Bass Management Board debate the possible parameters of the proposed Addendum III to Amendment 7 to the Interstate Fisheries Management Plan for Atlantic Striped Bass, or who may have sat in on recent meetings of the Plan Development Team charged with preparing the first draft of such Addendum, has probably come to recognize the limits of traditional recreational management tools—size limits, bag limits, and seasons—when it comes to addressing the current state of the striped bass stock.

The recreational bag limit in every state and in every bay and sound has already been reduced to just one fish; it is impossible to go any lower.  And it’s very difficult to accomplish further meaningful reductions, at least in the coastal, or what managers deem the “ocean,” fishery with any imaginable size limit.  Recent Plan Development Team meetings have revealed that the 36-inch minimum size, often suggested by anglers who lived through the last stock collapse and successful rebuilding, would actually increase striped bass removals by 10% in 2026.  It would take a 40-inch minimum size to achieve a 5% reduction, and the only thing that would reduce coastal recreational removals by 7%--which is what managers believe would be needed to achieve a 60% probability that the stock will be rebuilt by 2029, as the management plan requires—is a 37- to 40-inch slot, something that no one seems too ready to implement.

That leaves only seasons to get the work done, and while there are combinations of seasonal closures that would reduce recreational removals by 7% or more, no one is particularly in love with any of them.  Any closure would have a bigger impact on a short-season state like Maine than it would in New Jersey, where bass are, to at least some extent, available for 10 months of the year.  Closed seasons—particularly those that would prohibit anglers from even targeting striped bass in a catch-and-release fishery—could be reasonably set to achieve the needed reductions in the northeast and upper Mid-Atlantic without too much disruption, but in the lower Mid-Atlantic, the ocean fishery is so small that even closing it for an entire two-month “wave” wouldn’t reduce removals by 7%.

And, of course, not everyone supports “no-target” reductions.  Most anglers and for-hires specializing in light-tackle fishing don’t like them, because they won’t allow any bass fishing at all, while law enforcement discourages no-target closures because they’re just about impossible to effectively enforce.  On the other hand, traditional “six-pack” for hires, which generally engage in a catch-and-keep fishery, support the idea, because any no-target closures would be shorter than those merely outlawing harvest, and would allow the six-packs to return to their business of killing striped bass in the shortest possible time.

To date, the difficulty of devising “fair” seasons that treat all states and all stakeholders in a reasonably equitable manner has caused striped bass conservation efforts to stall.

Striped bass tags, which all anglers would be required to affix to any bass that they retained, immediately upon capture, could break the current stalemate and jumpstart conservation efforts.

The tag concept certainly isn’t new.  Currently, all commercially-caught striped bass must be tagged, usually upon capture, although Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina permit tagging at the point of first sale.  New Jersey, which has outlawed commercial striped bass fishing and uses its commercial quota to provide “bonus” bass for recreational fishermen, has issued “bonus tags” to its anglers for many years.

Other states have used tags to control landings of other species for many years.  In Texas, recreational red drum are subject to a slot size limit of 20 to 28 inches.  However, anglers receive a Red Drum Bonus Tag that allows them to retain one “bull” drum, a fish  more than 28 inches long, when they purchase their fishing license, and may purchase a second such tag each year if they choose to do so.  Not everyone does.

While there are certainly some details that would require real thought before they were worked out, the basic parameters of a tag-based recreational striped bass management program would fairly easy to set. 

The current 1-fish bag limit and current slot sizes for the coast and the Chesapeake Bay, as well as for the specially-regulated fisheries in the Hudson River and in portions of the Delaware River and Delaware Bay, would remain in place.  Any further reductions in recreational fishing mortality would be achieved by limiting the number of striped bass tags issued in each state.

The ASMFC’s Striped Bass Technical Committee would begin the process by estimating the number of slot-sized striped bass that could be caught and still constrain fishing mortality to or below the fishing mortality target (with release mortality and commercial quota also a part of that calculation).  With that estimate in hand, managers would determine how many striped bass tags could be issued to anglers in order to approach, but not exceed, the fishing mortality target.

The initial estimates of how many tags to issue would be a little rough, as managers recognize that not every tag will be filled.  To account for unfilled tags, states would issue more tags than the number of bass to be removed, just as is done with commercial tags today.  In the beginning, managers would have to be conservative with the number of tags issued, to avoid overages.  But after the system was in place for a few years, they would gain some idea of how many unused tags would likely be left at the end of the year, and could fine-tune the number authorized.

States could then be given an initial allocation of tags, based on the proportion of bass landed in their state in recent years compared to the number landed coastwide.  Allocations could also consider the coastal and Chesapeake Bay fisheries separately, with the number of tags available in each fishery tailored to size/year class abundance.  For example, given the six consecutive years of poor spawns in the Chesapeake Bay, if a recreational tag program was already in place, the Technical Committee might advise, if it saw fit, that Chesapeake jurisdictions issue fewer tags for Bay anglers than would otherwise be the case, to help assure that a larger percentage of the smaller year classes might eventually enter the spawning stock.

With the allocations set, anglers would then be able to purchase their striped bass tags.  Every East Coast state already has some sort of saltwater licensing system for its anglers (although, in New York and New Jersey, it’s called a “registration” and costs the angler nothing).  Thus, anglers who wanted striped bass tags could merely order, and pay for, such tags at the same time that they obtained their license.  The cost of the tags would be set by each state, as it deemed appropriate, and could be set high enough to fully fund the costs of the tag program.  Such an approach that would seem very familiar to many East Coast sportsmen who also hunt, and already follow a similar procedure to purchase tags to harvest big game and turkeys.

Of course, unlike big game, where harvest is often limited to one animal per year, anglers would probably be able to obtain more than one striped bass tag, to allow them to retain multiple fish each season.  To accommodate anglers who wish to keep more than one bass each year, while best assuring that every angler who wants to purchase a tag can get at least one, states would probably have to restrict the initial purchase a limited number of tags, and then allow anglers to purchase additional tags after they had reported their landings from the initial purchase to state managers.

And yes, the mandatory reporting of all striped bass caught would provide each state’s fisheries managers with a better idea of when and where fish were being caught in their waters than does the current Marine Recreational Information Program, which can only survey a limited number of anglers and isn’t intended to provide detailed catch information.

It seems like a simple, effective approach to striped bass management that would function well in a perfect world but, unfortunately, this world is far from perfect.  If a tag-based system was proposed, problems would inevitably arise.  Perhaps foremost among them would be how to address fish caught by anglers fishing from for-hire vessels.

In many—I’m guessing most—states along the striper coast, anglers fishing from party and charter boats don’t have to purchase individual fishing licenses; instead, a license purchased in the name of the for-hire vessel covers all of the boat’s customers.  Thus, striped bass tags would have to be purchased by the vessel, rather than by the anglers on board.

But there, too, the problem shouldn’t be insurmountable.

Just as states could receive an allocation of tags based on each state’s contribution to the overall catch, each state could create a pool of tags reserved for the for-hire fleet, based on that fleet’s landings when compared to overall state landings.  Then, because for-hire vessels are required to file daily vessel trip reports that provide a detailed accounting of a boat’s landings, it would be a simple thing to apportion out the for-hire tags based on each vessel’s share of the reported landings.  Should any vessel decide not to purchase tags that it was eligible to buy, such tags could be assigned to a general pool, that any for-hire boat might purchase once it had provided a full accounting of tags already used.

Such an approach would largely maintain the status quo between the for-hire fleet and private anglers, and between vessels within the for-hire fleet.  But it would also provide opportunities for experimentation with new ideas.

For a number of years, the for-hire fleet has been promoting the concept of sector separation.  That is, special rules for customers aboard their boats that would allow such customers to take more or smaller fish than allowed to the great majority of anglers, or fish when the season is closed to everyone else.  A striped bass tag might allow managers to experiment with such an approach, at least with respect to the bag limit.  

Managers could, for example, allow for-hire anglers a second bass, which would require the vessel they fished from to utilize a second tag for the same customer.  In such a situation, each for-hire operator would be able to make the simple business decision of restricting passengers to one fish per trip, so that the boat could carry passengers for a longer period of time, or allowing passengers to take a second fish and utilize a second tag, which might attract more anglers to that particular boat, but allow it to fish for a shorter period of time.

Whether the additional passengers attracted to the boat justified the shorter season is something that each vessel owner could independently decide.

The other big issue complicating tag use is compliance.  A tag system would only work if anglers affixed the tag when a bass is retained, and didn’t let fish remain untagged until a law enforcement officer appeared on the scene.  An angler engaged in the latter behavior could potentially take multiple bass over a span of days, even if only a single tag was purchased.

Poaching is already a significant problem in the recreational striped bass fishery, with far too many anglers willing to take undersized, oversized, over-limit, and out-of-season fish.  The question is whether the adoption of a paid-for tag would inspire some, or perhaps many, previously law-abiding anglers to begin disregarding the rules because they resent being assessed a charge to retain a bass.

My gut reaction is that, while most fishermen would obey the law, there would be a substantial minority who resented the fee-based tag, and would try to find ways to take extra fish for each tag purchased.  It’s funny how the same person who thinks nothing of paying $250,000 or, perhaps, quite a bit more for a boat, thousands of dollars on fuel, and run a four- or five-digit fuel bill each year will grow indignant at the idea of having to buy a $10 fishing license; having to pay for a striped bass tag would almost certainly strike such folks in the same way.

But that is an issue for the Management Board to debate, should they ever consider a recreational striped bass tag.  Over all, the issue seems to have merit.  In theory, at least, it would effectively constrain recreational fishing mortality without the need for controversial seasons.  An appropriate charge for each tag would make the program self-funding.  And the entire cost would be paid by people who want to catch and keep a striped bass, without burdening the rest of the angling community.

At this point, I’m not going to say that adopting bass tags is the right way to go.  There are issues that must be considered, and might ultimately militate against such approach.  But it is an approach that the Management Board should at least consider, and one that could provide relief from the current cycle of constantly more restrictive rules.

It is worthy of serious study.

MID-ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND ASMFC ADVANCE PLAN TO SPLIT RECREATIONAL FISHERY

 

On the afternoon of April 9, at a joint meeting of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission’s Interstate Fishery Management Policy Board, fisheries managers voted to move forward with an amendment to the management plans for bluefish, summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass which, if adopted, will grant special privileges to anglers fishing from for-hire vessels, in the form of higher bag limits, lower minimum sizes, and/or longer seasons, while relegating shore-based and private boat anglers to a sort of second-class status.

The effort was a long time in the making.  It arose out of the Mid-Atlantic Council’s “Recreational Reform Initiative,” a multi-year project that the Council describes as

“an effort of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (Council) and the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission) to improve management of the recreational fisheries for summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, and bluefish.

“The goals of the initiative are to (1) provide stability in the recreational bag, size, and season limits, (2) develop strategies to increase management flexibility, and (3) achieve accessibility aligned with availability/stock status for all four species.”

If you think that sounds a lot like the goals set out in the 2014 propaganda piece, "A Vision for Managing America's Saltwater Recreational Fisheries," put out by the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership, with the connivance and active encouragement and support of the recreational fishing and boatbuilding industries,  you’re on the right track.  Like the TRCP’s “Vision,” the Recreational Reform Initiative was an industry-supported effort to sidestep the clear legal requirements and strict scientific standards of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which was intended to allow anglers to kill more fish and, in doing so, generate more profits for the for-hire, boatbuilding, and fishing-tackle industries.

The American Sportfishing Association, the nation’s largest fishing tackle trade association and one of the prime movers behind the TRCP “Vision” document, has no qualms about touting its role in the Mid-Atlantic “reform” initiative, proudly stating that

“The initial focus of the recreational management reform initiative was a suite of harvest control rules (HCR) that incorporate more scientific variables when determining management changes for the recreational fishery than just a comparison between recreational harvest and the harvest limit…

“The American Sportfishing Industry (ASA) has worked for several years with coalition partners and the ASMFC and MAFMC to help advance the HCR approaches to final action and implementation.”

But now, the American Sportfishing Association might find that it shot itself in the foot, as both the Council and ASMFC work toward developing an amendment that will disfavor the shore-based and private boat anglers who, collectively, account for far more fishing trips, and purchase far more fishing equipment, than do those fishing from for-hire boats.

To put the issue in context, for the period 2021-24, shore-based and private boat anglers, fishing between Maine and Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, accounted for 93% of all recreational fishing trips primarily targeting black sea bass, nearly 98% of all directed recreational trips for scup and summer flounder, and more than 99% of all such trips primarily targeting bluefish, thus clearly generating the lion’s share of the social and economic benefits that accrue from such fisheries.  Yet, the Mid-Atlantic Council and the ASMFC seem determined to reduce such anglers’ share of the landings of all four species, so that the handful of anglers fishing from for-hire vessels can take more.

The Council advises that it

“and Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission) Policy Board are developing an amendment to consider modifications to the recreational management program for summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, and bluefish.  Specifically, the amendment may consider options for managing for-hire recreational fisheries separately from other recreational fishing modes (referred to as sector separation)…”

It justifies such amendment by alleging that

“the two sectors have different motivations, preferences, fishing behaviors, operational needs, and data reporting requirements.  Some recreational fishery participants have expressed an interest in recreational sector separation, which would entail managing for-hire and private sectors of the recreational fishery separately.  This could potentially allow managers to better tailor management to the needs and preferences of each sector while allowing for improved utilization of data reported by the for-hire sector.”

However, the Council also recognizes that

“sector separation would also introduce complexity to the management process, and some stakeholders have raised concerns that it could create regulation imbalances and conflict within the recreational fishing community.  Sector separation may also require the use of data that is more uncertain when broken down by sector.”

In truth, sector separation, as it is being pursued in the Mid-Atlantic region, is just one more effort being promoted by the for-hire fleet, which might allow their customers to take home more fish than the regulations currently allow, in the hope that more fish might lead to more customer trips, and help to salvage an industry that has passed its prime, and is now experiencing a slow and probably inevitable decline.

That doesn’t mean that the concept of sector separation is inappropriate under all circumstances.  Back in 2014, the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council adopted Amendment 40 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico, which set up separate sub-allocations, within the overall recreational allocation, for the for-hire and private boat fleets.  That was done because, in the Gulf, the private boat fishery was chronically overfishing the recreational red snapper allocation, causing the federal red snapper season to grow shorter and shorter every year.  And while the federally permitted for-hire boats cold only fish for red snapper while the federal season was open, the private boats could retreat to state waters, where seasons were longer (in Texas, at that time, the season never closed) and continue to overharvest red snapper.  Because federal red snapper management considered landings on a Gulf-wide basis, regardless of whether the fish were caught in state or federal waters, the excessive state-waters landings led to shorter and shorter federal waters seasons, which threatened to put the for-hire boats out of business.

In the Gulf, sector separation was adopted as a way to restore a sort of parity between the for-hire and private boat fleets.

In the Mid-Atlantic, parity already exists, with both for-hire and private vessels fishing under the same set of rules (with the exception of a handful of mostly state regulations that already favor the for-hires).  In the Mid-Atlantic, sector separation would be used to destroy that parity, and grab more fish for the for-hires at the expense of everyone else.

And that’s something that the for-hire fleet doesn’t even try to deny.  At the April 9 meeting, Adam Nowalsky, New Jersey’s legislative proxy at the ASMFC and a long-time advocate for the party and charter boat industry, noted that fisheries management was, in fact, a “zero sum game,” and that any extra fish that might be awarded to for-hire anglers had to be taken away from someone else. 

He went on to argue that there ought to be what he called a “needs analysis” that looked at the needs of anglers belonging to the different modes (shore based, private boat, party boat, and charter boat) with the focus on the anglers themselves.  He noted that the for-hire operators were “more akin” to commercial fishermen, in that commercial fishermen provided fish to the non-fishing public, while the for-hire operators provided access to the fish for the non-boat-owning public,

“who cannot seek out fishing opportunity for themselves.”

His arguments were all valid, as far as they went, but they left out one important point:  There are currently an abundance of for-hire boats based all along the New England and Mid-Atlantic coasts, which provide opportunity for any anglers who choose to patronize them.  If those boats aren’t carrying enough passengers to remain in business, it’s not because anglers don’t have the access or the opportunity to fish, it’s because anglers choose not to take advantage of what the for-hire fleet offers.

Such choice could be made for many reasons.  The boats might cost too much.  They might be too difficult to get to (if you ever tried to drive out to Montauk, New York, particularly on a summer weekend—or, perhaps more importantly, tried to drive home from Montauk on a Saturday or Sunday afternoon, and spent literal hours trying to get through the traffic jams in the various villages that dot Long Island's South Fork, you understand what “difficult to get to” really means). 

The loss of once-abundant fish species may make anglers less willing to spend the time and money on a for-hire trip.  For example, over the last few decades, just here on Long Island, we’ve seen the collapse of the winter flounder stock, which once supported fisheries in the early spring and late fall, when few other fish were available.  We’ve lost the summer cod fishery, which used to see boatloads of anglers catching big fish—a few over 50 pounds—while fishing in their shirtsleeves (we've lost almost all of the winter cod fishery, too, but that came a little bit later).  We’ve lost the winter tautog fishery, and seen the remaining tautog fishery decline significantly since the 1980s, although it’s showing some signs of rebirth.  We’ve lost the May/June pollock fishery at Block Island; and we’ve lost the winter whiting and ling fishery in the New York Bight.

Those losses can't help but hurt the for-hire fleet, even though it routinely campaigns against regulations needed to keep fish stocks healthy.

Angler preferences may have changed.  Night bluefishing used to be very popular, particularly off New Jersey and New York; now almost no boats pursue it.  And anglers may have more attractive fishing platforms available to them today.  When I was a boy, the wooden, 14-foot Old Town rowboat was probably the most popular fishing vessel, and even when I entered my 20s, most middle-class anglers operated relatively modest outboards that limited them to fishing inshore waters.  Today, boat ownership is more common, and many anglers of even modest means operate, or have friends who operate, very capable vessels, reducing their need to  pay for a for-hire trip if they want to venture onto the sea. 

Angling, like many outdoor activities, is also becoming less popular with younger people, who prefer more social activities, often conducted indoors.  That means that fewer families consider making a for-hire trip when they plan a family outing.  Even if a family might want to make such a trip, the atmosphere on many of today’s boats is not very family friendly.  When I was just six or seven years old, my parents thought nothing of taking me out on a New England party boat, but if the clientele on the boats back then was like it is on some boats today, such that captains are afraid to look into a customer’s cooler to count the catch because they’re worried about becoming the victims of violence, I suspect that my family, too, would have sought a different source of entertainment.

But the for-hire fleet tends to put all the blame for their troubles on needed regulations—which have undoubtedly dissuaded some harvest-oriented anglers from fishing—and argue that sector separation, that gifts them more liberal rules, is needed to save an industry which, with a business plan dating back to before the Second World War may, like American Motors, Sears Roebuck, and F.W. Woolworth, just be dying of obsolescence and old age brought on by a failure to change with the times.

Although Capt. Rick Bellavance, President of the Rhode Island Party and Charter Boat Association, noted at the April 9 meeting that sector separation had “a lot of support” in Rhode Island, what he didn’t acknowledge was that such support, not only in Rhode Island but elsewhere along the coast, is largely limited to members of the for-hire fishery (which is natural, for who wouldn’t want to be on the receiving end of a few additional fish?).   

But the comments received during the scoping process for the sector separation amendment tell a more complete story.  Over all, the Council received 124 written comments addressing sector separation, and another 53 comments were made (including some by the same people) at hearings held at five different locations along the coast.  Of the total comments received, opinions were about evenly split, with 78 commenters supporting sector separation, and 75 opposed. 

The next question was who supported and opposed the sector separation proposal.

That question was answered at the April 9 meeting, when Council staff put up a slide showing that of 110 written comments (it’s not clear why all 124 weren’t counted, unless the other 14 addressed issues other than sector separation, which isn't unlikely) 49 supported sector separation and 61 did not.  Of the 49 comments supporting sector separation, 37 were submitted by for-hire operators or related organizations, just 4 were sent in by anglers, 2 by “other” organizations and 6 by persons of unknown affiliation.  On the other hand, of the 61 comments opposing sector separation, 37 came from private anglers or related organizations, 2 from for-hire fishermen, 2 from commercial fishermen, and another 20 from parties whose sector affiliation was unknown.

So, in the end, sector separation was very strongly supported by the for-hire operators, who were responsible for about 2.3% of all trips that primarily targeted summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, or bluefish over the past four years, and very opposed by the shore-based and private boat anglers, who paid for and benefitted from the other 97.7% of the trips.

That, in itself, might have been enough to doom sector separation in some people’s minds, but it was clear that the Council and Management Board were going to, at the least, compose a draft amendment that will be released for additional public comment.  So the next thing they needed to contemplate was what that amendment was going to say.

At that point, New Jersey’s Nowalski made a motion to include “mode management” in the draft. 

“Mode management” would allow both for-hire and private anglers to be included in the same allocation of fish.  That way, the extra fish given to the for-hire mode would be taken directly away from everyone else, and if the more relaxed for-hire regulations resulted in a significant overage, the ensuing accountability measures would apply to the shore-based and private boat anglers, too, even if they didn’t contribute to the overage at all.

The alternative to “mode management” is true sector separation, in which the current recreational allocation for each species is split into two separate allocations, one for the for-hire fleet, one for all of the other anglers.  That way, if either the for-hires or the shore based and private boat anglers exceeds their allocation, only the responsible sector would be held accountable.  So long as the allocations were based on what each sector caught in the recent past, such sector separation wouldn’t result in the for-hires taking fish away from anyone; they would have to structure their separate regulations in a way that would keep them from exceeding their landings target each year.

Thus, mode management would allow the for-hire fleet to benefit from more relaxed regulations and additional fish, without having to accept any additional responsibility or regulatory burden, so it was no surprise that they favored such an approach.  Since Nowalsky's motion was only made for the ASMFC, Greg Hueth, a New Jersey party boat captain, made the same motion for the Council to consider.

Fortunately, other people had other ideas.  Michael Luisi, a Maryland fisheries managers, offered a substitute motion for both the ASMFC and the Council:

“Move to substitute to direct the [Fishery Management Action Team]/[Plan Development Team] to further develop issue 1, recreational sector separation with all approaches described in the document.  [emphasis added]”

Nowalsky predictably spoke against the motion to substitute, admitting that the intent of his original motion was to keep separate allocations and separate annual catch limits for the for-hires and for the rest—the great majority—of anglers out of future discussions.  He noted that a majority of the public comments made with respect to the issue supported mode management, although he failed to note that the vast majority of those comments came from the for-hire sector.  And he expressed concern that looking at the separate allocation issue would take additional time.

Michael Pentony, the National Marine Fisheries Service’s Regional Administrator for the Greater Atlantic Regional Fisheries Office, said that he would have supported the mode management motion, but was concerned that putting separate allocations on the table could draw out discussions, because allocation debates were historically “challenging,” while Anna Beckwith, a Council member from North Carolina, conceded that the managers would probably end up choosing mode management, but still wanted to see a complete analysis of the possible options.

When the vote was finally taken, the motion to substitute was narrowly approved by the Council on a 10 to 8 vote.  It found somewhat better support at the ASMFC, with 11 members voting in favor, including Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, the Potomac River Fisheries Commission, Virginia, and North Carolina, and 6—Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and NMFS—voting against.  After that, it easily won final approval, with a 17 to 1 vote at the Council and a 14 to 3 vote at the ASMFC, where only South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida remained opposed.

With the Council and ASMFC having responded to the scoping comments, it is now the duty of the two organizations’ staffs to compose a draft amendment, which will be reviewed and modified by both the Council and ASMFC at their August and December meetings.  At some point in early 2026, a final draft of the amendment will be approved for release and public comment, which will occur during the spring and/or summer of that year.  Assuming that managers decide to move forward with a final amendment, that document will be approved in the second half of 2026, and referred to NMFS for approval, with the final implementing regulations issued in the first half of 2027.

What will the final outcome be?  While it’s still too early to make any accurate predictions, the Council and ASMFC will probably adopt a mode-based management system that allows the for-hire fleet to take fish from the rest of the angling population, without holding that fleet accountable for any overages that such system might cause.  Instead, all anglers will be held collectively responsible for any excess landings attributable to the for-hire boats. 

While that might seem inequitable, it is a nearly inevitable outcome when the deck is stacked against the shore-based and private boat anglers who, despite their dominance of the recreational fishery, don’t hold a single recreational seat on the Mid-Atlantic Council.  For when the for-hire fleet holds all of the cards—and the recreational fishing industry controls all the recreational seats—it’s a near-certain bet that the majority of anglers aren’t really in the game at all, and are just being set up to lose.